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ABSTRACT 
The Mirai botnet deploys a distributed mechanism with each Bot continually scanning for a 
potential new Bot Victim.  A Bot continually generates a random IP address to scan the 
network for discovering a potential new Bot Victim.  The Bot establishes a connection with 
the potential new Bot Victim with a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) handshake.  The 
Mirai botnet has recruited hundreds of thousands of Bots.  With 100,000 Bots, Mirai 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on service provider Dyn in October 2016 
triggered the inaccessibility to hundreds of websites in Europe and North America (Sinanović 
& Mrdovic, 2017).  A month before the Dyn attack, the source code was released publicly on 
the Internet and Mirai spread to half a million bots.  Hackers offered Mirai botnets for rent 
with 400,000 Bots.  Recent research has suggested network signatures for Mirai detection.   
Network signatures are suggested to detect a Bot brute forcing a new Bot Victim with a 
factory default user-id and password.  Research has not been focused on the Bot scanning 
mechanism.  The focus of this research is performing experimentation to analyze the Bot 
scanning mechanism for when a Bot attempts to establish a connection to a potential new Bot 
Victim with a TCP handshake.  The thesis is presented: it is possible to develop a solution 
that can analyze network traffic to identify a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  
The three research questions are (a) Can the Bots be identified for summation? (b) Can the 
potential new Bot Victims be identified for summation? (c) Is it possible to monitor the Bot 
scanning mechanism over time?  The research questions support the thesis.  The Design 
Science Research (DSR) methodology is followed for designing and evaluating the solution 
presented in this study.  The original Mirai Bot code is used as a research data source to 
perform a Bot scanner code review.  A dataset containing Bot scanning network activity, 
recorded by the University of Southern California (USC), is utilized as the research data 
source for experimentation performed with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
solution.  The Bot scanner code review is performed to identify the Bot scanning functionality 
and network communications with a potential new Bot Victim.   A sampling from the Bot 
scanning dataset is confirmed from the analysis performed by the code review.   The solution 
 v
created in this study, the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype, evaluates a Bot scanning 
dataset.  Researchers can use the prototype to tabulate the number of Mirai Bots, the number 
of potential new Bot Victims, as well as the number of network packet types associated with a 
Bot attempting to connect to a potential new Bot Victim.  Using a database, permanent 
storage is utilized for counting Bots, potential new Bot Victims, and network packet types.  
Reporting as well as line-graphs is provided for assessing the Bot scanning mechanism over a 
time period.  Single case experimentation performed with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype provides answers to the research questions (a) Bots are identified for summation; 
(b) Potential new Bot Victims are identified for summation; (c) the Bot scanner is monitored 
over time.  A comparison to a NIDS solution highlights the advantages of the prototype for 
summating and assessing the Bot scanning dataset.  Experimentation with the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype and NIDS verifies it is possible to develop a solution that can 
analyze network traffic to identify a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  Future 
research could include adding the additional functionality to the Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype for evaluating a Bot scanner dataset for non-potential Bot Victims.          
 vi
DECLARATION 
I hereby certify that this dissertation constitutes my own product, that where the 
language of others is set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and that appropriate credit is given 
where I have used the language, ideas, expressions or writings of another. 
I declare that the dissertation describes original work that has not previously been 
presented for the award of any other degree of any institution. 
 
 
Signed,  
 
_____________________________ 
Charles V. Frank Jr. 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
MIRAI BOT SCANNER SUMMATION PROTOTYPE ..................................................................... I 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL FORM ................................................................................................II 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ...................................................................................................................... III 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................................... IV 
DECLARATION .................................................................................................................................. VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................... VII 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................... XII 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................... XIII 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1 
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM ........................................................................................................... 3 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................................................................... 5 
STATEMENT OF THE PURPOSE ................................................................................................................ 6 
THESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ...................................................................................................... 7 
Bots identified. ................................................................................................................................. 8 
Potential new Bot Victims identified. ............................................................................................... 9 
Bot scanning mechanism monitored ................................................................................................ 9 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................. 10 
REPOSITORY OF CODE ......................................................................................................................... 12 
Prototype folder ............................................................................................................................. 13 
Splunk folder .................................................................................................................................. 14 
Suricata folder ............................................................................................................................... 14 
RATIONALE AND SIGNIFICANCE ........................................................................................................... 15 
ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ........................................................................................................ 17 
Assumptions ................................................................................................................................... 17 
Limitations ..................................................................................................................................... 17 
KEY TERMS ......................................................................................................................................... 17 
NATURE OF THE STUDY ....................................................................................................................... 19 
SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 20 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION ................................................................................................ 21 
LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................................................... 22 
 viii
DDOS ATTACK SURVEY ...................................................................................................................... 22 
Attack timeline................................................................................................................................ 23 
Attack classification ....................................................................................................................... 24 
Flooding attacks ........................................................................................................................................ 25 
Software attacks ........................................................................................................................................ 26 
Mirai attack types ........................................................................................................................... 26 
Defense strategies .......................................................................................................................... 27 
Recent enterprise impact ................................................................................................................ 27 
DDoS attack summary ................................................................................................................... 28 
MIRAI AND VARIANTS ......................................................................................................................... 29 
Initial Mirai attacks ....................................................................................................................... 29 
Mirai source code publicly released .............................................................................................. 29 
Mirai spreading mechanism ........................................................................................................... 30 
Mirai for rent ................................................................................................................................. 30 
Prominent Dyn attack .................................................................................................................... 31 
Bitcoin miner variant ..................................................................................................................... 32 
Satori variants ................................................................................................................................ 32 
Mirai and variants summary .......................................................................................................... 33 
MIRAI COMPONENTS ........................................................................................................................... 33 
Operation and communication steps .............................................................................................. 34 
Bot malware ................................................................................................................................... 37 
Malware attack module ............................................................................................................................. 37 
Malware killer module .............................................................................................................................. 37 
Malware scanner module .......................................................................................................................... 37 
Bot scanner statistics ..................................................................................................................... 38 
Mirai components summary ........................................................................................................... 38 
MIRAI MITIGATION .............................................................................................................................. 39 
Weak passwords ............................................................................................................................. 39 
Cataloguing vulnerable IoT devices .............................................................................................. 40 
Inoculation ..................................................................................................................................... 40 
Protecting IoT devices from infection ............................................................................................ 40 
Network traffic analysis ................................................................................................................. 41 
Mirai mitigation summary .............................................................................................................. 42 
NETWORK TRAFFIC ANALYSIS SOLUTIONS ......................................................................................... 43 
Packet sniffers ................................................................................................................................ 43 
Network intrusion detection systems .............................................................................................. 44 
Network traffic analysis solutions summary .................................................................................. 45 
CHAPTER SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 46 
 ix
METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................ 47 
RESEARCH METHOD JUSTIFICATION .................................................................................................... 47 
RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH APPROACH .............................................................................................. 48 
Problem identification .................................................................................................................... 49 
Requirements specification ............................................................................................................ 49 
Design work ................................................................................................................................... 53 
Summation ................................................................................................................................................ 54 
Persistent database .................................................................................................................................... 57 
Assessment ............................................................................................................................................... 58 
Artifacts .......................................................................................................................................... 62 
Evaluation ...................................................................................................................................... 63 
Communication .............................................................................................................................. 63 
Rationale for research approach summary .................................................................................... 63 
RESEARCH DATA SOURCES ................................................................................................................. 63 
Required research data sources ..................................................................................................... 64 
Mirai program code .................................................................................................................................. 64 
Bot scanning network dataset ................................................................................................................... 65 
Research data sources summary .................................................................................................... 65 
DATA ANALYSIS METHODS ................................................................................................................. 66 
Code review ................................................................................................................................... 66 
Bot scanning network dataset ........................................................................................................ 68 
Sample network packet analysis ..................................................................................................... 69 
Performing experimentation .......................................................................................................... 70 
Data analysis methods summary .................................................................................................... 71 
LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS...................................................................................................... 71 
Delimitations .................................................................................................................................. 71 
Limitations ..................................................................................................................................... 72 
CHAPTER SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 72 
EXPERIMENTATION ......................................................................................................................... 73 
BOT SCANNER CODE REVIEW .............................................................................................................. 74 
Scanner initialization ..................................................................................................................... 74 
Random IP address ........................................................................................................................ 81 
Bot scanner code review summary ................................................................................................. 82 
BOT SCANNING SAMPLE NETWORK PACKET ANALYSIS ...................................................................... 82 
Sample PCAP file ........................................................................................................................... 83 
SYN packet ..................................................................................................................................... 84 
Retransmission packet .................................................................................................................... 85 
 x
Bot scanning network packet analysis summary ............................................................................ 86 
MIRAI BOT SCANNER SUMMATION PROTOTYPE CODE REVIEW .......................................................... 87 
Summation ...................................................................................................................................... 88 
Assessment ..................................................................................................................................... 93 
Prototype code review summary .................................................................................................... 98 
SINGLE CASE EXPERIMENTATION ........................................................................................................ 98 
Persistent database ........................................................................................................................ 98 
Assessment automation .................................................................................................................. 99 
Reporting assessment ................................................................................................................... 101 
Graphical Assessment .................................................................................................................. 105 
Single case experimentation summary ......................................................................................... 108 
PROTOTYPE SOLUTION COMPARISON ................................................................................................ 109 
NIDS evaluation ........................................................................................................................... 109 
PCAP conversion .................................................................................................................................... 110 
Bot scanning signature ............................................................................................................................ 111 
Alert log configuration ............................................................................................................................ 112 
Generating alerts from dataset ................................................................................................................ 112 
Indexing alert log .................................................................................................................................... 113 
NIDS reports and charts .............................................................................................................. 113 
Searching for bot totals ........................................................................................................................... 113 
Searching for network packet totals ........................................................................................................ 116 
Searching for potential new Bot Victim subnets ..................................................................................... 118 
Prototype comparison with NIDS solution ................................................................................... 120 
Methods comparison ............................................................................................................................... 120 
Performance comparison ........................................................................................................................ 121 
Bot scanning results comparison ............................................................................................................. 122 
Prototype solution comparison summary ..................................................................................... 126 
CHAPTER SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... 127 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 128 
OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................................................... 128 
CONTRIBUTIONS ................................................................................................................................ 129 
FINDINGS ........................................................................................................................................... 130 
Bots identified .............................................................................................................................. 132 
Potential new Bot Victims identified ............................................................................................ 132 
Bot scanning mechanism monitored ............................................................................................ 132 
LIMITATIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 133 
FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................................................................................................... 134 
 xi
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................... 136 
 
 xii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype Functional Requirements ............. 49 
Table 2 Bot Scanner Summation Prototype Nonfunctional Properties ....................... 51 
Table 3 Additional Tool Requirements ........................................................................ 53 
Table 4 Pandas DataFrame Summation Results ......................................................... 57 
Table 5 Summation Database Table Fields ................................................................. 58 
Table 6 Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype Python Scripts ............................... 62 
Table 7 Detail and Summary Functions ...................................................................... 93 
Table 8 Graphical Functions ....................................................................................... 95 
Table 9 Method for NIDS Evaluation ........................................................................ 110 
Table 10 Splunk Bot Total Report Sample ................................................................. 114 
Table 11 Splunk Network Packet Totals Report Sample ............................................ 117 
Table 12 Splunk Subnet Report Sample ..................................................................... 119 
Table 13 Methods Comparison .................................................................................. 120 
Table 14 Performance Comparison ........................................................................... 121 
Table 15 Solution Totals Comparison ....................................................................... 123 
Table 16 Tshark Packet Comparison ......................................................................... 124 
 xiii
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Dyn attack heat map. .................................................................................... 31 
Figure 2. Mirai operation and communication. ........................................................... 35 
Figure 3. Network patterns between the loader and the new Bot Victim. ................... 42 
Figure 4. Mira Bot Scanner Summation Prototype architectural components. ........... 54 
Figure 5. Summation algorithm. .................................................................................. 56 
Figure 6. Assessment reporting algorithm. .................................................................. 59 
Figure 7. Assessment graphing algorithm. .................................................................. 61 
Figure 8. Sublime text editor. ...................................................................................... 67 
Figure 9. Tail end of Bot scanner code. ....................................................................... 67 
Figure 10. Example of a daily packet capture. ............................................................ 68 
Figure 11. Analyzing a PCAP file with Wireshark. .................................................... 69 
Figure 12. Analysis of retransmission packet with Wireshark. ................................... 70 
Figure 13. Assign random IP address to IP header. ..................................................... 75 
Figure 14. Assign TCP header destination. ................................................................. 76 
Figure 15. Read packets from raw socket and verify IP header. ................................. 77 
Figure 16. Verify TCP header. .................................................................................... 78 
Figure 17. Connection table parameters. ..................................................................... 79 
Figure 18. Setup connection module. .......................................................................... 80 
Figure 19. Get random IP address. .............................................................................. 81 
Figure 20. 2016-11-20.pcap file analysis. ................................................................... 84 
Figure 21. SYN packet. ............................................................................................... 85 
Figure 22. TCP retransmission packet. ........................................................................ 86 
Figure 23. Gathering the packet source and destination IPs. ....................................... 88 
Figure 24. Determining the Bots and potential new Bot Victims................................ 89 
Figure 25. Totals inserted into MongoDB. .................................................................. 91 
Figure 26.  PCAP processing time. .............................................................................. 91 
 xiv
Figure 27. Process PCAP files. .................................................................................... 92 
Figure 28. Dataset details. ........................................................................................... 94 
Figure 29. Bot totals graph function. ........................................................................... 96 
Figure 30. Creating the line graph for the number of Bots. ......................................... 96 
Figure 31. Creating the line graph for number of potential new Bot Victims. ............ 97 
Figure 32. Persistent database contents. ...................................................................... 99 
Figure 33. Functions for answering the research questions. ...................................... 100 
Figure 34. Main driver for answering the research questions. .................................. 101 
Figure 35. Dataset details example. ........................................................................... 102 
Figure 36. Dataset verification from MongoDB Daily_PCAP table. ........................ 102 
Figure 37. Dataset summary for all PCAP files. ....................................................... 104 
Figure 38. Dataset summary for a certain date range. ............................................... 106 
Figure 39. Packet totals line graph. ........................................................................... 106 
Figure 40. Bots line graph. ........................................................................................ 107 
Figure 41. Potential new Bot Victims line graph. ..................................................... 108 
Figure 42. PCAP conversion function. ...................................................................... 111 
Figure 43. Bot scanning signature. ............................................................................ 111 
Figure 44. Suricata alert log configuration. ............................................................... 112 
Figure 45. Suricata command line options. ............................................................... 112 
Figure 46. Splunk alert log index. ............................................................................. 113 
Figure 47. Splunk Bot totals search. .......................................................................... 114 
Figure 48. Splunk Bot totals line graph. .................................................................... 115 
Figure 49. Splunk Bot totals column chart. ............................................................... 115 
Figure 50. Splunk search for packet totals. ............................................................... 116 
Figure 51. Splunk packet totals line graph. ............................................................... 117 
Figure 52. Splunk packet totals column chart. .......................................................... 118 
Figure 53. Splunk search from victim subnets. ......................................................... 119 
Figure 54. Tshark SYN packet summation. ............................................................... 124 
Figure 55. Tshark retransmission packet summation. ............................................... 124 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, the term Internet of Things (IoT) was proposed by Kevin Ashton to describe 
how the physical world is connected to the Internet thru sensors (Gupta, Mudgal, & Mehta, 
2016).  The definition of IoT has garnered a great deal of attention, with numerous standards 
bodies and researchers posting different definitions (James A. Jerkins & Stupiansky, 2018).  
(Minerva, Bir, & Rotondl, 2015) study definitions for IoT.  Minerva et al. (2015) state, 
“Different definitions and architectural models for IoT reflect different perspectives and 
support different business interests.” (p. 7).  A common thread among all definitions is that 
IoT devices have the ability to collect and process information and communicate over the 
Internet (James A. Jerkins & Stupiansky, 2018).  The Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE), the world’s largest technical professional organization dedicated to 
advancing technology for the benefit of humanity, defines IoT as, 
 
a self-configuring, adaptive, complex network that interconnects ’things’ to the 
Internet through the use of standard communication protocols. The things offer 
services, with or without human intervention, through the exploitation of unique 
identification, data capture and communication, and actuation capability. The service 
is exploited through the use of intelligent interfaces and is made available anywhere, 
anytime, and for anything taking security into consideration. (Minerva et al., p. 74). 
 
 Current research is focused on securing IoT devices (Frank, Nance, Jarocki, & Pauli, 
2017).  Frank et al. (2017) estimate there are currently 15 billion Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices. By 2020, the estimate is projected to be as high as 50 billion IoT devices.  Recent 
research conducted by the authors (Aman, Chua, & Sikdar, 2017) study trusting the data 
originating from IoT.  With the rapid growing number of IoT devices deployed for smart 
cities, smart homes, smart hospital care, smart vehicles, and etc., the amount of data and the 
sensitivity of the data collected make the IoT devices prime targets for cyber-attacks.  
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Emphasized by IoT security researchers Aman et al. (2017), main security challenges faced 
by IoT include authentication, data integrity, data provenance, privacy, and access control.  
Authentication refers to the validation of the IoT device.  Data integrity refers to the accuracy 
and consistency of the data collected via the IoT device.  Data provenance is concerned with 
the historical record of the data and its origin.  In context of this study, privacy refers to 
protecting the exposure of sensitive information collected from the IoT device.  Access 
control refers to the authorizations assigned to the users of the IoT device.  Emerging 
technologies such as blockchain and Software Defined Networks (SDNs), are possible 
security solutions for IoT (Mohan et al., 2018).   
IoT systems, such as smart vehicles, must be concerned with securing the IoT devices 
that comprise the system and must be concerned with protection from un-authorized access.  
If the IoT devices allow for un-authorized access, then the IoT devices are vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks and the IoT system as a whole could become compromised.  Recent research 
focuses on the security vulnerabilities of a smart car (Park et al., 2016).  Sniffing the 
communication between the smart car and the cloud, the authors Park et al. (2016) analyzed 
that dash cam communication is not encrypted.  Communication between the dash cam and 
the cloud revealed a packet is being sent with the factory default “admin” user- id and 
“000000” password.  Concerning factory default credential settings, J. A. Jerkins et al. (2018) 
explain,  
 
One of the most frequently exploited design flaws in IoT devices is embedding default 
credentials into the device’s firmware so that the owner cannot restrict remote access 
by changing or removing the credentials. (“IoT insecurity”, para. 1).  
 
On October 2016 the Mirai botnet executed a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack against service provider Dyn that took down hundreds of websites (Kolias, 
Kambourakis, Stavrou, & Voas, 2017).  An IoT botnet is a collection of compromised IoT 
devices, infected with malware, typically for executing DDoS attacks (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 
2017).  Mirai deploys a distributed spreading mechanism where Bots spread to webcams, 
DVRs, and routers with factory default user-ids and passwords (Kolias et al., 2017).  Recent 
research has suggested network signatures for detecting the spreading mechanism (J. A. 
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Jerkins, 2017; Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  The Mirai spreading 
mechanism consists of a Bot finding a new Bot Victim and then taking Command and Control 
(C&C) of the new Bot Victim thru the upload of the malware (Kolias et al., 2017).  This study 
applies the knowledge base of previous Mirai research to provide an analysis of the network 
traffic associated with a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim. 
Chapter 1 of this study consists of the following sections (a) a discussion for the 
background of the problem; (b) a discussion on the statement of the problem for this study; (c) 
a discussion on the statement of the purpose of this study; (d) a discussion for the thesis 
statement and research questions; (e) a discussion for the research methodology of this study; 
(f) a discussion for the rational and significance of this research; (g) assumptions and 
limitations are presented; (h) key terms are defined; (i) a discussion for the nature of the 
study; (j) a discussion for the organization of the dissertation.  The following section provides 
a discussion of the background for the Mirai botnet. 
Background of the Problem 
On October 21, 2016, 100,000 Mirai Bots attacked service provider Dyn and caused 
the un-availability of several high-profile websites such as GitHub, Twitter, Netflix and many 
others (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).   A month before the Dyn cyber-attack the Mirai code 
was exposed publicly on the hacking community web forum Hackforums (J. A. Jerkins, 
2017).  Within only two months of the source code’s release, the number of Bots more than 
doubled to half a million (Kambourakis, Kolias, & Stavrou, 2017).  Hackers offer Mirai for 
rent with as many as 400,000 bots (Kolias et al., 2017) .  Recent research has identified the 
vulnerability in IoT devices that allows for the spreading of Bots (J. A. Jerkins, 2017; 
Kambourakis et al., 2017; Kolias et al., 2017). 
Research performed by J. A. Jerkins (2017) focuses on how the Bot brute forces a new 
Bot Victim.  The source code is reviewed to create a Mirai variant which will use the same 
Bot brute forcing mechanism to catalog IoT devices that are vulnerable to Mirai Command 
and Control (C&C).  Reviewing the Mirai code, J. A. Jerkins (2017) emphasizes, 
 
The Mirai botnet’s success was primarily due to the large number of available IoT 
devices with remote access credentials stored in their firmware. These devices exposed 
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Telnet, SSH, and web services to the Internet on their outside interfaces protected only 
by the firmware credentials. The credentials, in the form of username and password, 
cannot be changed without new firmware from the manufacture. Furthermore, the 
remote access services cannot be disabled without modifying the firmware of the IoT 
device or altering the running code on the device. (“The rise of IoT Botnets”, para. 2). 
 
A code review has been performed concentrating on the Bot scanning mechanism 
(Conley, 2017).  Besides generating a random non-government IP address, the Bot scanner 
code contains functionality for creating a network socket and performing a TCP handshake.  
The socket is a network interface that allows the Bot to communicate with TCP/IP over the 
internet (Koutsoubelias & Lalis, 2013).  The TCP handshake exchanges SYN and ACK 
packets to establish connection between hosts (Arlitt & Williamson, 2005) .  The Bot attempts 
to establish a connection to a new Bot Victim on telnet ports 23 and 2323.  Also, protocols, 
such as telnet, establish connection with the TCP handshake.  The code review performed by 
Conley (2017) supports the research performed by (Šemić & Mrdovic, 2017).  Semic and 
Mrdovic (2017) discovered that after the Bot establishes a connection, a telnet handshake 
occurs.   
The research conducted by Kambourakis et al. (2017) reviews the code for details 
concerning the Bot and the C&C infrastructure.  The Bot is responsible for identifying a new 
Bot Victim (Kambourakis et al., 2017).  Kambourakis et al. (2017) explain, “The malware 
employs a brute-force dictionary-based technique for “guessing” passwords based on a hard-
coded list. That inventory contains 62 username/password dyads.” (p. 269).  Emphasizing 
network signatures can be created, Kambourakis et al. (2017) suggest that network traffic can 
be monitored on standard ports 23, 2323, and 22,  which are bombarded with authorization 
attempts to the IoT device  
Current research performed by the authors Kolias et al. (2017) study Mirai 
communication and operation. The Mirai communication and operation consists of (a) the Bot 
brute forcing a new Bot Victim (b) the bot communicating the logon information back to the 
C&C server (c) the C&C server uploading the malware onto the new Bot Victim and (c) the 
C&C server commanding the Bots to execute a DDoS attack.  Kolias et al. (2017) explain the 
brute forcing as containing two major responsibilities.  For the first task, the Bot is continually 
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generating a random IP address and attempting to connect to a potential new Bot Victim with 
that random generated IP address.  For the second major task, when a connection is successful 
the Bot will attempt a telnet remote access logon with a list of factory default user-ids and 
passwords.  A new Bot Victim is identified when the Bot can logon with the factory default 
user-id and password.  Analyzing the code and network traffic, Kolias et al. (2017) suggests, 
“Almost all stages of infection leave a footprint that can be recognized through basic network 
analysis.” (p. 82).  
The authors (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017) perform static and dynamic analysis to 
classify Mirai DDoS attacks.   Network signatures are experimented with for detecting Mirai 
DDoS attacks.  A signature is suggested for detecting a Bot from an external network brute 
forcing a new Bot Victim.  Based upon the research performed to analysis Mirai DDoS 
attacks, Sinanovic and Mrdovic (2017) conclude that Intrusion Detection Signatures (IDS) 
can be created for all parts of Mirai operation.  Researchers Sinanovic and Mrdovic (2017) 
suggest creating a virtual test environment to perform experimentation to study how a Mirai 
Bot finds and compromises a vulnerable IoT device.    
Recent research has reviewed the Mirai code and analyzed the Mirai network traffic.  
Mirai components are static and its behavior can be detected thru analyzing network traffic. 
Network signatures have been suggested for identifying a Bot brute forcing a new Bot Victim 
(J. A. Jerkins, 2017; Kambourakis et al., 2017; Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 
2017).  Even though network signatures have been suggested for detecting a Bot brute forcing 
a new Bot Victim, experimentation has not been focused on analyzing the network traffic for 
the Bot scanning mechanism.  The next section states the research problem.      
Statement of the Problem 
The Mirai botnet deploys a distributed mechanism with each Bot continually scanning 
for a potential new Bot Victim (J. A. Jerkins, 2017; Kambourakis et al., 2017; Kolias et al., 
2017).  A Bot continually generates a random IP address to scan the network for discovering a 
potential new Bot Victim (Kambourakis et al., 2017).  Once the Bot establishes a connection 
with the potential new Bot Victim, a telnet handshake occurs (Šemić & Mrdovic, 2017).  A 
Bot remotely accesses the Bot Victim with telnet, providing a factory default user-id and 
password for logon (J. A. Jerkins, 2017).  With 100,000 bots, Mirai DDoS attacks on service 
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provider Dyn in October 2016 triggered the inaccessibility to hundreds of websites in Europe 
and North America (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  A month before the Dyn attack, the source 
code was released publicly on the Internet and Mirai spread to half a million Bots 
(Kambourakis et al., 2017).  Hackers offered Mirai botnets for rent with 400,000 Bots (Kolias 
et al., 2017).  Recent research has suggested network signatures for Mirai detection 
(Kambourakis et al., 2017; Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  Based upon 
network analysis, Kolias et al. (2017) suggest network signatures can be created for Mirai 
detection.  Kambourakis et al. (2017) study the Mirai malware code for Bot brute forcing and 
suggest signatures can be created for network detection.  Performing network analysis of 
Mirai DDoS attacks, Sinanović and Mrdovic (2017) suggest future research experimenting 
with network signatures to detect a Bot brute forcing a new Bot Victim.  Unfortunately, 
research provided in the literature has not performed experimentation focused on analyzing 
the network traffic for the Bot scanning mechanism, which is the focus of this research.  The 
next section provides the purpose of this study. 
Statement of the Purpose 
The primary purpose of this research is to develop a prototype that summates the 
network traffic generated from the Bot scanning mechanism. The Bot brute forces a new Bot 
Victim thru remote access with telnet using a list of factory default user-ids and passwords.  
Before the Bot can remotely access the new Bot Victim, the Bot generates a random IP 
address and tries to connect to a potential Bot Victim associated with the random generated IP 
address.  The solution, the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype, focuses on evaluating the 
Bot scanning mechanism, from network traffic, by counting the Bots and potential new Bot 
Victims and network packet types.  The network traffic will contain the source IP of the Bot 
and the destination IP of the potential new Bot Victim. 
An analysis of the network traffic generated during experimentation with the Mirai 
Bot Scanner Summation Prototype identifies the Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  
The number of Bots is identified.  The amount of potential new Bot Victim is identified.  The 
analysis supports the thesis.  Furthermore, the analysis of the Bot scanning network traffic 
performed from experimentation with the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype answers 
additional questions that are not part of the primary focus.   
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Once the experimentation has completed and analysis of the Bot scanning mechanism 
has concluded with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype solution, the results will be 
compared to existing peer-reviewed journals that focus on IoT.  The next section will define 
the thesis and research questions.            
Thesis and Research Questions 
As stated in the Statement of the Problem subsection, a Bot is continually scanning for 
a potential new Bot Victim (Kambourakis et al., 2017).  Static and dynamic analysis suggests 
Mirai components are recognizable.  Network analysis has suggested signatures for Mirai 
detection (Kolias et al., 2017).  The objective of the research is to perform experimentation to 
create a Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype focused on analyzing the network traffic for 
summating the Bot scanning mechanism. 
In this dissertation, the following thesis is presented: it is possible to develop a 
solution that can analyze network traffic to identify a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot 
Victim.  Analyzing the Bot scanning mechanism, a Bot can be identified for summation, a 
potential new Bot Victim can be discovered for summation, and the Bot scanning can be 
monitored over time.   
For the literature review of this study, network traffic analysis solutions were studied 
as possible solutions for experimentation.  The network traffic analysis solutions reviewed, 
packet sniffers and NIDS, do not meet the requirements for summating the Bot scanning 
mechanism.  Packet sniffers and NIDS lack a persistent database that is necessary for the 
summation process for tabulating Bots, potential new Bots Victims, and SYN and 
retransmission network packets.  Also, packet sniffers and NIDS contain limitations for 
creating reports and graphs required for monitoring the Bot scanning mechanism over time.  
To design an original solution that meets the requirements for experimentation a code review 
of the Bot scanning mechanism is performed to determine the network interfaces and 
communication between a Bot and a potential new Bot Victim.  The Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype, the original solution of this study, searches thru the network packets 
from a Bot scanning dataset.  Each packet is evaluated to identify the Bot as well as the 
potential new Bot Victim.  The summation is tabulated based upon the Bot and potential new 
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Bot Victim identification.  The Bot scanning is summated for the date range of the Bot 
scanning dataset. 
Current research has analyzed the Mirai malware code for its functionality (Sinanović & 
Mrdovic, 2017).  The Mirai malware residing on the Bot contains the functionality for brute 
forcing a new Bot Victim (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).   For this study, a code review 
performed on the Mirai malware for the Bot scanning mechanism supports the research 
conducted by (Conley, 2017; Šemić & Mrdovic, 2017).  The code review has verified the Bot 
scanning mechanism. The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype performs experimentation 
to evaluate a network dataset consisting of the Bot scanner gathered by the University of 
Southern California (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-
B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  The experimentation performed with the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype will support the thesis and answer the following three research 
questions:   
1. Can the Bots be identified for summation? 
2. Can the potential new Bot Victims be identified for summation? 
3. Is it possible to monitor the Bot scanning mechanism over time? 
Answering the research questions will evaluate the experimentation performed with 
the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  The research questions will help answer if it is 
possible to (a) identify a Bot for summation; (b) identify a potential new Bot Victim for 
summation; (c) determine the Bot scanning mechanism over time.  Evaluation performed 
from the experimentation with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype will be validated 
based upon answering the research questions.   
Bots identified.  Researchers Kolias et al. (2017) describe the operational and 
communication aspects of the Bot brute forcing a new Bot Victim.  Before a Bot can remotely 
access a new Bot Victim with telnet, the Bot scans for a potential new Bot Victim.  The 
scanning is comprised of generating a random IP and then connecting to that IP on ports 23 or 
2323 (Conley, 2017; Kolias et al., 2017).  A Bot connection to an potential new Bot Victim is 
established with the TCP handshake (Arlitt & Williamson, 2005).  The Bot sends a SYN 
packet for establishing the TCP handshake, to the potential new Bot Victim on port 23 or 
2323.  The source IP of the SYN packet represents the Bot.  Analysis performed in this study 
verifies the network packets associated with the Bot scanner dataset for containing SYN 
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packets.  (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-
scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype will 
linearly search thru the dataset for the source IP of the Bot scanning network SYN packets to 
summarize the number of Bots.  
Potential new Bot Victims identified.   A Bot randomly generates an IP address with 
the hopes of that IP address becoming a potential new Bot Victim (Kolias et al., 2017).  When 
the Bot tries to establish a connection to a potential new Bot Victim, a TCP handshake is 
initiated with a SYN network packet.  As part of the TCP handshake initiation, the destination 
IP is expected to respond back with an ACK packet (Arlitt & Williamson, 2005).  The 
destination IP may not receive the SYN packet due to some network security mechanism, 
such as a blocking firewall, or due to not listening on the SYN packet destination port.  Also, 
a non-existent destination IP may not respond back with an ACK packet.  If the Bot does not 
receive an ACK before the retransmission timer expires, the Bot will assume the ACK has 
been lost and will retransmit the SYN network packet.  A potential new Bot Victim responds 
back to the Bot with an ACK.  A potential new Bot Victim does not cause the Bot to 
retransmit ACK network packets.  The Bot scanner dataset contains SYN and retransmission 
packets.  The Bot Scanner Summation Prototype will linearly search thru the dataset to 
tabulate potential new Bot Victims from the SYN packets.  Retransmission packets will not be 
included for the tabulation of potential new Bot Victims.      
 Bot scanning mechanism monitored.  The dataset is collected from Bot scanning 
activity beginning 06/01/2016 and ending on 03/30/2017.  The dataset contains a PCAP file 
for each day of Bot scanning network activity.  The Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
summates the number of Bots, potential new Bot Victims, and SYN packets per PCAP file.  
The daily summations are stored in a persistent database.  The number of Bots, potential new 
Bot Victims, and SYN network packets can be tabulated within a time period by the Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype.  Based upon the date-range, the Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype searches the persistent database. Searching the persistent database, the Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype is able to summate the Bot scanning mechanism over that time-period.  
The number of Bots, potential new Bot Victims as well as the SYN packets are tabulated 
based upon the date range.  The rate at which Bots attempt to connect to potential new Bot 
Victims can be calculated as well as the rate of potential new Bot Victims.  The Bot Scanner 
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Summation Prototype provides reports and graphs for evaluating the Bot scanning 
mechanism.  The next section discusses the research methodology. 
Research Methodology 
Design Science Research (DSR) focuses on the development of solutions for practical 
problems  (Cleven, Gubler, & Huner, 2009; Kampling, Klesel, & Niehaves, 2016; Offermann 
et al., 2009).  The main DSR requirements are rigor and relevance (Offermann et al., 2009).  
Artifact development commonly covers the phases (a) problem identification; (b) 
requirements specification; (c) design; (d) evaluation; (e) communication. (Cleven et al., 
2009).  Experimental research is well suited for DSR (Kampling et al., 2016).  Thesis are 
evaluated using laboratory experiments (Offermann et al., 2009).   Evaluation can be 
qualitative or quantitative (Cleven et al., 2009).  Evaluation for this study is quantitative since 
the Bot scanner mechanism is summated.  This study follows the DSR methodology for 
artifact development. 
DSR researchers Cleven et al. (2009) describe the focus for artifact development as 
being either technical, organizational, or strategic.  Examples of technical DSR artifacts could 
include computer programs, algorithms, and databases.  Organizational artifacts could include 
process models and methods for organizational re-design.  An example of a strategic artifact 
is a design for a decision support system or a road map for software development.  This study 
developed technical artifacts for developing the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype to 
summate a Mirai Bot scanning dataset.  
The first phase for artifact development is problem identification.  Statement of the 
research problem is one of the most important parts of research (Ellis & Levy, 2008).  The 
authors Ellis and Levy (2008) focus on the research problem and emphasize the importance 
and impact of the research problem for problem-based research.  The research problem 
addresses and delimits the research questions (Ellis & Levy, 2008).  The research questions 
determine the methodology and then the methodology produces results (Ellis & Levy, 2008).  
Cleven et al. (2009) explain, “Regarding an identified research problem, decisions concerning 
the artifact type and focus, object, and reference point may further be made” (“Configuring 
evaluation design criteria in the DSR process”, para. 3).   The Statement of Problem 
subsection for this study has identified the problem and focus.  Once the problem has been 
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identified, the next step in the DSR process for artifact development is requirements 
specification. 
The requirements specification phase focuses on the requirements for the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype (Offermann et al., 2009).  A functional requirement defines the 
behavior of an artifact.  A nonfunctional property is a quality of the system, not behavior 
(Wieringa, 2014).  An example of a necessary functional requirement for the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype is to evaluate the Mirai Bot scanner network traffic contained 
in the Bot scanner dataset for summating Bots and potential new Bot Victims.  An example of 
a nonfunctional property is that the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype should be usable on a 
PC running the Windows 10 Operating System (OS) with at least 12 Gigabytes (GB) of 
memory, 500GB hard drive, and an Intel Core i5 2.20 Gigahertz (GHz) processor.  A detailed 
list of the functional requirements and nonfunctional properties will be provided in Chapter 3 
Methodology.  Once the specifications and nonfunctional properties have been defined, the 
design work phase begins. 
In the design work phase, the solution is designed (Offermann et al., 2009).  Stated by 
Offermann et al. (2009), “It is divided into the steps “artefact design” and supporting 
“literature research.” (“Solution design”, para. 1).  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype consists of technical artifacts.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
contains Python program scripts that search thru the Bot scanner dataset to summate Bots, 
potential new Bot Victims, and network packet including TCP SYN and retransmission 
packets.  The Bot and packet summations for each day are permanently stored in a database.  
Each research question will have an associated defined Python function within the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype.  The defined function contains the logic to answer the 
research question.  There are three defined functions to answer the research questions for (a) 
calculating the number of Bots; (b) calculating the number of potential new Bot Victims; (c) 
monitoring the Mirai spreading mechanism over time.  Chapter 2 of this study contains a 
literature review of the Mirai botnet as well as a review of competing solutions for analyzing 
network traffic datasets.  Once the design has completed, the next step in DSR is evaluation.     
Current research performed by Venable et al. (2012) presents a framework for an 
evaluation strategy.  The evaluation for the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype is artificial 
since all of the artifacts are purely technical.  Also, the evaluation strategy for this study is 
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expost since the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype evaluates a recorded Bot scanner dataset 
by summating the Bot scanning network activity.  Evaluation is an iterative process and may 
require review and re-evaluation (Offermann et al., 2009).  During the experimentation, 
supplementary code reviews may be needed to gather additional artifacts concerning the Bot 
scanning mechanism.  The logic for the defined functions within the Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype solution may need to be modified based upon experimentation or additional 
requirements gathering.  Concerning the relationship between experiments and DSR, 
Kampling et al. (2016) emphasizes that experimentation is the central method for evaluation 
of artifacts in DSR, but few studies focus on the use of experiments.  
Experimentation will be performed from a dataset gathered by the University of 
Southern California (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-
B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  The dataset contains only Bot scanning activity 
collection starting on June 1, 2016 and ending on March 31, 2017.  The dataset contains Mirai 
identified TCP SYNs sent to ports 23 and 2323.  Through 2016-11-20, only traffic to IP 
address (130.152.184.2) is included in the dataset.  From 2016-11-20 onward traffic to 
192.228.79.0/24 is added.     
The dataset contains the Bot trying to establish a connection to a potential new Bot 
Victim over ports 23 and 2323, which are telnet ports (Kolias et al., 2017).  The user executes 
functions within the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype to answer the research questions. The 
research questions evaluate the effectiveness of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
for evaluating Bot scanner network traffic.   
Once the experimentation is complete, the final stage is communication.  The findings 
will be communicated within this dissertation.  A research paper will explain the findings of 
this research and the findings will be presented at a conference and a research paper will be 
published in a peer-reviewed journal.  The following section details repository of the code and 
configuration files of this study. 
Repository of Code 
Github is a popular software development platform for version control with Git 
(Github, 2019).  Github allows developers to maintain a repository of program code as well as 
non-program files (Ray, Posnett, Filkov, & Devanbu, 2014).  For this dissertation, a Github 
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repository was maintained for the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype that allows for 
public access and download of the Python programs as well as the configuration files and 
Excel spreadsheets utilized during experimentation (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  In Chapter 2, 
Network Traffic Analysis Solutions, Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is reviewed, 
discussing the Suricata NIDS for alerting on network traffic and the Splunk Security Incident 
Event Management (SIEM) for reporting on the Suricata alert log.  In Chapter 4, Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype Code Review, the prototype Python programs for summation 
and assessment are reviewed, followed by a Single Case Experiment with the prototype and 
the Bot scanning dataset.  For a  Prototype Solution Comparison, Suricata and Splunk are 
configured for Bot summation and assessment, with the results being compared to the Mirai 
Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  The repository contains programs, configuration files, 
and spreadsheets for the prototype, Suricata, and Splunk (Infosecchazzy, 2019).       
  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype repository consists of (a) a Word 
document, Ann_Senpai_Statement.docx, which contains the Anna Senpai statement, posted 
on an internet forum, describing the Mirai botnet (Gamblin, 2016) ; (b) an Excel spreadsheet, 
Bot_Scanning_Solution_Comparison.xlsx, which contains a comparison between the 
prototype and Splunk for Bot and network packet summation totals during experimentation; 
(c) a Prototype folder containing Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype Python programs; 
(d) a Splunk folder consisting of reports generated from Splunk searches; (e) a Suricata folder 
containing configuration files for alerting on when a Bot attempts to connect to a potential 
new Bot Victim.   
 Prototype folder.  The prototype folder contains a repository of the Python programs 
required for the summation and assessment components of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype.  The folder consists of the following files: 
 ANSWER_RESEARCH_QUESTIONS.PY FORMATTED TEXT OUTPUT.docx, 
which contains the assessment for all of the PCAP files of the dataset; 
 Analyze_PCAP_Files.py, a Python module that enumerates the PCAP files for 
summation; 
 Answer_Research_Questions.py, a module that calls the functions to answer the 
three research questions; 
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 BotScanner.py, which contains the functions to perform summation with Mirai Bot 
Scanning dataset; 
 BotScannerResults.py, which contains the functions for assessment of the Mirai 
Bot Scanning dataset; 
 Packet_Summary_Questions.py, which provides a summary of the runtime for 
summating the dataset. 
The prototype folder contains the Python programs that encompass the summation and 
assessment components of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  During 
experimentation, the Python programs completed the summation and assessment of the Bot 
scanning dataset.  The next sub-section describes the contents of the Splunk folder. 
Splunk folder.  The Splunk folder contains reports, generated during the 
experimentation of this dissertation, from Splunk searches of the Suricata alert log, with the 
log containing alerts of Bots attempting to connect to potential new Bot Victims.  The folder 
contains (a) Packet_Counts_Suricata_Splunk.csv, which contains network packet counts per 
PCAP date; (b) Subnets_Suricata_Splunk.csv, which contains potential new Bot Victim 
subnets per PCAP date; (c) Total_Bots_Suricata_Splunk.csv, which contains Bot and potential 
new Bot Victim counts per PCAP date.  The Splunk folder contains the Splunk search results 
that allow for summation comparison with the prototype summation results.  The next 
subsection presents the Suricata folder. 
Suricata folder.  The Suricata folder contains the programs and configuration files 
necessary to produce an alert log, from the Bot scanning dataset, of Bots attempting to 
connect to potential new Bot Victims.  The folder contains (a) Alert_Dataset.bat, which is a 
batch file for calling Suricata to alert on each PCAP file of the Bot scanning dataset; (b) 
Convert_Pcap.py, which converts the PNCAP files of the Bot scanning dataset to PCAP 
format; (c) mirai-bot-scanning.rules, which contains the Suricata rule for detecting when a 
Bot is attempting to connect to a potential new Bot Victim; (d) suricata.yml, which contains 
the configuration for the Suricata alert log.  The Suricata folder contains the programs and 
configuration files that allow Suricata to produce an alert log that is searched by Splunk for 
summating Bots, potential new Bot Victims, and network packets.  The next section details 
the rationale and significance for this research.         
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Rationale and Significance  
The rationale for this research comes from the fact that according to Kambourakis et 
al. (2017), “after its source code was disclosed on Sept. 30, 2016, Mirai botnets managed to 
control remotely nearly half a million IoT devices, assembling a mighty botnet.”  (p. 267).   A 
month after the source code was disclosed, the prominent Dyn attack occurred with 100,000 
Bots executing a DDoS attack against DNS service provider Dyn which caused the un-
availability of hundreds of web-sites. (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  According to 
Kambourakis et al. (2017), since the release of the Mirai source code Mirai variants are 
created daily.  The authors Kolias et al. (2017) state, 
 
Today, Mirai mutations are generated daily, and the fact that they can continue to 
proliferate and inflict real damage using the same intrusion methods as the original 
malware is indicative of IoT device vendors’ chronic neglect in applying even basic 
security practices. (p. 81).   
 
At the end of Feb. 2017, a Mirai variant executed a 54-hour long app-layer DDoS 
attack against a US College (Kambourakis et al., 2017).  According to Kambourakis et al. 
(2017) nearly 900 thousand customers of Deutsche Telekom Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
were denied Internet access after their routers being enslaved as Bots from a Mirai variant.   
Mirai is successful in spreading to IoT devices due to remote access credentials stored 
in the IoT firmware (J. A. Jerkins, 2017).  The Bot scans to connect to a potential new Bot 
Victim (Kolias et al., 2017).  The Bot identifies a new Bot Victim by remotely accessing the 
new Bot Victim with a factory default user-id and password (Kolias et al., 2017).  Referring to 
insecure IoT interfaces, at least six out of ten IoT devices tested contained security issues with 
their web access interfaces.  These security issues were centered around  poorly managed 
sessions and weak logon credentials (Atwady & Hammoudeh, 2017). 
Recent research focuses on IoT security challenges (Medwed, 2016).  The author 
Medwed (2016) emphasizes, “Exploits reported at a steady pace clearly suggest that security 
is a major challenge when the world wants to successfully switch from an IoT hype to a real 
IoT deployment.” (“ABSTRACT”, para. 2),  Current research is focused on mitigating IoT 
device vulnerabilities (Hadar, Siboni, & Elovici, 2017).  Researchers Hadar et al. (2017) 
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explain that anti-virus for IoT devices is not practical due to limited computing power on the 
actual IoT device. Recent research has shown that Mirai does not attempt to avoid detection 
(Kolias et al., 2017). 
Recent research has focused on studying network traffic during C&C of the upload of 
the malware onto the new Bot Victim (Kolias et al., 2017).  Additional research has been 
focused on classifying the DDoS attacks commanded by the C&C server (Sinanović & 
Mrdovic, 2017).  Research has suggested network signatures for detecting a Bot brute-forcing 
a new Bot Victim (Kambourakis et al., 2017; Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 
2017).  Although network signatures have been suggested for brute forcing, experimentation 
has not been performed to study the brute-forcing.  The limited amount of peer-reviewed 
research focused the Mirai botnet indicates the lack of research focused on IoT botnets 
(Kolias et al., 2017).      
Current research on the Mirai botnet has not focused on the Bot scanner to study how 
a Bot connects to a potential new Bot Victim.  This Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
performs experimentation with the Bot scanner.  Experimenting with a Bot scanner dataset, 
the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype reveals the number of Bots, number of potential New 
Bot Victims, and the number of Bots scanning over time.  Answering the research questions 
with the experimentation provides deeper insight and knowledge into the number of Bots 
scanning, the number of potential new Bot Victims, as well as the network communication 
and protocols required for a Bot to connect to a potential new Bot Victim.   
A comparison of network packet analysis tools demonstrates the significance and 
elegance of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype solution.  Packet sniffer stools and 
NIDS were compared., Packet sniffers and NIDS do not contain textual and graphical output 
capabilities needed for evaluation of the dataset in order to answer the research questions.  
Also, packet sniffers and NIDS do not contain a database for permanent storage of the 
summation of the Bot scanner per day.  Packet sniffers and NIDS do not contain the necessary 
functionality for calculating the number of Bots, potential Bot Victims, and are not able to 
monitor the Bot scanner over time. 
The Bot Scanner Summation Prototype provides insight into the Bot scanner which 
has not been previously provided by current Mirai research.  Considering that variants deploy 
the same Bot scanning methods as the original Mirai botnet, future research could include 
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experimentation with variants.  Several assumptions have been made to perform this research 
and the next section discusses those assumptions.  
Assumptions and Limitations 
This selected research topic filled a void for studying the Bot scanner.  Although 
current research has studied network traffic, the focus of those studies has not been on a Bot 
scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  It is possible that experimentation exists for the Bot 
scanner, but there was a lack of references in peer-reviewed journals during the literature 
review.  
Assumptions.  The scope of this study is the original Mirai code that was posted on an 
internet forum.  The Mirai botnet does not encrypt network traffic.   
Limitations.  The captured dataset is limited to the Bot scanner network traffic. 
Botnet research and IoT have produced several terms that have specific meaning.  To 
eliminate confusion in this research, the following section will contain a definition of terms.  
Key Terms 
The following terms will be continually used throughout this research.  The definitions 
will help to eliminate any confusion with these terms. 
Bot: An IoT device that is under Mirai C&C (Kolias et al., 2017). 
Bot scanner:  The Bot is constantly generating random IP addresses, attempting to 
connect to the random IP address, and trying to remotely access the potential new Bot Victim 
with telnet and a factory default user-id and password (J. A. Jerkins, 2017). 
Bot scanner dataset: The dataset contains Bot scanning activity collection by the 
University of Southern California starting on June 1, 2016 and ending on March 20, 2017 
(Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-
20160601/rev5870, 2016) 
Bot Victim: An IoT device with default credentials that is vulnerable to Mirai malware 
infection (J. A. Jerkins, 2017). 
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C&C: Command and Control refers to the Mirai server responsible for loading the 
malware onto the new Bot Victim and instructing the Bots to execute a DDoS attack  (Kolias 
et al., 2017). 
DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service refers to an attack that floods an internet service 
with network traffic from different sources to render that internet service unavailable 
(Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017). 
DSR: Design Science Research is the research methodology followed by this study for 
experimentation. Design Science Research focuses on the development of solutions for 
practical problems (Cleven et al., 2009; Kampling et al., 2016; Offermann et al., 2009).   
IEEE: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the world’s largest 
technical professional organization dedicated to advancing technology for the benefit of 
humanity, is conducting on-going research towards the definition of IoT (Minerva et al., 
2015).  
 IoT: “a self-configuring, adaptive, complex network that interconnects ’things’ to the 
Internet through the use of standard communication protocols. The things offer services, with 
or without human intervention, through the exploitation of unique identification, data capture 
and communication, and actuation capability. The service is exploited through the use of 
intelligent interfaces and is made available anywhere, anytime, and for anything taking 
security into consideration.” (Minerva et al., p. 74). 
IP address: A unique network identification for the IoT device (Kambourakis et al., 
2017). 
Mirai: An IoT botnet that spreads to IoT devices with factory default credentials (J. A. 
Jerkins, 2017). 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype:  The solution presented in this study for 
performing experimentation with the Bot scanner dataset for assessing the summation of Bots, 
potential new Bot Victims, and network packets.  
Mirai variant: The original Mirai code is modified to include different functionality 
(Kolias et al., 2017). 
NIDS:  A Network Intrusion Detection System applies signatures or use anomaly 
detection for alerting on malicious network traffic (Kumar & Singh, 2012). 
19 
PCAP file: A standard format for captured network traffic that can be read by network 
monitors or network pack sniffers, such as Wireshark (Buczak et al., 2016).  
SIEM:  A Security Incident Event Management solution assesses the alert log from a 
NIDS (Nagaraja & Kumar, 2018). 
TCP handshake:  A connection between a Bot and a potential new Bot Victim is 
established thru the exchange of SYN and ACK packets (Arlitt & Williamson, 2005) .   
 
The next section presents the nature of the study.    
Nature of the Study 
The design of this study was to perform experimentation to support the thesis.  A 
solution, the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype, was evaluated to analyze network 
traffic to summate the Bot scanning mechanism.  Recent peer-reviewed research has not been 
focused on perform experimentation for the Bot scanning mechanism (Kambourakis et al., 
2017; Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).   
The DSR methodology was followed to develop the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype .  A code review was performed for the Bot scanner, to identify the communication 
between a Bot and a potential new Bit Victim.  The dataset was sampled, to characterize the 
Bot scanning network packets.  The solution, the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype, 
was developed to perform quantitative analysis of the dataset.  The solution calculates the 
number of Bots, number of potential new Bot Victims, and the number of network packet 
types including SYN and re-transmission packets.  Based upon the calculations per day, the 
Bot spreading mechanism was monitored for the date range of the Bot scanning dataset. 
The Mirai code was exposed publicly on the hacking community web forum 
Hackforums (J. A. Jerkins, 2017).  The code review for this study reviews the original Mirai 
code posted on Hackforums for the Bot scanner.  According to Kambourakis et al. (2017), 
since the release of the Mirai source code Mirai variants are created daily.  Variant code is not 
reviewed.  
 The dataset contains Bot scanning activity collection starting on June 1, 2016 and 
ending on March 20, 2017 (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-
LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  This dataset contains Bot scanning 
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activity limited to the TCP SYN network packet sent to a potential new Bot Victim for 
connecting to telnet ports 23 and 2323.  Recent research studying Mirai network traffic has 
performed experimentation from a controlled testing environment (Kambourakis et al., 2017; 
Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  Even with limitations, experimentation 
performed by the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype solution with this dataset can answer the 
research questions and confirm the thesis, from actual captured Bot scanning network activity.  
The next section provides a summary for this chapter. 
Summary 
Depending upon the definition of IoT, there are billions of IoT devices.  By 2020, the 
estimate for IoT devices is as high as 20 billion.  IoT devices provide the needed applications 
for gathering data for smart cities, smart cars, smart homes, health care, and so on.  
Applications for IoT seems limitless.  IoT devices are vulnerable due to factory default weak 
passwords.  The IoT device is manufactured with a default user-id and password.  Research 
has shown that IoT devices are vulnerable to being compromised due to weak passwords 
associated with the factory default user-id.  
On October 2016 the Mirai botnet executed a prominent DDoS attack against service 
provider Dyn, rendering hundreds of websites un-available.  It is estimated that 100,000 Mirai 
Bots attacked Dyn.  With the public release of the Mirai code, Mirai has been offered as-a-
service and variants are created daily.  A hacker, BestBuy, brags of offering Mirai as-as-
service consisting of 400,000 bots.  Mirai variants have not only included DDoS attacks but 
also perform SQL Injection attacks and bitcoin mining.  Variants have expanded the Bot 
spreading mechanism to include exploits for firmware vulnerabilities.  This study focuses on 
the original Mirai botnet spreading mechanism.       
The Mirai Bot spreads the malware to IoT devices with factory default user-ids and 
passwords.  The Mirai spreading mechanism consists of a Bot finding a new Bot Victim and 
then taking Command and Control (C&C) of the new Bot Victim thru the upload of the 
malware.  A component of the Mirai spreading mechanism is the Bot connecting to a potential 
new Bot Victim with a TCP handshake over telnet ports 23 and 2323.  When trying to 
establish the TCP handshake, the potential new Bot Victim returns a SYN packet waiting for 
an ACK packet from the Bot for acknowledgement.  Once the Bot receives the SYN packet, a 
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potential Bot Victim has been identified, and then the Bot attempts to remotely access the 
potential Bot Victim via telnet with known factory default user-ids and passwords.  If the Bot 
brute-force is successful, then C&C uploads the malware onto the Bot Victim. 
Recent peer-reviewed research has focused on experimentation the Mirai DDoS 
attacks, the C&C upload of the malware, and has suggested research for detecting the Mirai 
spreading mechanism with Snort IDS signatures.  This study follows the DSR methodology 
for developing and experimenting with a solution for detecting a Bot connecting to a potential 
new Bot Victim.  The artificial solution, the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype, evaluates a 
Bot scanner dataset to answer the research questions.  The Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
provides the artifacts to calculate the number of Bots, potential new Bot Victims, and network 
packet types over a user-supplied date-range of the dataset.  The Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype provides textual as well as graphical analysis.  Compared with existing solutions, 
such as network packet analyzers, network forensic tools, and NIDS, the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype contains the artifacts necessary to answer the research questions.  The 
next section discusses the organization of the remainder of this study.            
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 is a literature review related current research performed with the Mirai 
botnet as well as provide a review and comparison of existing solutions to the solution 
presented in this study, the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  Chapter 3 details the 
DSR methodology for this study.  Chapter 4 presents the findings and results from the 
experimentation performed with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  Chapter 5 
completes this study by revealing conclusions, recommendations, and observations relative to 
suggested additional research defined by this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In Chapter 1 a definition of IoT is provided from the IEEE (Minerva et al., 2015).  A 
current study performed by researchers Minerva et al. (2015) presents many different 
definitions and architecture models for IoT.  Currently, there is an estimated 15 billion IoT 
devices.  By 2020, the estimate is as high as 50 billion (Frank et al., 2017).  The rapid growth 
of IoT devices has paved the way for systems such as smart cities, smart hospital care, and 
smart vehicles etc.  (Aman et al., 2017).  IoT systems face security challenges that include 
authentication, data integrity, data provenance, privacy, and access control (Aman et al., 
2017).  One of the most frequently exploited vulnerabilities in IoT devices is factory default 
credentials (James A. Jerkins & Stupiansky, 2018).  On October 2016 Mira executed a DDoS 
attack against service provider Dyn that took down hundreds of websites (Kolias et al., 2017).  
Recent research has suggested network signatures for detecting Mirai (J. A. Jerkins, 2017; 
Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017). 
The focus of this study is to apply the knowledge base of previous peer-reviewed 
Mirai research to perform experimentation with a Bot scanning network dataset to identify a 
Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  The literature review will consist of six sections 
(a) a survey of DDoS attacks is presented; (b) a discussion on a survey for Mirai and variants; 
(c) a discussion on the Mirai components; (d) a discussion on current research focused on 
Mirai mitigation; (e) a comparison of solutions for network traffic analysis; (f) a discussion 
for the summary of the literature review.  The following section presents a survey for DDoS 
attacks.   
DDoS Attack Survey 
A DDoS attack attempts to render a target unavailable by overwhelming it with 
network traffic from multiple sources.  The target could be an internet website, a server, 
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Central Processing Unit (CPU), storage, or network service (Deshmukh & Devadkar, 2015).  
To create an effective DDoS attack, three operational and communication steps are needed: 
Scanning, Propagation and C&C (Srivastava, Gupta, Tyagi, Sharma, & Mishra, 2011).  
Initially, the attacker or even the bots themselves scan to find vulnerable hosts to join the 
botnet.  Propagation is the process of spreading the malware onto vulnerable hosts to form 
bots.  The attacker commands the bots to execute the DDoS attacks against a target.   
This section presents a survey of DDoS attacks.  It consists of the following sub-
sections (a) a discussion of a timeline for DDoS attacks; (b) a discussion for the classification 
of DDoS attacks; (c) a discussion concerning DDoS defense mechanisms; (d) a discussion of 
the impact of recent DDoS attacks on enterprises; (e) a summary of DDoS attacks.  
Attack timeline. Researchers Deshmukl et al. (2015) provide a timeline of DDoS 
attacks.  DDoS attacks were first witnessed starting in 1999 and continue on to this very day.  
Some of the major DDoS attacks described by researchers Deshmukl et al. (2015) are as 
follows: 
 In 1999, a Trinoo network was commanded to flood a single system at the 
University of Minnesota, rendering the University of Minnesota network unusable 
for more than two days.   
 In 2000, a 15-year-old boy launched a DDoS attack on Yahoo CNN, eBay, Dell, 
and Amazon.   
 In 2003, the Mydoom e-mail worm was used to shut down the SCO group website 
for two weeks (Wong, Bielski, McCune, & Wang, 2004).   
 In December 2007 Russian government websites suffered DDoS attacks.   
 In November 2008, the Conficker worm propagated thru vulnerabilities in the 
Microsoft OS (L. Zhang, Yu, Wu, & Watters, 2011).   
 On July 4th, 2009, 27 US government websites experienced a DDoS attack. 
Among the US government site attacked were the White House, Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), Department of Transportation, and the Department of the 
Treasury.  
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 On 2010 DDoS attacks were launched on credit-card websites for MasterCard, 
PayPal, and Visa. This string of attacks is known as "Pay Back" and was launched 
in retaliation for stopping to give credit services to WikiLeaks.   
 In 2011 the LulzSec hacktivist group attacked the website of the US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA).   
 2012 witnessed many DDoS attacks on US banks involving use of the 
Itsoknoproblembro DDoS tool.      
Recent DDoS attacks occurring in 2016 include IoT and an attack on a cryptocurrency 
start-up (Pritchard, 2018).  Security researcher Pritchard (2018) listed the Mirai DDoS attacks 
that occurred in 2016.  A review of Mirai DDoS attacks will be presented in the next section 
for Mirai and variants.  Starting on April 5, 2017, over a four-day period the BrickerBot IoT 
botnet launched thousands of Permanent Denial of Service (PDoS) attempts from various 
locations around the world.  On November 2, 2017 the Electroneum cryptocurrency start-up’s 
website was a victim of a DDoS attack. The DDoS attack locked caused Electroneum to lock 
investors out of their accounts while the DDoS attack was mitigated. The Financial Conduct 
Authority, the UK financial markets regulator, emphasized to the investors that Initial Coin 
Offerings (ICOs) offer no protection.  On February 28, 2018, GitHub was hit by a 
Memcached amplification attack of 1.35 TBs, which is the largest-ever DDoS attack 
(Paganini, 2018).  The following sub-section discusses the classification of DDoS attacks.          
Attack classification.  DDoS attacks can be classified into two categories: flooding 
and software (Srivastava et al., 2011).  A flooding attack occurs when the target is 
overwhelmed with network traffic thus exhausting the bandwidth with a high number of 
packets.  A software attack attempts to exploit a software vulnerability with a small number of 
malformed packets.  The main types of DDoS flooding attacks are: SYN, Internet Control 
Message Protocol (ICMP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), DNS, Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP), and Amplification (Cloudflare, 2018; Deshmukh & Devadkar, 2015; 
Srivastava et al., 2011).  The main types of software attacks can be classified as: Ping of 
Death, Teardrop Attack, and Land Attack (Srivastava et al., 2011).  Focusing on the Mirai 
botnet, Bots are commanded for executing ten different types of DDoS flooding attacks 
(Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  The next sub-section presents a review of flooding attacks.   
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Flooding attacks.  In a SYN flooding attack, the victim is flooded with SYN packets 
containing spoofed IP addresses.  The connections on the targeted victim are left open waiting 
for a response from the spoofed IP.  If the victim is flooded with enough SYN packets, the 
victim could hang or crash (Srivastava et al., 2011).   
In an ICMP flooding attack, forged ICMP echo packets, containing the targeted victim 
IP, are sent to broadcast addresses of vulnerable networks. All of the systems on the 
vulnerable networks reply to the targeted victim with ICMP ECHO packets. A flood of  ICMP 
ECHO packets exhausts the bandwidth available to the targeted victim (Nikolskaya, Ivanov, 
Golodov, Minbaleev, & Asyaev, 2017).   
In a UDP flooding attack, a deluge of UDP packets are sent to a random port on the 
victim system.  Realizing that no applications are associated with the port, the victim 
generates an ICMP packet with an unreachable destination.  Flooded with enough UDP 
packets, the targeted victim could become unresponsive or crash (Srivastava et al., 2011).  
Other variations of UDP flooding attacks include Fragmentation, DNS flooding, VoIP 
flooding, and Media data flooding (Nikolskaya et al., 2017).  
 In a DNS flood attack, a domain’s DNS servers are flooded in an attempt to disrupt 
DNS resolution.  DNS flood attacks are a new type of attack corresponding with the 
formation of IoT botnets.  DNS flood attacks take advantage of the high bandwidth 
connections of IoT devices to directly overwhelm the DNS servers of major DNS service 
providers.  Disrupting DNS resolution compromises a website's ability to respond to 
legitimate traffic (Cloudflare, 2018). 
In a HTTP flooding attack, a victim website is overwhelmed with HTTP requests.  
There are two types of HTTP attacks: GET and POST.  A HTTP GET attack requests images, 
files, or other assets from the website.  In a HTTP POST attack, typically a form is submitted 
on a website.   The server must handle the incoming request and query a database.  A HTTP 
POST attack is more computing intensive than a HTTP GET attack.  Once the victim has been 
deluged with the HTTP requests, the website is unable to respond to normal traffic 
(Cloudflare, 2018).   
In an Amplification flooding attack, a large number of packets, forged with the victim 
IP,  are sent to a broadcast IP address of a network.  The systems in the broadcast address 
range send a reply,  resulting in a flood of network traffic targeted at the victim.  This type of 
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attack exploits the broadcast address feature found in network routers.  Smurf and Fraggle are 
examples of amplification flooding attacks (Nikolskaya et al., 2017).  The next-subsection 
reviews DDoS software attacks.                    
Software attacks.  In a Ping of Death attack, the attacker uses of the ping command to 
send an IP packet larger than the 65,536 bytes allowed by the IP protocol.  Not knowing how 
to handle the oversized packet, systems hang or crash.  Nowadays systems are safe from this 
type of attack (Srivastava et al., 2011),  For a Teardrop Attack, an attacker sends two packet 
fragments that cannot be reassembled properly.  Making use of a bug in the TCP/IP 
fragmentation re-assembly of operating systems, the system could reboot or shutdown 
(Srivastava et al., 2011).  In a Land Attack an attacker sends a malicious packet with the same 
source and destination IP address. Whenever the victim system replies to the malicious packet 
an infinite loop is created resulting in a slow-down of the system that can lead to a reboot .  
Other fields can be manipulated to form malicious IP packets in an attempt to cause a DoS 
attack (Deshmukh & Devadkar, 2015).  The next sub-section discusses Mirai DDoS attack 
types.         
Mirai attack types.  The Mirai malware spreads to vulnerable IoT devices to form a 
botnet that is commanded and controlled for DDoS attacks (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  
The botmaster commands the DDoS attacks from the C&C server (Kambourakis et al., 2017).  
The C&C communicates with the Bot to specify the target and type of DoS attack.  Once the 
Bot receives the attack information from the C&C server, the DDoS attack commences with 
the Bot attacking the victim,  The botmaster is presented with a virtual terminal on the C&C 
server that contains ten types of DDoS attacks that can be commanded  (Sinanović & 
Mrdovic, 2017).   
UDP and UDPPLAIN attack commands issued from the C&C server instruct the Bots 
to generate UDP packets with a random payload and random source IP address.  SYN, ACK, 
and STOMP attack commands generate SYN or ACK flood attacks.  The HTTP attack 
command initiates a HTTP flooding attack.  The VSE command generates a Valve Source 
Engine query UDP Amplification flood attack.  The DNS command targets the authoritative 
DNS server with a DNS flooding attack.  The GREETH and GREIP commands flood the 
victim with malicious Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) encapsulated Ethernet and IP 
packets.  The next sub-section discusses DDoS defense strategies. 
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Defense strategies.  DDoS defense strategies can be classified into the following 
categories: prevention, detection, and response (Deshmukh & Devadkar, 2015).  Prevention 
methods try to stop DDoS attacks from being initiated Ingress and egress packet filters on 
routers can help to prevent traffic from malformed packets (Srivastava et al., 2011).  A 
firewall can block malicious network packets from entering or leaving a network.  A Web 
Application Firewall (WAF) can prevent malicious HTTP requests from reaching the website. 
(Sheth & Thakker, 2013).   Other prevention techniques include disabling IP broadcasting, 
disabling unused services, and applying security patches (Deshmukh & Devadkar, 2015).  
Detection aims to detect an ongoing attack as soon as possible without disrupting legitimate 
traffic.  Signature-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) apply signatures to 
detect network traffic of known DDoS attacks.  Anomaly-based NIDS establish a baseline and 
then detect anomalies, caused by the DDoS attack, in the network traffic (Srivastava et al., 
2011),  When DDoS attack is detected, a response could be to block the attack or trace the 
origin of the attack.  Response can be accomplished using an Access Control List (ACL).  The 
ACL on the router could prevent malicious packets from being routed to the targeted victim 
(Deshmukh & Devadkar, 2015).  Updated firewall rules can block malicious network traffic 
(Sheth & Thakker, 2013).  Tracing back the source of the attack is difficult because of 
spoofed IP addresses (Srivastava et al., 2011).  The following sub-section presents the recent 
impact of DDoS.   
Recent enterprise impact.  Neustar is a leading DDoS protection company (Neustar, 
2018).  Neustar queried 1,010 executives to find out how DDoS attacks affect their 
organizations and what measures are in place to counter these attacks. .  According to the 
2017 Neustar Worldwide DDoS Attacks & Cyber Insights Research Report, DDoS attacks are 
on the rise and the enterprise can now expect the cost of at least $2.5 million every time they 
become a victim (Neustar, 2017).  Included in the Neustar report:  
 84 percent included in the research have experienced at least one DDoS attack in 
the last 12 months, up from 73 percent in 2016; 
 86 percent of these businesses were struck with multiple DDoS attacks over the 
past 12 months;   
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 63 percent said the loss of revenue at peak times caused by DDoS disruption can 
sometimes reach beyond $100,000 an hour;  
 45 percent of DDoS attacks were greater than 10 Gbps per second;   
 15 percent of attacks were greater than 50 Gbps which is almost double the rate 
reported in 2016. 
A recent Kaspersky Lab study indicates DDoS attacks are on the rise in the first 
quarter of 2018 (Alexander Khalimonenko, 2018). There is a significant increase in the total 
number and duration of DDoS attacks compared to the fourth quarter of 2017.  SYN attacks 
remain the most popular form of DDoS attacks. There is a six-times increase in sustained 
attacks lasting longer than 50 hours.  The Kaspersky study estimates DDoS attacks originating 
from China were at 59.42%, followed by the US at 17.83%, and South Korea at 8%.   
The Neustar report shows the deep financial costs for DDoS attacks and shows that 
DDoS attacks are becoming increasingly costly and more powerful.  The Kaspersky study for 
the first quarter of 2018 indicates an increase in the occurrence of DDoS attacks as well as an 
increase in the number of sustained attacks.  The next section discusses a summary of DDoS 
attacks.     
DDoS attack summary.  DDoS attacks attempt to overwhelm the victim website with 
network traffic.  The first DDoS attack occurred in 1999 to overwhelm the University of 
Minnesota network.  DDoS attacks have progressed to the current internet landscape where 
IoT botnets are utilized for targeted DDoS attacks.  DDoS attacks can be categorized into 
flooding and software attacks.  Flooding attacks send a deluge of malicious packets to the 
targeted server in hopes of crashing it.  Software attacks attempt to exploit software 
vulnerabilities.  Mitigation strategies include trying to prevent, detect, and respond to DDoS 
attacks.  Patching software vulnerabilities and ingress and egress packet filters on routers can 
help to prevent DDoS attacks.  NIDS can detect DDoS attacks based upon signatures and 
anomalies.  Recent studies indicate that DDoS attacks targeted at enterprises are rising as well 
as the costs.  The next section discusses the Mirai botnet and variants.    
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Mirai and Variants 
The previous section presented a discussion on a survey of DDoS attacks.  DDoS 
attacks started as early as 1999 and continue to occur today.  There are two main 
classifications for DDoS attacks: flooding and software.  Flooding attacks attempt to deluge 
the targeted victim with network traffic.  Software attacks exploit known vulnerabilities 
contained in program code.  Mitigation techniques attempt to detect and prevent DDoS 
attacks.  Because of spoofing IP addresses, it is difficult to traceback the attack.  Recent 
studies have shown the increase of DDoS attacks and their steep financial impact on 
enterprises.  Concerning Mirai, Bots are commanded to execute ten different types of DDoS 
flooding attacks.   
Mirai was identified in August 2016 by the white hat security research group 
MalwareMustDie (Kolias et al., 2017).  In Japanese, the definition for Mirai is “the future” 
(Kolias et al., 2017).  This section consists of the following sub-sections (a) a discussion of 
initial Mirai attacks; (b) a discussion of the Mirai source code that was publicly released; (c) a 
discussion concerning the Bot spreading mechanism; (d) a discussion of Mirai for rent; (e) a 
discussion of the prominent Mirai Dyn attack; (f) a discussion of a bit coin miner variant; (g) 
an overview of Satori variants; (h) a summary of Mirai and variants.  
Initial Mirai attacks.  September 2016, the Mirai botnet performed DDoS attacks on 
internet services.  Researchers Kolias et al. (2017) emphasize the strength of the Mirai botnet: 
 
Krebs was hit with 620 Gbps of traffic, “many orders of magnitude more traffic than is 
typically needed to knock most sites offline.” At about the same time, an even bigger 
DDoS attack using Mirai malware—peaking at 1.1 Tbps— targeted the French 
webhost and cloud service provider OVH (p. 81). 
 
After the initial attacks on Krebs website and French webhost and cloud service 
provider OVH, the Mirai source code was publicly released (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  
The following sub-section describes the public release of the Mirai code. 
Mirai source code publicly released.  The author, Anna-Senpai released details on 
the Mirai architecture as well as how to compile the Mirai code and operate the C&C 
(Infosecchazzy, 2019).  Concerning the number of Bots, Anna-Senpai believes that originally 
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Mirai was able to spread to 380,000 Bots but after the initial attacks on Krebs Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) have been able to shutdown Bots and Mirai has lessened to 300,000 Bots 
(Infosecchazzy, 2019). 
Mirai was able to spread to 380,000 bots from telnet only.  Telnet is an un-encrypted 
protocol that allows the Bot to remotely access the new Bot Victim with a factory default 
user-id and password (Kolias et al., 2017).  Concerning the number of Bots, Anna-Senpai is 
claiming that Mirai contained a maximum of 380,000 Bots during the Kreb attack.  After the 
Kreb attack, Mirai contained 300,000 Bots.  Since the attack, the number of Bots reduced by 
80,000.  Anna-Senpai emphasizes this reduction in Bots is due to ISPs shutting down Bots.  
The next sub-section describes the Mirai spreading mechanism. 
Mirai spreading mechanism.  Mirai spreads by infecting IoT devices such as 
webcams, digital video recorders, and home wireless routers that run the BusyBox operating 
system (Kolias et al., 2017).  Mirai spreads to IoT devices with remote access credentials 
stored in their firmware (J. A. Jerkins, 2017).  The Bot contains 62 username/password dyads 
for remotely accessing the new Bot Victim (Kambourakis et al., 2017).  The “real-time-load”, 
described by Anna Senpai (Infosecchazzy, 2019),  is the distributed mechanism where a Bot 
identifies a new Bot Victim, via telnet with the factory default user-id and password, for 
upload of the malware by C&C (Kolias et al., 2017).  Once the malware has been uploaded by 
the C&C, the new Bot Victim becomes a Bot, and the iterative process begins for finding a 
new Bot Victim.   The next sub-section describes Mirai for rent. 
Mirai for rent.  After the public release of the Mirai source code, a hacker offers 
Mirai for rent with as many as 400,000 Bots (Kolias et al., 2017).  The  hacker was 
interviewed by security blogger (Cimpanu, 2016).  Cimpanu (2016) was able to gather 
information on how the hacker BestBuy was able to spread Mirai to contain 400,000 Bots.  
The Mirai source code was modified to include Secure Shell (SSH) for remote access to IoT 
devices as well as a zero-day vulnerability. 
The hacker BestBuy created a variant of Mirai for rent.  SSH was added for remote 
access.  SSH utilizes an encrypted protocol for remote access (Venkatachalam, 2007).  In 
addition to telnet, the Bot utilizes the encrypted SSH protocol to remotely access a new Bot 
Victim with the factory default user-id and password.  Support was added to exploit a zero-
day vulnerability.  Experimentation performed by security researcher Whittier-Jones (2018) 
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shows that IoT devices can be exploited by many old and patched security exploits.  During 
the interview, Cimpanu (2016) gathered additional information for a mitigation technique 
implemented by BestBuy.  BestBuy was able to bypass DDoS mitigation systems by spoofing 
Bots.  Spoofing a Bot includes faking the Bot IP address.   
This variant of Mirai implemented the spoofing to fake the Bot IP address to avoid 
detection (Takemori, Fujinaga, Sayama, & Nishigaki, 2009).  The Mirai for rent variant 
contains three features that the Original Mirai does not.  SSH functionality was implemented 
for remote access.  A zero-day vulnerability was exploited.  The Bot’s IP address was 
spoofed.  With these added features, the Mirai for rent variant spread to 400,000 Bots.  The 
next sub-section describes the prominent Dyn attack.  
Prominent Dyn attack.  On October 2016 Mirai performed a DDoS attack on service 
provider Dyn (Kambourakis et al., 2017).  With 100,000 bots, Mirai DDoS attacks on service 
provider Dyn triggered the inaccessibility to hundreds of websites in Europe and North 
America (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  A heat map is a graphical representation of data 
represented as colors.(Wilkinson & Friendly, 2009).  Shown below in Figure 1 is a heat map 
depicting the wide-spread internet outage.  
 
 
Figure 1. Dyn attack heat map.   
Taken from ("Level3 outage map," 2018). 
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Shown above in Figure 1, the heat map depicts a large concentration of web-sites un-
available in the northeast and west coast of the Unites States.  High traffic websites such as 
Twitter, Netflix, Reddit, GitHub and many others became un-available for several hours 
(Kolias et al., 2017).  During the press briefing the US Press Secretary Josh Earnest was 
questioned about the Internet outage.  His response, "the DHS is tracking it.” ("Press Briefing 
by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 10/21/2016," 2016).  The next sub-section explains a bitcoin 
miner variant.       
Bitcoin miner variant.  In March 2017, a variant appeared with bitcoin miner 
functionality (Kambourakis et al., 2017).  Bitcoin is a popular cryptocurrency (Dziembowski, 
2015).  Bitcoin mining is a computational process that is used to verify Bitcoin transactions 
for profit (Vilim, Duwe, & Kumar, 2016).  The variant utilizes the power accumulated from 
IoT devices to mine the digital currency for financial gains.  Besides bitcoin mining, the ELF 
Linux Mirai variant has the abilities to execute  Structured Query Language (SQL)  injection 
attacks. 
SQL injection occurs when an attacker inserts a malicious SQL query into the web 
application to manipulate data or gain access to the database (Yeole & Meshram, 2011).  For 
this variant, the Bot is trying to execute the SQL injection attack.  Not only is the Bot 
performing an SQL injection attack, in addition the Bot is mining for bitcoins.  The original 
Mirai did not perform SQL injection attacks nor did not mine for bitcoins for profit.  This 
variant shows Mirai evolving into a different attack other than a DDOS attack, which is SQL 
injection.  Not performing an attack, such as a DDoS or SQL injection, the Bots are mining 
for bitcoins.  The following sub-section provides an over view of Satori variants. 
Satori variants.  Recently, on December 12, 2017, the Satori variant was identified 
(Arzamendi, Bing, & Soluk, 2018).   The first version of Satori distinguished itself from Mirai 
in that its spreading mechanism exploits two vulnerabilities in IoT devices: (1) a “zero-day” 
in Huawei’s home gateway and (2) a command execution vulnerability in Realtek’s Universal 
Plug and Play (UPNP ) Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP ) interface (Arzamendi et al., 
2018).  Both Satori versions were clearly intended to target specific types of devices, unlike 
Mirai, which infects any device running BusyBox via telnet with a factory default username 
and password (J. A. Jerkins, 2017).   Other versions of Satori are similar to Mirai and use 
telnet to propagate (Arzamendi et al., 2018).   
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The fourth variant of Satori, is the first known Argonaut RISC Core (ARC) malware 
(Arzamendi et al., 2018).   Adding ARC malware greatly expands the potential for bots.  ARC 
processors have been licensed by more than 190 companies and are deployed in more than 1.5 
billion products a year (Arzamendi et al., 2018).  The Satori variant shows how a Mirai 
variant is going beyond the brute-force spreading mechanism of the “real-time loader” by 
exploiting two firmware vulnerabilities.  Also, Satori is expanding to an additional large set of 
potential bots from the ARC processor.  The next sub-section provides a summary of Mirai 
and variants. 
Mirai and variants summary.  Literally, Mirai variants are created daily (Kolias et 
al., 2017).  With many variants created since the Mira code was publicly released, it would be 
impossible to discuss each one.  The variants chosen provide insight into the evolution of 
Mirai variants.  Mirai first appeared on the scene to perform DDoS attacks on internet 
services.  Anna-Senpai released the code to a public forum shortly after.  After the code was 
released, variants started to be created.  Some of the variants are similar to Mirai and are 
telnet-based botnets that execute DDoS attacks.  The Mirai for rent variant added an 
additional remote access method for SSH, exploited a zero-day vulnerability, and spoofed 
Bots.  Other variants, such Satori, are not telnet-based but exploit vulnerabilities for 
propagation.  Satori included IoT devices built upon the ARC processor.   A variant was 
discovered that mines for bitcoins for profit.  Variants are utilizing new methods for 
propagation, exploiting firmware vulnerabilities, developing strategies to avoid detection, and 
are performing DDoS as well as non-DDoS attacks.  In December 2017, three hackers 
pleaded guilty to computer-crimes charges for creating and distributing Mirai ("Justice 
Department Announces Charges and Guilty Pleas in Three Computer Crime Cases Involving 
Significant DDoS Attacks," 2017).  To grasp a deeper understanding of Mirai, with a 
particular focus on how a Bot finds a new Bot Victim, the next section will discuss the Mirai 
components. 
Mirai Components 
The previous section discussed Mirai and variants.  In September 2016, the Mirai 
botnet performed DDoS attacks on internet services.  After the initial attacks on Krebs 
website and French webhost and cloud service provider OVH, the Mirai source code was 
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publicly released (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  The author, Anna-Senpai released details on 
the Mirai architecture as well as how to compile the Mirai code and operate the C&C 
(Infosecchazzy, 2019).  The “real-time-load” is explained as a distributed mechanism where a 
Bot identifies a new Bot Victim, via telnet with the factory default user-id and password, for 
upload of the malware by C&C (Kolias et al., 2017).  After the public release of the Mirai 
source code, a hacker offers Mirai for rent with as many as 400,000 Bots (Kolias et al., 2017).  
On October 2016 Mirai performed a DDoS attack on service provider Dyn (Kambourakis et 
al., 2017). With 100,000 bots, Mirai DDoS attacks on service provider Dyn triggered the 
inaccessibility to hundreds of websites in Europe and North America (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 
2017).  In March 2017, a variant appeared with bitcoin miner functionality (Kambourakis et 
al., 2017).  Recently, on December 12, 2017, the Satori variant was identified (Arzamendi et 
al., 2018).  The Satori variant shows how a Mirai variant is going beyond the brute-force 
spreading mechanism of the “real-time loader” by exploiting two firmware vulnerabilities.  
This next section discusses the Mirai components consisting of (a) a discussion of the Mirai 
operation and communication steps; (b) a discussion of the Mirai malware; (c) a discussion of 
bot scanner statistics; (d) a summary focused on the Mirai components related to the focus of 
this study.  The next sub-section discusses Mirai operational and communication steps. 
Operation and communication steps.  Researchers Kolias et al. (2017) study Mirai 
operation and communication.  Kolias et al. (2017) explain Mirai being comprised of four 
components (a) the Bot which is responsible for searching and finding new Bot Victims as 
well as executing DDoS attacks; (b) the C&C server which provides a CLI to check 
component status and command a DDoS attack; (c) the loader which uploads the malware 
onto the new Bot Victim; (d) the report server which maintains a database with details about 
the Bots.  Below, Figure 2 shows the key steps for the operation and communication for the 
Mirai components. 
 
35 
 
Figure 2. Mirai operation and communication.   
Taken from (Kolias et al., 2017, p. 81). 
 
In Figure 2 the components are depicted along with the step that corresponds with the 
operation and communication between components.  Steps [1. Brute force, 2. Report, 3. 
Check status, 4. Infect command, and 5. Malicious binary] constitute the distributed spreading 
mechanism, the “real-time-load”, which is described by Anna-Senpai (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  
Step 6. Attack command represents the C&C server commanding the Bot for executing a DoS 
attack.  Step 7. Attack represents the Bot participating in a DDoS attack.  The operational and 
communication steps are as follows: 
 In Step 1, the bot brute-forces a potential new Bot Victim to discover IoT devices 
configured with factory default user-ds and passwords. There are 62 possible factory 
default user-id and password combinations.  
 For Step 2, when a potential new Bot Victim is discovered by the Bot via remote 
access with a factory default user-id and password, the Bot forwards various new Bot 
Victim characteristics  to the report server through a different port.  The characteristics 
include the needed information, such as the IP address, user-id, password, and 
hardware architecture of the potential new Bot Victim, for the C&C loader server to 
upload the malware. 
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 In Step 3, via the C&C server, the botmaster frequently checks the report server to 
determine the new Bot Victims that require the upload of the malware as well as 
verifying the status of the Bots that comprise the botnet.  Typically, a Tor server is 
utilized to disguise and keep the IP address of the C&C server anonymous.   
 Concerning Step 4, after querying the report server for potential new Bot Victims that 
are not infected with the malware, the botmaster issues an infect command to the 
loader server, providing the necessary logon characteristics for remotely accessing the 
potential new Bot Victim.   
 For Step 5, the loader remotely accesses the potential new Bot Victim and instructs 
the potential new Bot Victim to download and execute the malware.  Once the 
malware is downloaded and executed it will attempt to protect itself from other 
malware by shutting down telnet and SSH services.  Once the malware is loaded and 
executed, the new Bot can communicate with the C&C server to receive attack 
commands. For C&C communication between the C&C and the Bot, a domain name 
is hardcoded in the malware.  The domain name is cnc.changeme.com.  The botmaster 
can change the C&C IP address without modifying the malware and without extra 
communication between the C&C and the Bot. 
 For Step 6, the botmaster commands all Bot instances to execute a DDoS against a 
targeted website.  Parameters supplied by the C&C include the type and duration of 
attack, the IP addresses of the Bots, and the target IP address of the public facing 
website server. 
 In Step 7, the Bots are commanded to start attacking the targeted server with one of 10 
available DDoS attacks contained in the malware.  The available DDoS attacks are 
Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE), TCP, and HTTP flooding attacks.  
Step 1. Brute force represents (a) a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim; (b) a 
Bot identifying a new Bot Victim by remotely accessing the new Bot Victim with the factory 
default user-id and password.  With the problem being discussed in Chapter 1 of this study, 
the focus for this study is a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim, which is a sub-step 
described for brute-forcing.  The next sub-section describes the Bot malware.  
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Bot malware.  Recent research by (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017) performed static 
analysis of the malware resident on the Bot.  The malware contains three main modules (a) 
attack; (b) killer; (3) scanner.  The Attack module is responsible for executing the DDoS 
attack commanded from the C&C.  The Killer module is responsible for killing processes that 
are associated with ports that Mirai utilizes.  The Scanner module scans for potential new Bot 
Victims.  The next sub-section describes the malware attack module. 
Malware attack module.  The Attack module parses the command received from the 
C&C server and launches the Denial of Service (DoS) attack.  There are ten different DoS 
attack functions.  Each DoS command contains its own procedure for generating the 
commanded DoS attack network traffic.  The functionality of the malware attack module is 
not part of the focus for this study.  The next sub-section describes the malware killer module.   
Malware killer module.  The Killer module kills processes associated with ports 22, 
23 and 80 and prevents applications from using these ports again.  Port 22 is associated with 
SSH.  Port 23 is used by telnet.  Port 80 is associated with Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP).  HTTP allows for the communication between web browsers and web servers 
(Mogul, 2002).  By killing applications that are using ports 22, 23, and 80, Mirai is freeing up 
those ports for use.  Therefore, the ports for telnet, SSH, and HTTP are available on the Bot.  
Killer continually scans memory trying to find and kill similar malware running on the Bot.  
The malware eliminates worms (such as the Anime, qBot, and Bashlight) with a technique 
known as memory scraping (Kambourakis et al., 2017).  The functionality of the malware 
killer module is not part of the focus for this study.  The next sub-section describes the 
malware scanner module, which is the focus of this study.       
Malware scanner module.  The Scanner module uses telnet and a random generated 
public IP address to search for a potential new Bot Victim.  Researchers Kolias et al. (2017) 
study the IP addresses that are excluded from the random generated IP address.  The US 
Postal Service, the Department of Defense, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, General 
Electric, and Hewlett-Packard are black-listed from the random generated IP list.  Suggested 
by Kolias et al. (2017),  Mirai avoids propagating to certain IP addresses in order to avoid 
detection from the US government.  Besides black-listing government IP addresses, Mirai 
does not contain any other limitations for generating random IP addresses.   
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Besides generating a random IP address, the Bot scanner code contains functionality 
for creating a socket and performing a TCP handshake (Conley, 2017).  A socket is a network 
interface that allows the Bot to communicate with TCP/IP over the internet (Koutsoubelias & 
Lalis, 2013).  Once the socket has been initialized, a TCP Handshake is performed with the 
random generated IP address.  Researchers study TCP across the internet (Arlitt & 
Williamson, 2005).  The TCP handshake exchanges Synchronize (SYN)  and 
Acknowledgement (ACK) packets to establish a connection between hosts (Arlitt & 
Williamson, 2005).  The Bot attempts to establish a connection to a new Bot Victim on ports 
23 and 2323.  The research performed by Conley (2017) supports the research performed by 
(Šemić & Mrdovic, 2017).  Semic and Mrdovic (2017) discovered that after the Bot 
establishes a connection, a telnet handshake occurs.  The next sub-section presents bot 
scanner statistics.    
Bot scanner statistics.  When the Bot has discovered a potential new Bot Victim, a 
list of 62 factory default user-id and password combinations are used to gain remote access to 
the new Bot Victim.  The new Bot Victim logon credentials are sent back to the reporting 
server (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  When the bot successfully gains access to a new Bot 
Victim, the Bot reports the new Bot Victim IP and logon credentials to the C&C server for 
malware infection and then continues scanning for a potential new Bot Victim (J. A. Jerkins, 
2017).  The Bot initiates a maximum of 128 connections per second (Kambourakis et al., 
2017).  Therefore, the Bot can connect to 128 potential new Bot Victims per second.  Once a 
minute, the Bot sends the new Bot Victim credentials to the report server on port 80 
(Kambourakis et al., 2017).  The Bot establishes a raw socket connection to C&C server to 
receive DoS commands (Kambourakis et al., 2017).   The botmaster uses the Command Line 
Interface (CLI) on the C&C server to command attacks as well as manage Mirai (J. A. 
Jerkins, 2017).  The next sub-section provides a summary of Mirai components focused on a 
Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim. 
Mirai components summary.  Recent research by (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017) 
performed static analysis of the malware resident on the Bot.  The malware contains three 
main modules (a) attack; (b) killer; (c) scanner.  With the focus for this study being a Bot 
scanning for a potential new Bot Victim, the Scanner module is the central focus for this 
study.  The Bot attempts to establish a connection to a new Bot Victim on ports 23 and 2323.  
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The Scanner module uses telnet and a random generated public IP address to search for a 
potential new Bot Victim.  When the Bot successfully gains access to a new Bot Victim, the 
Bot reports the new Bot Victim IP and logon credentials to the C&C server for malware 
infection and then continues scanning for a potential new Bot Victim (J. A. Jerkins, 2017).  
The next sub-section surveys peer-reviewed journals focused on Mirai mitigation strategies.   
Mirai Mitigation  
The previous section discusses Mirai components.  Kolias et al. (2017) explain Mirai 
being comprised of four components (a) the Bot is responsible for searching and finding new 
Bot Victims as well as executing DDoS attacks; (b) the C&C server provides a CLI to check 
component status and command a DDoS attack; (c) the loader uploads the malware onto the 
new Bot Victim; (d) the report server maintains a database with details about the Bots.  Being 
part of the first component described by Kolias et al. (2017), the focus for this study is a Bot 
scanning a potential new Bot Victim.  The Bot malware is constantly generating random IP 
addresses and attempting to establish a connection to the potential new Bot Victim via a TCP 
handshake (Šemić & Mrdovic, 2017).   
This next section discusses the Mirai mitigation consisting of (a) a discussion of IoT 
vulnerabilities related to weak passwords; (b) a discussion of cataloguing IoT devices 
vulnerable to Mirai infection; (c) a discussion inoculating IoT devices from Mirai infection; 
(d) a discussion protecting IoT devices from Mirai infection; (e) a discussion of network 
traffic analysis that suggests network signatures for Mirai detection; (f) a summary of Mirai 
mitigation.   
Weak passwords.  Recent research conducted by (Whitter-Jones, 2018) reviews IoT 
security.  The IoT attack surface includes Plug and Play mechanics of devices that are 
vulnerable to brute forcing of default credentials and DoS attacks.  There is a problem with 
the integration of IoT devices within an already established network domain that utilized 
Active Directories and policies.  IoT devices do not have the capabilities of connecting to 
Active Directory.  Group policies and password policies are not applied. Device setup by an 
individual could allow for weak passwords (Whitter-Jones, 2018).  Concerning default 
credentials and access controls, Whitter-Jones (2018) emphasize that requiring consumers to 
change default passwords would provide a greater layer of security and would reduce the risk 
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of Mirai infection.  Researcher Jerkins (2017) explains that manufacturers are not currently 
motivated by market forces or regulatory requirements to improve the security of IoT.  
Consumers are not concerned with security.   The next sub-section describes cataloguing IoT 
devices vulnerable to Mirai infection.  
Cataloguing vulnerable IoT devices.  J. A. Jerkins (2017) creates a Mirai variant to 
catalog vulnerable devices.  The device type, manufacturer, firmware version, and network 
address are catalogued.  An email is sent to the owner of the network for the vulnerable 
device. There are legal challenges with this approach for securing IoT.  Laws, statutes, and 
regulations exist concerning computer intrusion and abuse in the United States (J. A. Jerkins, 
2017).  Researchers Jerkins and Stupiansky (2018) clarify that one of the most frequently 
exploited design flaws is being unable to change device default credentials since the default 
credentials are embedded into the firmware.  Another vulnerability is the lack of a method for 
manufacturers to provide security updates.  The next sub-section describes inoculating IoT 
devices from Mirai infection.   
Inoculation.  James A. Jerkins and Stupiansky (2018) propose a method for limiting 
the spreading of malware through inoculation epidemics.  A harmless virus would search for 
IoT devices that are vulnerable to malware infection.  Once a vulnerable device was 
encountered, the harmless virus would inoculate the device by execution of a reboot (James 
A. Jerkins & Stupiansky, 2018).  A simulation showed that inoculated devices slowed down 
the spread of the malware.  Researchers James A. Jerkins and Stupiansky (2018) believe that 
if the inoculation cannot prevent the Mirai epidemic from occurring it can slow down the 
Mirai infection and provide time to react to the Mirai infection.  This research prevents the 
spread of Mirai by restarting the IoT device.  A simulation has shown that restarting the IoT 
device can inhibit the spread of Mirai.  The research is not focused on preventing the infection 
of IoT devices from the Mirai malware.  The next sub-section discusses protecting IoT 
devices from infection.  
Protecting IoT devices from infection.  Current research conducted by authors Frank 
et al. (2017) conduct experiments for protecting an IoT device from Mirai.  A device 
hardening script puts a wrapper around the firmware that prevents the upload of the malware 
from the loader.  Another script executing in the background detects open ports associated 
with Mirai.  The ports are closed, and the programs associated with the ports are killed 
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preventing further processing.  The combination of the hardening and detecting scripts protect 
the IoT device from Mirai malware infection. 
  Contrasting the research conducted by James A. Jerkins and Stupiansky (2018), the 
research performed by Frank et al. (2017) does not require the IoT device to be rebooted to 
eliminate the Mirai malware infection.  Future research suggests developing network 
signatures for determining indicators of compromise for the IoT device (Frank et al., 2017).  
The next sub-section presents Mirai network traffic analysis.  
Network traffic analysis.  Conley (2017) analyzed Mira network traffic with a 
network packet sniffer.  Network packets were gathered for destination port 23.  The contents 
of the packets contained the factory default user-id and password.  The dynamic analysis 
performed by Conley (2017) supports recent research performed that Mirai is a telnet-based 
botnet that contains a list of factory default user-ids and passwords for remote access (J. A. 
Jerkins, 2017; Kambourakis et al., 2017; Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).   
Mirai does not try to avoid detection (Kolias et al., 2017).  Network or host-based signatures 
can detect Mirai (Kambourakis et al., 2017).   Since the focus of this study is counting the 
number of Bots and potential new Bot Victims from a recorded Bot scanner dataset, this study 
does not focus on experimenting with network signatures to detect the Bot scanning 
mechanism.  Even though the focus of this research is not experimenting with network 
signatures for Bot detection, the Bot scanner code review and the analysis of the Bot scanner 
network packets from the dataset reveal the necessary information to develop network 
signatures for Bot scanning detection.   
During Mirai infection network traffic on telnet ports 23 and 2323 can be monitored, 
which is barraged with logon attempts to gain access to the IoT device (Kambourakis et al., 
2017).  Mirai contains a list of factory default user-ids and passwords which signatures can 
detect (Jonsdottir, Wood, & Doshi, 2017).  Current research performed by (Šemić & Mrdovic, 
2017) with a honeypot, shows that the Bot establishes a connection, performs the telnet 
handshake, and successfully logs in with the factory default user-id and password.  Once the 
Bot logs in, the honeypot receives several successive inputs (a) enable; (b) system; (c) shell; 
(d) sh.  These inputs are to attain access to the new Bot Victim shell (Šemić & Mrdovic, 
2017).  
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 Mirai botnet researchers Kolias et al. (2017) study communication patterns between 
the loader and a new Bot Victim, during the upload of the malware.  Shown below, Figure 3 
shows the network traffic between the loader and the new Bot Victim.   
 
 
Figure 3. Network patterns between the loader and the new Bot Victim. 
Taken from (Kolias et al., 2017, p. 821). 
 
Figure 3 shows that patterns of the network traffic are indicative of the malware 
infection.  Session times vary, but the type of messages, packet sizes, and the sequence of 
messages form a pattern.  Similar to research performed by Kolias et al. (2017) for analyzing 
network traffic, researchers Sinanović & Mrdovic (2017) perform dynamic analysis of the 
network communication between the C&C and Bot during a DDoS attack.  Experimentation 
performed by Sinanović and Mrdovic (2017) was successful in detecting Bot DDoS with 
network signatures.  A signature was suggested to prevent Mirai infection from an external 
network.  Supporting the view of Kolias et al. (2017), Sinanović and Mrdovic (2017) suggest 
it is possible to create network signatures for all parts of Mirai operation.  Network signatures 
seem to be the best and easiest way to detect and stop Mirai.  Future research is suggested for 
creating a more complex test environment to see how a Bot brute-forces a new potential Bot 
Victim.  The next sub-section provides a summary for this section.  
Mirai mitigation summary.  The IoT attack surface includes Plug and Play 
mechanics of devices that are vulnerable to brute forcing of default credentials and DoS 
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attacks (Whitter-Jones, 2018).  Researcher Jerkins (2017) explains that manufacturers are not 
currently motivated by market forces or regulatory requirements to improve the security of 
IoT.  James A. Jerkins and Stupiansky (2018) propose a method for limiting the spreading of 
malware through inoculation epidemics.  Research performed by James A. Jerkins and 
Stupiansky (2018) prevents the spread of Mirai by restarting the IoT device.  A simulation has 
shown that restarting the IoT device can inhibit the spread of Mirai.  Current research 
conducted by authors Frank et al. (2017) conduct experiments for protecting an IoT device 
from Mirai.  A device hardening script puts a wrapper around the firmware that prevents the 
upload of the malware from the loader.  Another script executing in the background detects 
open ports associated with Mirai. The ports are closed, and the programs associated with the 
ports are killed from further processing.  Network traffic has been analyzed and signatures are 
suggested for Mirai detection (J. A. Jerkins, 2017; Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 
2017).  The next section discusses network traffic analysis tools. 
Network Traffic Analysis Solutions 
Solutions have been created to analyze network traffic.  These solutions vary in their 
capability and intended purpose.  Two major categories of network traffic analysis tools are: 
packet sniffers and network intrusion detection systems.  This section will discuss the features 
and limitations of packet sniffers and network intrusion detection systems.  A summary is 
provided discussing how the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype addresses these 
limitations.  The next sub-section discusses packet sniffers. 
Packet sniffers.  A packet sniffer, also known as a network or protocol analyzer, is a 
program running on a network attached device that passively records all network traffic 
(Asrodia & Patel, 2012).  Some popular packet sniffers include Wireshark, Tcpdump, and 
Windump.  Tcpdump is a Unix and Linux command-line program for capturing network 
traffic.  Packet sniffers save captured network traffic to a PCAP file.  Packet sniffers contain 
two forms of analysis: real time and batch.  Real time analysis is performed as the network 
packets are being captured.  Batch analysis is performed from a captured PCAP file (Asrodia 
& Patel, 2012).  Based upon the network packet type, the packet sniffer parses the network 
traffic to the appropriate packet fields.  Using a packet sniffer, the user is able to determine 
the network protocol associated with the packet as well as the packet field values.   
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Although packet sniffers capture network traffic, they provide limited functionality for 
summing packets based upon packet fields, storing summation results in a persistent database, 
producing customized reports, and providing customized graphical output.  Tcpdump and 
Windump do not provide the functionality for summation of packets, a persistent database of 
summation analysis, the ability to produce reports, and display line graphs.  Wireshark 
provides a GUI that does provided for searching thru the network packets based upon filters 
of packet field values.  Wireshark can count the number of packets based upon the filter 
values.  Although Wireshark contains a GUI with filtering and summation capabilities, similar 
to Tcpdump and Windump, a persistent database in not available for storing the summation 
and packet analysis results required for the research performed in this study.  Each 
instantiation of a packet sniffer requires performing the summation and analysis of the PCAP 
file since the results are not stored in a persistent database.  With the Bot scanner dataset 
containing 304 PCAP files and total size of 3.88 GB, a persistent database of summation 
results per PCAP file is required to produce the reports and line graphs near real time.  Also, 
Wireshark does not contain the reports or line graphs necessary for providing the information 
corresponding to the terms specified in this research for Bots and potential new Bot Victims.  
The next sub-section discusses network intrusion detection systems.     
Network intrusion detection systems.  Network Intrusion Detection Systems, known 
as NIDS, monitor the network traffic and produce alerts that are logged in a file on the 
operating system.  Also, NIDS can alert on a captured PCAP file.  The alerts are forwarded to 
a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system for further analysis and 
reporting (Nagaraja & Kumar, 2018).  There are two categories of NIDS: signature-based and 
anomaly based.  Signature-based NIDS compare the captured packets against a database of 
known vulnerabilities and malicious signatures to detect cyber-attacks (Kumar & Singh, 
2012).  Snort, Suricata, and Bro are examples of signature-based NIDS (Thongkanchorn, 
Ngamsuriyaroj, & Visoottiviseth, 2013).  Anomaly-based NIDS detect anomalies with a 
comparison to base-lined network traffic (W. Zhang, Yang, & Geng, 2009).  DarkTrace is an 
example of an anomaly-based NIDS that deploys artificial intelligence and anomaly detection 
for an immune system that prevents cyber-attacks (Darktrace, 2018).   
The limitations for NIDS is similar to the limitations for packet sniffers.  NIDS send 
alerts to a SIEM.  NIDS lack the capabilities for summation of network packets, summing 
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packets based upon packet fields, storing summation results in a persistent database, 
producing customized reports, and providing customized graphical output.  Therefore, NIDS 
only produce alerts and cannot perform analysis required for research presented in this 
dissertation.  NIDS rely upon a SIEM for providing a persistent database for storing the alerts 
and allowing for additional analysis with customized reporting and customized dashboards 
containing graphs.  Requirements for a solution to analyze the Bot scanner dataset include 
being able to execute the solution on a PC with Windows 10 and the solution should be self-
contained, not requiring additional solutions for reporting and graphing.  Based upon 
requirements, SIEM integration with NIDS does not meet the requirements for a solution of 
this dissertation.  The next subsection provides a summary comparing network traffic analysis 
solutions to the Mira Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.               
Network traffic analysis solutions summary.  Packet sniffers record network traffic.  
Tcpdump and Windump are command-line solutions for packet capture and analysis.  
Wireshark provides a GUI for packet capture and analysis.  Packet sniffers do not contain the 
filters for identifying a Bot or a potential new Bot Victim.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype contains the functionality for analyzing the Bot scanner dataset.  The user of the 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype does not need to know the filters or logic for 
summation.  The user provides a date range and the summation is performed.  The Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype contains a persistent database of summation results based upon 
each PCAP file analyzed.  The persistent database will provide for near real time reports and 
graphs.  The reports and graphs contain the terms defined in this dissertation, Bot and 
potential new Bot Victim, thus providing information that is easily comprehensible to a user 
who has read this dissertation.  NIDS suffer from similar limitations as packet sniffers.  NIDS 
do not provide the functionality for the summation of the Bot scanner mechanism per PCAP 
file, persistence of the summation analysis per PCAP file, and reports and graphs with 
terminology from this dissertation.  NIDS produce alerts in a log file that is sent to a SEIM for 
persistence and analysis.  The Bot Scanner Summation Prototype is a self-contained solution 
that meets all of the requirements for analyzing the Bot scanner dataset.  The next section 
provides a chapter summary for the literature review.          
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Chapter Summary  
Chapter 2 focused on the literature review, which indicated that Mirai is a concern.  
Although research regarding Mirai exists, an anomaly is present regarding performing 
experimentation for identifying A Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  The topics 
discussed in the chapter include (a) a discussion of DDoS attacks; (b) a discussion on a survey 
for Mirai and variants; (c) a discussion on the Mirai components; (d) a discussion on current 
research focused on Mirai mitigation; (e) a discussion of network traffic analysis solutions.  
The completed literature review answered questions regarding a Bot scanning for a potential 
new Bot Victim.  Chapter 3 developed the design for the quantitative research method for this 
study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
The focus of this study is to perform experimentation with the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Prototype from a recorded Mirai Bot scanner dataset for tabulation of Bots scanning for 
potential new Bot Victims.  Chapter 2 surveyed existing literature that applies to the 
background of this study and supports the focus of this study.  DDoS attacks were reviewed. 
Mirai and variants were discussed.  Mirai command and communication was studied.  Mirai 
mitigation techniques were discussed.  Network traffic analysis tools were reviewed and 
compared to the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.   In the following sections, Chapter 
3 presents (a) the research method justification; (b) rationale for the research approach; (c) 
research data sources; (d) data analysis methods; (e) limitations and delimitations; (f) 
summary of the research methodology.  The following sub-section discusses the research 
method justification.  
Research Method Justification 
DSR focuses on the development of solutions for practical problems (Cleven et al., 
2009; Kampling et al., 2016; Offermann et al., 2009).  DSR provides a framework for the 
development and evauluation of the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype (Cleven et al., 2009).   
There are many different research methods to investigate problems or implementations 
(Wieringa, 2014).  DSR author Wieringa (2014) describes the following research methods: 
survey, single case mechanism, technical action research, and statistical difference-making 
experiments.  Instances of an implementation or of a problem is surveyed to gathered statistics 
for evaluation and problem investigation.  A single case mechanism experiment applies 
stimuli and explains the response.  Technical Action Research (TAR) is the evaluation of an 
artifact in a real-world problem.  Statistical difference-making experiments compare the 
average outcome to samples.            
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A survey was not appropriate as a research method for this dissertation since the focus 
of this research is solely technical.  This study did not perform a statistical difference-making 
experiment since only one Bot Scanner dataset is experimented with.  In TAR, single cases are 
experimented with, but the experimentation is not performed to answer a question.  TAR is 
done in the field under real-world conditions.  TAR is not an appropriate research method for 
this study since this study answers three research questions concerning the evaluation of the 
Bot scanner dataset with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  A single case 
mechanism best describes the research method for this study.  Usually, single case 
experiments are performed in a laboratory to test a prototype.  A prototype serves as 
inspiration for those that come later (Prototype, n.d.).  A case study is performed evaluating 
the Bot Scanner Summation Prototype with a captured Bot scanner network dataset.  The next 
section discusses the rationale for the research approach.    
Rationale for Research Approach 
Current research has performed experimentation to evaluate network traffic when the 
Mirai malware is uploaded onto the new Bot Victim (Frank et al., 2017; Kolias et al., 2017).  
Additional research has been focused on evaluating the network traffic from a Mirai DDoS 
attack (Kambourakis et al., 2017; Margolis, Oh, Jadhav, Kim, & Kim, 2017; Sinanović & 
Mrdovic, 2017).  Additional research has focused on the Mirai malware code (J. A. Jerkins, 
2017; Roses, 2016; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  While current research has been focused on 
various aspects of the Mirai botnet, research is far from being exhausted covering the various 
communications and operations of Mirai.  
Anna-Senpai, the creator of Mirai, boasts about the spreading of Mirai (Infosecchazzy, 
2019).   The Mirai spreading mechanism consists of a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot 
Victim and then brute-forcing the Bot Victim with a factory default user-id and password. The 
literature review of this study did not reveal research focused on evaluating network traffic 
from the Mirai spreading mechanism.  Specifically, new research can be conducted to 
evaluate network traffic when a Bot is scanning for a new Bot Victim.  Following the DSR 
research phases described by researchers Cleven et al. (2009), the research approach for the 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype solution included in this section presents (a) 
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problem identification; (b) requirements specification; (c) design; (d) evaluation; (e) 
communication.  The next sub-section provides a discussion for problem identification.   
Problem identification.  Review of network traffic analysis tools demonstrated that 
the requirements of this study could not be met for summation of a Bot scanner dataset with 
current network traffic analysis tools, such as packet sniffers and NIDS.  Packet sniffers and 
NIDS do not contain the capabilities for summating the Bot scanner dataset or the 
functionality for creating reports and line graphs based upon a date-range of the dataset.  
Packet sniffers and NIDS do not contain a persistent database for storing the Bot scanning 
summation for each PCAP file of the dataset.  NIDS send alerts to a SIEM for additional 
analysis typically including reporting and dashboards.  The Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype was developed as a practical solution to meet the requirements of being self-
contained to evaluate a Bot scanner dataset to summate Bots, potential new Bot Victims, and 
network packet totals.  The next sub-section presents the requirements for the Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype. 
Requirements specification.  The requirements for this study are based upon 
functional requirements, nonfunctional properties, and additional tool requirements for 
performing experimentation with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  The 
functional requirements define the required functions for the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype.  Below, Table 1 provides a description of the functional requirements including the 
functions and their descriptions.        
 
Table 1 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype Functional Requirements 
Requirement Description 
PCAP The captured network traffic must be in PCAP format.  
  
SYN The PCAP file must only contain Bot Scanner SYN network 
packets for summation. 
 
Bot Summation Bots and potential new Bot Victims summation from PCAP. 
 
Network Packet 
Summation 
TCP SYN and retransmission packets summation from PCAP. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype Functional Requirements 
 
Requirement Description 
Persistent Database The NoSQL MongoDB v1.14.6 provides a database for 
persistence of the summation.  The MongoDB will contain the 
summation results from the Python scripts.    
Python 
Programming 
Modules 
All of the artificial scripts are written in Python v2.7.  The 
required modules are: 
 
 The Scapy v2.4 module is required for reading a PCAP 
file during summation.   
 The Pandas DataFrame v0.23.0 module is required for 
providing a high-performance data structure for 
summation.   
 The Bokeh 1.0.0 module provides the graphical 
capabilities.  
 
Date Range All Reports and Graphs require a date range.  The date range 
allows for the monitoring of the Bot Scanner mechanism over 
time with the Reports and Graphs. 
 
Reports The reports will be produced from reading the summation 
stored in a table of the persistent database.  Three required 
reports: 
  
1. A report is required for summation of Bots and potential 
new Bot Victims.  
2. A report is required for summation of network packets.  
3. A report is required for the run-time of summation.  
  
Graphs The graphs will be produced from reading the summation 
stored in a table of the persistent database. Three required 
graphs: 
  
1. A line graph is required for summated Bots.   
2. A line graph is required for summated new potential Bot 
Victims.   
3. A line graph will compare summated packet totals. 
 
 
Shown above in Table 1, functional requirements are defined for the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype.  The dataset is required to contain Bot scanning traffic 
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recorded in PCAP file format.  The dataset is limited to SYN network packets, representing 
Bots attempting to connect to potential new Bot Victims.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype is required to summate Bots as well potential new Bot Victims.  An additional 
requirement is the summation of network packets.  The MongoDB v1.14.6 is required for 
providing a persistent layer of summation that is powerful and scalable (Chodorow, 2013).   
Several Python programming modules are required.  The Scapy v2.4 module is 
required for reading a PCAP file during summation.  Scapy provides the functions for 
manipulating network traffic contained in a PCAP file (Biondi, 2011).  The Pandas 
DataFrame v0.23.0 module is required for providing a high-performance data structure for 
summation (McKinney, 2010).  The Bokeh 1.0.0 module provides the graphical capabilities 
(Barnard & Mertik, 2015). 
A date range is required for reports and graphs.  The date range provides the 
functionality for monitoring the Bot scanning mechanism by being able to assess the 
summation during a specified date period.  Three reports are required for evaluating the Bot 
scanning mechanism.  The required reports include a report summation of Bots and potential 
new Bot Victims, a separate report for summation of network packets, and another report for 
the run-time of summation.  Three graphs are required for providing visual analysis of the Bot 
scanner dataset.  The graphs include a line graph for summated Bots, a distinct line graph for 
summated new potential Bot Victims, and another line graph for comparing summated packet 
totals.  Shown below, Table 2 contains the nonfunctional properties for the Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype. 
 
Table 2 
Bot Scanner Summation Prototype Nonfunctional Properties 
Requirement Description 
Hardware A Dell PC running the Windows 10 Operating System (OS) 
with 12 Gigabytes (GB) of memory, 500 GB hard drive, and an 
Intel Core i5 2.20 Gigahertz (GHz) processor. 
 
Development Costs The development of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype solution must be done with free and open tools.  There 
is no budget for development. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Bot Scanner Summation Prototype Nonfunctional Properties 
 
Requirement Description 
Operational Costs There are no operational costs. The Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype is free to use and incurs no operational 
costs.  
   
Self-containment The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype does not interface 
with any other systems.  It is self-contained.  All of the 
components of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
must reside on the same PC. 
 
Real time analysis The reports and line graphs must be generated real time.   
 
       
  Shown above for Table 2, the nonfunctional properties define the operation of the 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  The hardware requirements specify the computing 
environment for this study.  Experimentation was performed on a Dell PC running the 
Windows 10 Operating System (OS) with 12 Gigabytes (GB) of memory, 500GB hard drive, 
and an Intel Core i5 2.20 GigaHertz (GHz) processor.  The hardware requirement represents 
the suggested minimum hardware configure for the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
solution.  Strict requirements state no development or operational costs.  The Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype is self-contained and does not require interfacing with any 
other systems.  Experimentation for this study was performed with all the components of the 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype residing on the same PC, including all of the Python 
scripts, the MongoDB database, and the Bot scanner dataset.  Real time assessment is a 
requirement for reporting and the graphing.  Besides Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
requirements and nonfunctional properties, two additional tools are required for performing 
experimentation.  Shown below in Table 3, the requirements for additional tools are 
described. 
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Table 3 
Additional Tool Requirements 
Requirement Description 
Network 
Traffic 
Analysis 
The Wireshark v2.6 packet sniffer is required for analyzing a packet of the 
Bot Scanner dataset (Wireshark, 2019).  Experimentation performed in this 
study verifies the Bot scanner dataset by using Wireshark to sample a PCAP 
file to study the contents of the network packets. 
 
Text Editor The Sublime v3.0 text editor is required for performing the Bot scanner and 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype code review.  Sublime allows for 
scrolling thru the code as well as contains a search function that allows 
reviewing targeted lines of code based upon the search value (Sublime, 
2019). 
 
 
A requirement for the network traffic analysis is the Wireshark v2.6 pack sniffer.  The 
Wireshark packet sniffer contains a GUI for analyzing the contents of the packets of the Bot 
scanner dataset (Asrodia & Patel, 2012).  Sampling a PCAP file from the dataset, analysis 
performed with Wireshark verified the Bot scanner dataset for only containing network traffic 
for TCP SYN packets and retransmission packets.  The Sublime text editor is required for the 
code review.  Sublime contains features, such as scrolling thru the lines of code and searching 
for specific task, that make it a good choice for the text editor (Kinder, 2013).  The 
requirements and nonfunctional properties have been defined.   The next sub-section discusses 
the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype design work.                
Design work.  The design work for the Mira Bot Scanner Summation Prototype is 
based upon an architectural structure.  An architectural structure consists of components that 
interact with each other.  Typically, programs contain components that communicate with 
each other for a desired result (Wieringa, 2014).  Shown below, Figure 4 depicts the 
architectural components of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.             
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Figure 4. Mira Bot Scanner Summation Prototype architectural components. 
 
Shown above in Figure 4, the summation component, or process, consists of reading 
the PCAP files of the dataset.  The summation process tabulates each PCAP file to summate 
the Bots, potential new Bot Victims, and SYN and retransmission packets.  The summation 
process stores the tabulated results from each PCAP file in a persistent database table.  The 
assessment process queries the database for the summated data to produce reports and line 
graphs.  The assessment of the Bot scanner dataset can only be performed from summated 
PCAP files.  The summation process is independent of the assessment process.  The 
summation component can be in the process of tabulating a PCAP file while the assessment 
component is querying the database.  Both components, summation and assessment, are 
dependent upon the persistent database.  The following sub-section discusses the summation 
component in detail. 
Summation.  In DSR a method is described as a type of artifact (Offermann et al., 
2009).  A method can describe an algorithm.  Shown below for Figure 5, the summation 
method, or algorithm: 
 
//Initialization 
Total_Bots = 0, Total_Potential_New_Bot_Victims = 0, Total_SYN = 0 
Total_Retransmission = 0, Total_Packets = 0, Starting_Time = 0, Ending_Time = 0 
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Packet_date = 0, L = [], S= [], SUBNETS = [] 
Starting_Time = now 
Packet_date = date_from_filename(PCAP) 
 
// Read the network packets of the PCAP file 
Insert into list L the source and destination IP of each network packet 
 
// Go thru each element of L 
For i in L  
         // Summate total packets 
         Total_Packets = Total_Packets + 1 
 
         // Determine subnet of destination IP 
         Add Subnet(L[i].destination_IP) to SUBNETS 
 
         // Unique source IP represents a Bot 
         If the count(L[i].source_IP in L)  == 1 
              Total_Bots = Total_Bots + 1 
 
         // Unique SYN packet 
         If the count (L[i] in L)  == 1 
             Insert L[i].destination_IP into S 
             Total_SYN = Total_SYN + 1 
 
         // Retransmission packet 
         If the count (L[i])  > 1 
             Total_Retransmission = Total_Retransmission + 1 
 
   // Go thru each destinaion IP in S 
   For j in S 
          // a unique destination IP in S represent a potential New Bot Victim 
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          If the count(L[j] in S)  == 1 
              Total_Potential_New_Bot_Vicitms =  
                                          Total_Potential_New_Bot_Vicitms + 1 
 
Ending_Time = now 
 
//Insert summation results into the database 
Insert Total_Bots, Total_Potential_New_Bot_Victims, SUBNETS  
    Total_SYN, Total_Retransmission, Total_Packets,   
    Starting_Time, Ending_Time,  Packet_date  
            Into 
    Persistent Storage     
Figure 5. Summation algorithm.       
 
 Shown above in Figure 5, the summation algorithm starts with initialization.  The 
network packets are read, and the source and destination IP of each packet is inserted into list 
L.  Searching through the items in L,  Total_Packets is summated, Total_Bots is summated 
from the unique source_IP within L, and the SUBNETS list is constructed from the 
destination_IP.  The S list is built to contain the destination_IPs from unique SYN packets, 
Total_SYN and Total_Retransmission is tabulated.  Once the search is complete through L, S 
is searched to summate Total_Potential_New_Bots based upon unique destination_IP within 
S.  The summation algorithm analyzes network traffic of a Bot scanner dataset to identify a 
Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  The summation algorithm is able to analyze Bot 
scanning network traffic to tabulate Bots, potential New Bot Victims, and Bot scanner 
network packets.  The starting and ending time of the summation is tracked.  The summation 
results are stored in the persistent database. 
 Instantiation describes implemented and prototype systems (Offermann et al., 2009).  
The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype is written entirely in Python and relies heavily 
upon the Pandas DataFrame for summating the network packets based upon DataFrame query 
parameters.  The Mirai botnet researcher will supply the PCAP file names for summation.  
For each PCAP file, the summation component must identify the Bots and potential new Bot 
57 
Victims.  The Scapy rdpcap function allows the summation process to read all of the SYN 
packets contained in the PCAP file (Biondi, 2018).   For each SYN packet, the source and 
destination IP are inserted in a Python list.  The source and destination IP lists are put in a 
Pandas DataFrame for querying ("Pandas: powerful Python data analysis toolkit," 2018).   
Shown below, Table 4 contains the queries of the DataFrame for summation. 
 
Table 4 
Pandas DataFrame Summation Results 
Query Description Summation Result 
Query the number of unique source IP 
addresses 
 
Summation of Bots 
Query number of unique destination IP 
addresses contained in unique SYN packets 
 
Summation of potential new Bot Victims 
Query the number of unique SYN packets Summation of SYN packets 
   
Shown above in Table 4, The DataFrame is queried to determine the number of unique 
source IP addresses.  Since the source IP represents the Bot, this query summates the Bots.  
The number of unique destination IP addresses contained in unique SYN packets is queried 
from the DataFrame.  A unique SYN packet contains a unique source and destination IP 
address combination.  Since the destination IP represents the potential new Bot Victim, the 
potential new Bot Victims are summated from the unique SYN packets.  The prototype 
identifies a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim for the tabulation of Bots and 
potential new Bot Victims.  Unique SYN packets represent SYN packets without a 
retransmission.  The number of unique SYN packets are summated.  Non-unique SYN 
packets represent retransmission packets.  The amount of retransmission packets is calculated 
by subtracting the number of unique SYN packets from the total packet count of the PCAP 
file.  Also, the runtime information, starting and ending date and time, is recorded for each 
PCAP summation.  The summations and runtime information are stored in a persistent 
database.   The next sub-section presents the details of the persistent database.  
Persistent database.  The summation totals for each PCAP file are stored in a 
MongoDB (Chodorow & Dirolf, 2010).  MongoDB provides an interface to programming 
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languages, such as Python, for the persistent storage and retrieval of data.  Research has 
shown MongoDB to be a powerful and scalable database for websites (Chodorow, 2013).  
Shown below, Table 5 presents the fields of the summation table within MongoDB.   
  
Table 5 
Summation Database Table Fields 
Field Description 
packet_date Date of the packet capture 
dest_subnet List of destination subnets 
total_packets Packet summation 
total_syn_packets Unique SYN packet summation 
total_retransmission_packets Retransmission packet summation 
total_bots Bot summation 
total_potential_new_bot_victims Potential new Bot Victim summation 
  
Shown above in table 5, the packet_date field holds the date determined from the 
name of the PCAP file of the Bot scanner dataset (Internet Addresses Census dataset, 
IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  The dest_subnet 
contains a list of destination subnets from the dataset.  Total_packets represents the total 
amount of network packets contain in the PCAP file.  Total_syn_packets contains the 
summated unique SYN packets.  Total_retransmission_packets contains the summated 
retransmission packets.  Total_bots represents the Bot summation.  The field 
total_potential_new_bot_victims contains the summation for the potential new Bot Victims.  
The persistent database provides a data source for assessing the summation with reports and 
graphs.  Besides the summation table, another table stores the runtime for each PCAP 
summation.  The runtime table contains the PCAP date along with the start and ending date 
and time for the summating the PCAP file.  This information helps to access summation 
performance.  The following sub-section provides details for the assessment component. 
Assessment.  The assessment component provides reports.  The reports require a date 
range for searching the database.  Detail and summary reports are produced from records 
contained in the database from the summation process.  The detail and summary reports are 
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similar in functionality.  Based upon the report specified, dataset or runtime, the detail report 
will report on each record from the database that resides within the date range.  Concerning 
summary reports, the database is queried in the same manner as detailed reports with the 
difference being that each database record is summated.  Figure 6 presents the reporting 
algorithm: 
 
// Initialization 
L = [] 
S = [] 
 
// Search the database 
//Add to list L the records of the database that fall within the date range 
L  Select records from Summation database that fall within a date range. 
 
// Sum up the L list 
If the report is a summary report 
 For i in L 
  S = S + i 
 
// Report on the details from L 
If the report is a details report 
 For i in L 
  Print i 
 
// Report on summary from S 
If the report is a summary report 
 Print S 
 Figure 6. Assessment reporting algorithm. 
 
Shown above in Figure 6, the assessment reporting algorithm starts by initializing the 
L and S list.  The L list represents the detail records from the summation database that fall 
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within the date range.  The S list represents the summation of the details.  Based upon a date 
range parameter, the detail records are loaded into L.  If a summary report is required, each 
item in L is summed together to form S.  For a detail report, the contents of L is reported on.  
Concerning a summary report, the contents of S is reported on.  
The botnet researcher selects the desired report and provides a date range for the 
assessment.  The assessment component searches the MongoDB database for the summated 
records that fall within the date range.  The reports generated from the assessment component 
are: 
 PCAP Runtime Details; 
 PCAP Runtime Summary; 
 Dataset Details; 
 Dataset Summary. 
There are two PCAP reports and two Dataset reports.  The PCAP Runtime Details 
report provides the detailed runtime information for each PCAP file from the persistent 
runtime table.  The detailed runtime information includes the starting and ending date and 
time for each PCAP file.  The PCAP Runtime Summary report summarizes the runtime 
information for the PCAP files within the date range.  The summary information includes the 
number of PCAP files within the date range and the average processing time.  The Dataset 
Details report provides the PCAP details from the summation table.  It provides the number of 
packets, the number of Bots, and the amount of potential new Bot Victims per PCAP.  The 
Dataset Summary report summarizes the Bot scanning mechanism from the PCAP files within 
the date range.  
Besides detail and summary reports, graphs are provided for visual assessment.  
Similar to reports, the graphs require a date range for searching the database.  Graphs are 
produced from records contained in the database from the summation process.  Similar 
functionality is required for generating the various graphs provided by the assessment 
component.  Figure 7 presents the graphing algorithm: 
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// Initialization 
L = [] 
 
// Search the database 
// Add to list L the records of the database that fall within the date range. 
L  Select records from Summation database that fall within a date range. 
 
// Draw line_graph from list L  
For i in L 
    draw_line_graph(i) 
 
Figure 7. Assessment graphing algorithm.  
 
Shown above in Figure 7, the assessment graphing algorithm initializes the L a list.  
The L list is constructed from the database search for the records that fall within the date 
range.  A line graph is drawn for each item, or field, in L.  
The researcher selects the desired line graph and provides a date range for the 
assessment.  The assessment component searches the MongoDB database for the summated 
records that fall within the date range.  Several line graphs are available for assessment: 
 Bot Totals; 
 Potential new Bot Victim Totals; 
 Bot Averages; 
 Potential new Bot Victim Averages; 
 Network Packet Totals. 
  Based upon the date range provided by the botnet researcher, the summation table is 
queried.  The Bokeh Python library contains a function for producing a line graph (Team, 
2014).  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype utilizes the Bokeh line function for 
plotting the line graph.  A distinct line graph is produced for Bot Totals, Potential new Bot 
Victim Totals, Bot Averages, Potential new Bot Victim Averages, and Network Packet 
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Totals.  The reports and line graphs provide the necessary information for the researcher to 
access, or monitor, the Bot scanning mechanism over time.  The next sub-section presents the 
artifacts. 
Artifacts.  Artifacts can be methods, techniques, notations, and algorithms in software 
(Wieringa, 2014).  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Protoype consists of Python programs 
that contain the methods, or functions, for implementing the algorithms for the summation 
and assessment process.  The prototype contains two components that interact with the 
persistent MongoDB database.  The summation component summates the Bot scanner dataset 
while the assessment component provides reports and graphs.  Both components are written in 
the Python scripting language.  Shown below in Table 6, the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype contains summation and assessment Python scripts. 
 
Table 6 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype Python Scripts 
Component Python Script 
Summation Analyze_PCAP_Files.py 
Summation BotScanner.py 
Assessment BotScannerResults.py 
 
Shown above in Table 6, the summation component consists of two Python scripts.  
The Analyze_PCAP_Files.py script enumerates the list of PCAP file names contained in the 
Bot scanner dataset.  Each PCAP filename is summated with the BotScanner.py.  The 
BotScanner.py script contains the functions for summation and database interface for 
persistent storage of the summation.  The assessment component consists of the 
BotScannerResults.py script.  The BotScannerResults.py script contains the functions for 
interacting with the database for generating the reports and graphs needed for assessment.  To 
perform summation or assessment, the botnet researcher needs to execute the required 
functions within the Python scripts.  In Chapter 5 Experimentation, a code review is 
performed for revealing the functionality of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
Python scripts.  The next sub-section discusses the evaluation step of the DSR process.  
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Evaluation.  Often, prototypes are tested in a single case experiment (Wieringa, 
2014). The artifacts, the Python scripts, are evaluated to determine the effectiveness of the 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  Experimentation is performed with the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype for summating and assessing a Bot scanner dataset.  The 
summation component is evaluated for its ability to summate Bots, potential new Bot 
Victims, and network packets per PCAP file of the dataset.  The database will be evaluated 
for containing the summation results.  The assessment component is evaluated for its 
effectiveness for generating reports and graphs.  Evaluation of the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype provides deeper insight into monitoring the Bot scanning mechanism 
over time.  The next sub-section discusses communication. 
Communication.  The single case experiment was performed with the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype.  The Python scripts that constitute the Mira Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype are provided in the Appendices and are publicly available on Github.  
The evaluation and experimentation of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype results 
were presented in this dissertation. The experimentation was presented in a technical manner 
so that researchers can gain a deeper understanding of the Mirai Bot scanner.  The next sub-
section presents the summary.   
Rationale for research approach summary.  The phases for DSR artifact 
development commonly covers (a) problem identification; (b) requirements specification; (c) 
design; (d) evaluation; (e) communication. (Cleven et al., 2009).  The Statement of Problem 
subsection for this study has identified the problem and determined the artifact type and focus.  
The requirements for performing the experimentation of this study was provided.  The design 
and evaluation of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype was presented for summating 
and accessing the Bot scanner dataset.  The research performed in this study is meant to add 
to the common body of knowledge of the Mirai botnet.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype was developed in hopes of inspiring researchers to further investigate Mirai.  The 
next section discusses the research data sources.  
Research Data Sources 
The previous section described the DSR research process.  This section discusses the 
research data sources and consists of the following sub-sections (a) an introduction to the 
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required research data sources; (b) a discussion of the Mirai code; (c) a discussion of the Bot 
scanning network dataset; (e) a discussion for the summary of the research data sources.    
Required research data sources.  Two data sources are utilized for this research.  
The first data source is the publicly available Mirai code (Gamblin, 2016).  The second data 
source is from a captured Mirai Bot scanning  network dataset gathered by the University of 
Southern California (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-
B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  A single case experiment is performed with the Mirai 
Bot Scanner Summation Prototype for evaluating the captured Mirai Bot scanning network 
dataset.  The first data source, the Mirai code, is required for a Bot scanner code review.  The 
next sub-section discusses the Mirai code. 
Mirai program code.  The Mirai code was exposed publicly on the hacking 
community web forum Hackforums (J. A. Jerkins, 2017).  According to Kambourakis et al. 
(2017), since the release of Mirai’s source code Mirai variants are created daily.  Security 
researcher (Gamblin, 2016) has created a repository for the original Mirai code exposed on 
Hackforums.  Recent research has performed a code review for various components of Mirai 
(J. A. Jerkins, 2017; Kambourakis et al., 2017; Kolias et al., 2017).  Simon Roses, a cyber-
security researcher, performed Mirai static code analysis. Tintorera, a static analysis tool, 
determined Mirai is a small project and not too complicated to review (Roses, 2016).  Roses 
(2016) view point of Mirai code being a small project and not too complicated to review is 
supported by the current peer-reviewed research performed for analyzing Mirai and its 
various components (J. A. Jerkins, 2017; Kambourakis et al., 2017; Kolias et al., 2017).   
Researchers Kolias et al. (2017) study Mirai operation and communication.  Kolias et 
al. (2017) explain the Bot which is responsible for searching for and finding new Bot Victims 
as well as executing DDoS attacks.  Discussed by Kolias et al. (2017), Mirai avoids 
propagating to certain IP addresses in order to avoid detection from the US government.  
Besides black listing IP addresses, Mirai does not contain any other limitations for generating 
random IP addresses.  The Bot scanner module uses telnet and a random generated public IP 
address to search for a potential new Bot Victim (Kolias et al., 2017).  A code review 
performed by security researcher Conley (2017) concentrates on a Bot connecting to a 
potential new Bot Victim.  Conley (2017) supports the research performed by (Šemić & 
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Mrdovic, 2017).  Semic and Mrdovic (2017) discovered that after the Bot establishes a 
connection, a telnet handshake occurs. 
Inspired by current peer-reviewed research (J. A. Jerkins, 2017; Kambourakis et al., 
2017; Kolias et al., 2017), this study performs a code review for a Bot scanning for a potential 
new Bot Victim.  The original Mirai code exposed publicly on Hackforums is reviewed 
(Gamblin, 2016).  The code review performed in this study studies and consolidates the 
modules of the Bot functionality for scanning for a new potential Bot Victim.  The code 
review studies the modules and network mechanisms required for a Bot to connect to a 
potential new Bot Victim.  Experimentation is performed from a captured Mirai Bot scanning 
network dataset.  The next sub-section discusses the Bot scanning network dataset. 
Bot scanning network dataset.  Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
experimentation is performed with a Mirai network dataset gathered by the University of 
Southern California (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-
B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  The dataset is limited to Bot scanning activity 
collection starting on June 1, 2016 and ending on March 20, 2017.  The dataset is described 
as, 
 
The dataset represents scanning traffic from Mirai observed at B-Root. It includes only 
Mirai-identified TCP SYNs sent to ports 23 and 2323; other traffic is removed. 
Through 2016-11-20, we observe only traffic to one IP address (130.152.184.2). From 
2016-11-20 onward it adds traffic to 192.228.79.0/24. (Internet Addresses Census 
dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016). 
    
The University of Southern California provides root DNS services (USC, n.d.).  The 
dataset only contains TCP SYN packets sent to telnet ports 23 or 2323.  The TCP SYN packet 
is part of the TCP handshake, used by a Bot to connect to a potential new Bot Victim (Arlitt & 
Williamson, 2005).   This dataset contains captured network packets of Bots attempting to 
connect to potential new Bot Victims.  The next sub-section provides a summary of the 
research data sources. 
Research data sources summary.  Two data sources are required for this study.  The 
first data source is the publicly available Mirai code (Gamblin, 2016).  The Mirai code is 
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required for a code review to determine the Bot scanning mechanism.   The second data 
source is from a captured Bot scanning network dataset gathered by the University of 
Southern California (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-
B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  Experimentation with the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype is performed with the Bot scanning dataset.  The next section describes 
the data analysis methods. 
Data Analysis Methods 
The previous section discussed the two data sources that are required for this study.  
This section discusses the data analysis methods and consists of the following sub-sections (a) 
a discussion of the Bot malware code review focused on the Bot scanner; (b) a discussion of 
the Bot scanner network dataset; (c) a discussion of analyzing a PCAP file from the Bot 
scanning dataset; (e) a discussion of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype for 
performing experimentation with the Bot scanning dataset; (f) a summary of the data analysis 
methods.  The following sub-section describes the code review.         
Code review.  The first data source required is the publicly available Mirai code 
(Gamblin, 2016).  A code review requires manually reviewing the code.  The code review for 
this study focuses on the modules for the Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  The 
Mirai code was downloaded onto a PC for performing the code review.  
The Sublime text editor contains features required for the code review (Kinder, 2013; 
Sublime, 2019).  Sublime allows for scrolling thru the code as well as contains search 
functionality which allows for targeted searches which is beneficial for following the flow of 
the Bot scanner code.  The Bot scanner code is reviewed to study the functionality associated 
with a Bot connecting to a potential new Bot Victim.  An example of the Bot scanner code 
review performed with the Sublime text editor is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Sublime text editor. 
 
   Shown above for Figure 8, the Sublime editor provides the line number.  Key words 
are color coded.  The tail end of the Bot scanner code is shown below in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. Tail end of Bot scanner code. 
 
Shown above in Figure 9, the Bot scanner code contains 991 lines of C programming 
code.  With the use of the Sublime editor, 991 lines of C code is reviewed for the functionality 
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of a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  Besides performing the code review with 
the Sublime editor, experimentation is performed with a captured Mirai Bot scanning network 
dataset.  The next sub-section discusses the captured Bot scanning network dataset.   
Bot scanning network dataset.  The second data source is from a captured Mirai Bot 
scanning network dataset gathered by the University of Southern California (Internet 
Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-
20160601/rev5870, 2016).  The dataset contains Bot scanning activity collection starting on 
June 1, 2016 and ending on March 31, 2017.  A single case experiment with Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation is performed with the captured Bot scanning dataset.   
The dataset was downloaded on to a PC.  The dataset contains two folders.  A folder 
for the year 2016.  Another folder for the year 2017.  Inside each folder there is a folder of 
packet capture files associated for each day.  An example of the contents of a daily folder is 
shown below in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Example of a daily packet capture. 
 
  Shown above in Figure 10 is an example for the contents of each packet capture 
folder. The 2016 daily 2016-06-01.pcap folder contains the Packet Capture (PCAP) file.  A 
PCAP file is in a standard format for captured network traffic that can be read by network 
monitors or network pack sniffers, such as Wireshark (Buczak et al., 2016).  Each daily folder 
contains a packet capture, representing the Bots scanning for potential new Bot Victims for 
that day.  Each 2016 and 2017 daily folder contain one PCAP file.  The 2016 daily folders 
contain 214 PCAP files with a total of 1.66 GB in size.  The 2017 daily folders contain 90 
PCAP files with a total of 2.22 GB in size.  A total of 304 PCAP files comprise the captured 
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network data with a total size of 3.88 GB.  The next sub-section describes the sample network 
packet analysis.   
Sample network packet analysis.  This study analyzes a sample of the network 
packets with Wireshark.  Wireshark is a tool for analyzing network traffic (Jillepalli, Leon, & 
Sheldon, 2018).  An example of analyzing a PCAP file with Wireshark is shown below in 
Figure 11. 
 
  
Figure 11. Analyzing a PCAP file with Wireshark. 
 
Shown above in Figure 11, the 2016-12-20.pcap file is analyzed with Wireshark.  All 
of the network packets are loaded into Wireshark for manual analysis.  Wireshark provides 
the packet number, Time, Source, Destination, Protocol, Length, and Info for each network 
pack.  Concerning the experimentation and answering the research questions, fields of interest 
are (a) the Source which represents the IP address of the Bot; (b) the Destination which 
represents the IP address of a potential new Bot Victim; (c) the Info which contains the source 
port as well as the destination port of 23 or 2323.  The manual analysis performed with 
Wireshark will sample the PCAP file to evaluate the Bot scanner traffic.  To analyze all the 
PCAP files and perform experimentation to answer the research questions, a utility is needed.  
Analyzing the PCAP file within Wireshark, shows SYN packets that require retransmission.  
Shown below in Figure 12 is an example of a retransmission SYN packet. 
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Figure 12. Analysis of retransmission packet with Wireshark. 
 
Shown in Figure 12, Wireshark highlights the retransmission packets in black.  The 
information for the packet indicates a TCP Retransmission.  The TCP retransmission packet 
occurs when the target IP has not acknowledged the SYN packet as part of the TCP 
handshake (Go, Kune, Woo, Park, & Kim, 2013).  There are many reasons why a destination 
does not acknowledge a SYN packet.  Some of the reasons a destination may not 
acknowledge the SYN packets are (a) IP address is not assigned to an IoT device; (b) 
destination IP not listening on the destination port; (c) a firewall has blocked network traffic.  
For the evaluation and experimentation of this study, a retransmission packet represents a Bot 
trying to connect to an IP address that is not vulnerable to Mirai infection or that does not 
have a device assigned to that IP address.  The Bot is unable to connect to a potential new Bot 
Victim.  The next sub-section describes performing the experimentation.   
Performing experimentation.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
components consist of Python programs to perform the experimentation.  The summation 
component contains Python modules for Bot tabulation.  The assessment component contains 
Python modules for producing reports and graphing.  Both components, summation and 
assessment, interact with the database.  The summation component stores the PCAP 
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summation results on the database.  The assessment module searches the database for 
producing the reports and graphs. 
During experimentation, following the completion of the summation process, the 
database will be verified to contain the Bot scanning summation.  The results from the 
assessment reports and line graphs will be verified from the PCAP summated records in the 
database.  The reports and line graphs will be experimented over a date range of the Bot 
scanning dataset.  The reports and line graphs will be assessed for their effectiveness for 
providing the summation results from the Bot scanner dataset.  The next sub-section provides 
a summary.   
Data analysis methods summary.  This section presents the research data sources.  A 
code review for the Bot scanner was discussed.  Details of the captured Bot scanner network 
dataset was provided.  Sample network packet analysis was performed for SYN and 
retransmission packets.  Single case experimentation with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype components interacting with the recorded Bot scanning dataset  was discussed.  The 
next section discusses the limitations and delimitations of the research methodology for this 
study.          
Limitations and Delimitations 
This selected research methodology filled a void for studying the Bot scanner.  
Although current peer-reviewed research has experimented with analyzing network traffic, the 
focus of those studies has not been on a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  It is 
possible that experimentation exists for the Bot scanner, but there was a lack of references in 
peer-reviewed journals during the literature review.   
Delimitations.  Mirai variants are created daily (Kolias et al., 2017).  The code review 
for this study does not consider variants.  The code review is performed on the original Mirai 
code that was exposed publicly on the hacking community web forum Hackforums (J. A. 
Jerkins, 2017).  Security researcher (Gamblin, 2016) has created a repository for the original 
Mirai code exposed on Hackforums.  The repository created by Gamblin (2016) is used for 
the code review.  Focusing on the experimentation of this study, which focuses on a Bot 
connecting to a potential new Bot Victim, the code review focuses on the mechanism of the 
Bot scanner for connecting to a potential new Bot Victim.  The code review will not cover 
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other steps of the Bot scanner, such as (a) remotely accessing the new Bot Victim with a 
factory default user-id and password; (b) sending that logon information back the C&C for the 
upload of the malware onto the new Bot Victim (Kolias et al., 2017).   
Limitations.  Sample packet analysis and experimentation is performed with the 
dataset gathered by the University of Southern California (Internet Addresses Census dataset, 
IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  The dataset 
contains Bot scanning activity collection starting on June 1, 2016 and ending on March 31, 
2017.  Through 2016-11-20, Bot scanning traffic is sent to one IP address [130.152.184.2].   
From 2016-11-20 onward Bot scanning traffic is added to an additional subnet 
[192.228.79.0/24]. The dataset is limited to SYN packets sent from the Bot to the potential 
new Bot Victim.  The TCP SYN is the first step of the TCP handshake for a Bot establishing a 
connection to a potential New Bot Victim.  Additional research questions could have been 
formulated and answered if the dataset contained the network packets for the complete tasks 
of the Bot scanner.   The Bot scanner tasks include (a) the complete TCP handshake between 
the Bot and potential Bot Victim; (b) the Bot remotely accessing the new Bot Victim thru 
telnet with a factory default user-id and password; (c) the Bot communicating back to C&C 
with the logon information for malware upload onto the new Bot Victim.  With the dataset 
containing SYN packets from the Bot scanner, the experimentation with the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype is focused on a Bot attempting to connect to a potential new 
Bot Victim.  The next section provides a summary of the research methodology.   
Chapter Summary 
      Chapter 3 discusses the (a) research method justification; (b) rationale for the 
research approach; (c) research data sources; (d) data analysis methods; (e) limitations and 
delimitations.  The research method justified is a single case mechanism for the Mirai Bot 
Scanning Summation Prototype.  The DSR research process is discussed for the required 
artificial artifacts including the algorithms and Python programs.  The data analysis methods 
include (a) code review; (b) sample packet analysis; (c) experimentation with the recorded 
Bot scanner dataset.   This study is delimited by the original Mirai code and experimentation 
is limited to the recorded Bot scanning dataset.  The next chapter presents the experimentation 
for this study.             . 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENTATION 
Chapter 3 presented the methodology for this study which included (a) the research 
method justification; (b) the rationale for the research approach; (c) research data sources; (d) 
data analysis methods; (e) limitations and delimitations.  The research justification is for a 
single case mechanism for experimentation with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  
The rational for the research approach details the DSR methodology.  The research data 
sources for this study presented the Bot scanner code and a recorded Bot scanner network 
dataset.  The data analysis methods included (a) a code review of the Bot scanner code; (b) 
sample packet analysis of the Bot scanner network dataset; (3) the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype experimentation with the recorded Bot scanner dataset.  The Bot 
scanner code review focuses on the modules for the Bot scanning for a potential new Bot 
Victim.  A sample PCAP file from the Bot scanning dataset is analyzed to characterize the 
network packets.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype solution performs the 
experimentation with the Bot scanning dataset.  
Experimentation is performed to help answer the research questions.  The research 
questions are answered based upon the findings from experimentation performed from the (a) 
Bot scan code review; (b) sample packet analysis; (c) Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype.  The Bot scan code review focuses on the Bot scanner modules to delineate the 
functionality associated with a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  A sample PCAP 
file from the Bot scanning dataset is analyzed to characterize network packets for a Bot 
attempting to remotely connect to a new Potential Victim.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype contains a summation module that tabulates the Bot scanning mechanism and stores 
the summations in a persistent database.  An assessment module provides reports and line 
graphs from the persistent database.  The reports and graphs, based upon a supplied date range 
of the capture Bot scanning dataset, assess the Bot scanning mechanism over time.    
Chapter 4 contains the following sections (a) a code review of the Bot scanner; (b) 
network packet analysis from a sample PCAP file of the Bot scanning dataset; (c) Mirai Bot 
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Scanner Summation Prototype code review; (d) single case experimentation performed with 
the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype; (e) a comparison of the prototype with NIDS; 
(f) a chapter summary provides the important findings from the above-mentioned sections for 
Chapter 4.  The next section provides a code review of the Bot scanner. 
Bot Scanner Code Review   
Described as the first step in communication and operation, the Bot brute forces a 
potential new Bot Victim (Kolias et al., 2017).  The Bot brute forcing consists of (a) a Bot 
connecting to a potential new Bot Victim; (b) the Bot remotely accessing the new Bot Victim 
with a factory default user-id and password.  After the Bot establishes a connection, a telnet 
handshake occurs (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  A list of 62 factory default user-id and 
password combinations are used to gain remote access to the new Bot Victim with telnet 
(Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  Since the focus of this study is a Bot connecting to a potential 
new Bot Victim, the code review will focus on the Bot scanner code.  The modules providing 
the functionality for a Bot connecting to a potential new Bot Victim are reviewed.  This 
section contains the following sub-sections for the code review (a) a review of the Bot scanner 
initialization module which contains the functionality for creating the IP and TCP headers for 
connecting to a new potential Bot Victim; (b) a review of the module for creating a random IP 
address that the Bot scanner utilizes for the destination IP address for the potential new Bot 
Victim; (c) a summary provides the important findings from the above mentioned sections for 
the Bot scanner code review.  The next sub-section provides a code review for the Bot scanner 
initialization.   
Scanner initialization.  Focusing on a Bot connecting to a potential new Bot Victim, 
the code review concentrates on the mechanism of the Bot scanner for connecting to a 
potential new Bot Victim.  The Bot scanner.c program contains the functionality to brute 
force a potential new Bot Victim  (Gamblin, 2016).  The Bot scanner initialization module is 
the main driver for the Bot scanner and contains the functionality for a Bot connecting to a 
potential new Bot Victim.  Figure 13 reviews the functionality for assigning a random IP 
address for connecting to a potential new Bot Victim. 
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Figure 13. Assign random IP address to IP header. 
 
Shown above in Figure 13, is the main while-loop.  Beginning at line 211, The IP 
header [iph] is assigned a random id as well as a random IP address for the destination address 
[daddr].  The destination address represents the potential new Bot Victim IP address.  
Beginning at line 205, concerning the for-loop, SCANNER_RAW_PPS is defined to be 160, 
thus the scanner will generate 160 IP headers with random generated IP addresses.  At line 
201, fake_time ensures the synchronization of generating 160 IP headers and brute forcing 
potential new Bot Victims.  Fake_time ensures time has progressed before generating the IP 
header.  Fake_time and its calculation are out of scope and not reviewed for this study.  Once 
the IP header has been assigned the random destination address, the TCP header destination is 
assigned.  Figure 14 reviews the assignment of the port destination to the TCP header.  
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Figure 14. Assign TCP header destination. 
 
Shown above in Figure 14, the TCP header [tcph] is initialized.  Beginning at line 217, 
the TCP destination is assigned either 23 or 2323.  Every tenth iteration of a packet header, 
the destination is assigned 2323 else the destination is assigned 23.  Therefore, 9 out of 10 
destinations will be assigned 23 and one destination will be assigned 2323.  Telnet ports are 
associated with 23 and 2323 (Kolias et al., 2017).  At line 225, the TCP header sequence is 
assigned the IP header destination address [tcph->seq = iph->daddr].  Starting on line 229, 
the socket address is initialized.  The socket address [paddr] is set.  The socket is a network 
interface that allows the Bot to communicate with TCP/IP over the internet (Koutsoubelias & 
Lalis, 2013).   AF_INET refers specifically to IPv4 addresses (Li, Jin, Shao, & Liao, 2009).  
On line 230, the destination address of the packet header is assigned to the socket.  Line 231 
assigns the TCP header destination, which is the telnet port 23 or 2323.  At line 233, the 
scanner raw packet is sent thru the [paddr] socket to remotely connect to the potential new 
Bot Victim on the telnet port (Donahoo & Calvert, 2009).  
The TCP handshake exchanges SYN and ACK packets to establish connection 
between hosts (Arlitt & Williamson, 2005).  Once the SYN packet is sent to connect to a 
potential new Bot Victim, the Bot waits for an ACK packet response from the potential new 
Bot victim.  Figure 15 depicts the functionality for reading packets from the raw socket and 
verifying IP header.         
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Figure 15. Read packets from raw socket and verify IP header. 
 
Shown above in Figure 15, an infinite while loop receives the network packets to get 
the SYN and ACK responses form the potential new Bot Victim.  At Line 248 the variable n 
is assigned the return code from receiving the data from the socket.  In the following line 249, 
a break out of the while loop occurs if no data is received from the socket [n <= 0], timeout 
expired before data was received [errno == EAGAIN], or the receive operation would block 
communication on the socket [errno == EWOULDBLOCK] (Donahoo & Calvert, 2009).  At 
line 252, the size of the data [dgram] received from the socket [n] is verified to at least 
contain the size of the IP header [iphdr] and the size of the TCP header [tcphdr].  If the data 
received from the socket is not at least the size of the IP header plus the TCP header, then a 
continue to the beginning of the while loop is issued to receive more data from the socket.   
Starting at line 254, IP header [iph] checks are performed.  On line 254, if the IP 
header destination is not equal to the Bot address [iph->daddr != LOCAL_ADDR] then the 
code will continue to the beginning of the while-loop to receive another dgram from the 
socket.   On line 256, if the IP protocol is not equal to TCP [iph->protocol != 
IPPROTO_TCP] the code will continue to the beginning of the while-loop to receive another 
dgram packet from the socket.  Once the IP header has been verified, then the TCP header is 
verified.  Figure 16 shows the functionality for verifying the TCP header. 
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Figure 16. Verify TCP header. 
 
Shown above in Figure 16, various checks verify the TCP header [tcph].  The 
verification starts with line 258 verifying that the source is from telnet port 23 or 2323.  If the 
source is not from a telnet port [tcph->source != htons(23) && tcph->source != 
htons(2323)], then the code will continue to the beginning of the while-loop to read another 
dgram packet from the socket.  On line 260, if the TCP header destination is not equal to the 
source port then the code will continue to the beginning of the while-loop to read another 
dgram packet from the socket.  Line 260 represents a check for verifying that the telnet port, 
23 or 2323, matches between the TCP header and the Bot source for network communication.  
The code will continue to the beginning of the while-loop to read another dgram packet from 
the socket.  
Starting at line 262, if the syn flag is not set [!tcph->syn] and the ack flag is not set 
[!tcph->ack ] in the TCP header, the code will continue to the beginning of the while-loop to 
read another dgram packet from the socket.  The syn and ack TCP header flags verify a 
connection was made with the TCP handshake (Arlitt & Williamson, 2005).  The socket is 
establishing the network connection between the Bot and a potential new Bot Victim with the 
SYN and ACK packets.  On line 266, if the TCP header restart flag is encountered [tcph->rst] 
the code will continue to the beginning of the while-loop to read another dgram packet from 
the socket.  A TCP restart flag is sent when the target is not able to process the SYN packet 
(Arlitt & Williamson, 2005).  A TCP restart flag indicates that the Bot is unable to connect to 
the potential new Bot Victim.  At line 266, if the TCP header fin flag is set [tcph->fin] the 
code will continue to the beginning of the while loop to read another dgram packet from the 
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socket.  The fin flag indicates the target closing the TCP connection (Arlitt & Williamson, 
2005).  The potential new Bot Victim sets the fin flag to close the socket connection with the 
Bot.   
Line 270 performs a check for the TCP header ACK Sequence [ntohl(tcph->ack_seq) 
- 1) != iph->saddr].   The check at line 270 ensures the correct sequence for exchanging SYN 
and ACK TCP packets (Arlitt & Williamson, 2005).  The check at line 270 verifies a SYN 
packet was sent by the Bot and an ACK network packet was received from a potential new 
Bot Victim.  If the TCP header ACK sequence minus one is not equal to the IP header source 
address, then the code will continue to the beginning of the while-loop to read another dgram 
packet from the socket.  Once the checks have been performed for the IP header and TCP 
header, the TCP handshake has verified it is possible for the Bot to connect to a potential new 
Bot Victim.  (Arlitt & Williamson, 2005).  Figure 17 presents the code for establishing the 
connection table parameters and calling the setup_connection function with the connection 
parameters.        
 
 
Figure 17. Connection table parameters. 
 
Shown above in Figure 17, the connection parameters are established.  At line 278, 
the connection is added to the connection table [conn = &conn_table[n]].  At line 288, the 
connection destination address is assigned from the IP header [conn->dst_addr = iph-
>saddr]; the IP address of a potential new Bot Victim is assigned in the connection table.  At 
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line 289, the destination port is assigned to the connection table from the TCP header source 
[conn->dst_port = tcph->source].  Once the connection table parameters are set, at line 290, 
the setup_connection function is called providing the connection as a parameter 
[setup_connection(conn)].  Figure 18 reviews the setup_connection function. 
 
 
Figure 18. Setup connection module. 
 
Shown above in Figure 18, the Bot establishes a connection to a potential new Bot 
Victim.  At line 652, a handle is assigned to the socket.  Starting at line 665, the socketaddr 
variable addr is initialized.  At line 665, the socket family is set to IPv4 [addr.sin_family = 
AF_INET].  At line 666, the source address is set to the destination IP of the potential new Bot 
Victim [addr.sin_addr.s_addr = conn->dst_addr].  At line 667, the telnet port from the TCP 
handshake between the Bot and the potential new Bot Victim is assigned [addr.sin_port = 
conn->dst_port].  At line 669, the last time the Bot connected to the potential new Bot Victim 
is set [conn->last_recv = fake_time].  At line 670, the connection state is set to connecting 
[conn->state = SC_CONNECTING].  At line 671, The Bot makes a connection thru the 
socket to the potential new Bot Victim. 
The focus of this study is a Bot connecting to a potential new Bot Victim.  Therefore, 
the remaining Bot code for remotely accessing a potential new Bot Victim with a factory 
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default user-id and password is not reviewed.  Shown below in Figure 19, a random IP 
address is generated for the potential new Bot Victim.  The next sub-section reviews the code 
for generating the random IP address for identifying a potential new Bot Victim.  
Random IP address.  Shown in Figure 19, a random IP address is generated for 
identifying a potential new Bot Victim.  Discussed by Kolias et al. (2017), Mirai avoids 
propagating to certain IP addresses in order to avoid detection.  The black-list contains 
Loopback, Invalid address space, General Electric Company, Hewlett Packard Company, US 
Postal Service, Internal network, Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Network 
Address Translation (NAT) reserved, IANA special use, Multicast, and US Department of 
Defense.  Figure 19 presents the get_random_ip function which generates the random IP 
address.   
  
 
Figure 19. Get random IP address. 
 
 Shown above in Figure 19, the get_random_ip generates the random IP address for 
identifying and connecting to a potential new Bot Victim.  At line 678, a do-while loop is 
implemented.  Inside the do-while loop, beginning at line 680 and ending at line 685, the IP 
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address octets are randomly generated.  Starting at line 687, based upon the randomly 
generated octets the while condition black-lists several IP subnets.  Corporation subnets are 
black-listed, such as General Electric and Hewlett-Packard, as well as US government 
subnets, such as the US Postal Service and the Department of Defense.  The next sub-section 
provides a summary of the code review performed in this study.    
Bot scanner code review summary.  Described as the first step in communication 
and operation, the Bot brute forces a potential new Bot Victim (Kolias et al., 2017).  The Bot 
brute forcing consists of (a) a Bot connecting to a potential new Bot Victim; (b) the Bot 
remotely accessing the new Bot Victim with a factory default user-id and password.  After the 
Bot establishes a connection, a telnet handshake occurs (Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  The 
focus of this study is a Bot connecting to a potential new Bot Victim.  Focusing on a Bot 
connecting to a potential new Bot Victim, the code review concentrates on the mechanism of 
the Bot scanner for connecting to a potential new Bot Victim.   
The Bot scanner.c program contains the functionality to brute force a potential new 
Bot Victim  (Gamblin, 2016).  The Bot scanner initialization module is the main driver for the 
Bot scanner and contains the functionality for a Bot connecting to a potential new Bot Victim.  
The initialization module generates a random IP address for the potential new Bot Victim.  
Corporations, IANA, and US government entities are black-listed from the random IP 
address.  A socket connection is attempted with the random IP address and the telnet port.  A 
connection between the Bot and the potential new Bot Victim is attempted with the TCP 
handshake.  When the TCP handshake has been established between the Bot and the potential 
new Bot Victim, then the Bot connects to the potential new Bot Victim.  The connection is 
made thru the socket to the random generated IP address of potential new Bot Victim on the 
telnet port.  The next section provides packet analysis of the Mirai dataset that only contains 
network traffic representing Bots initiating the TCP handshake with potential new Bot 
Victims (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-
20160601/rev5870, 2016).  
Bot Scanning Sample Network Packet Analysis 
The previous section provided a code review of the Bot scanner.  The code review 
concentrates on the mechanism of the Bot scanner for connecting to a potential new Bot 
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Victim.  The Bot scanner initialization module generates a random IP address for the potential 
new Bot Victim with corporations, IANA,  and US government entities being black-listed.  A 
socket connection is attempted with the random IP address and the telnet port.  The socket 
connection is established with the TCP handshake being performed between the Bot and the 
potential new Bot Victim.  When the TCP handshake has been established between the Bot 
and the potential new Bot Victim, then the Bot connects to the potential new Bot Victim back 
thru the socket.  The connection is to the random generated IP address of potential new Bot 
Victim on the telnet port.  The code review supports the experimentation performed with the 
Bot scanning dataset.   
This section analyzes a sample PCAP file from the Bot scanning dataset.  The sample 
is indicative of the PCAP files gathered for the dataset. The Bot scanning dataset consists of 
daily PCAP files gathered starting on June 6, 2016 and ending March 31, 2017.  The dataset 
includes TCP SYNs sent on ports 23 and 2323.  (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT 
ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  This next section discusses 
the Mirai dataset network packets captured consisting of (a) a discussion of the sample PCAP 
file; (b) a discussion of SYN packets for when the Bot is attempting to establish a TCP 
handshake with a potential new Bot Victim; (c) a discussion of retransmission packets 
indicating the potential new Bot Victim not willing to perform the TCP handshake with the 
Bot; (d) a summary of the packet analysis. 
Sample PCAP file.  The PCAP file analyzed for this section is for the Bot scanning 
traffic recorded on 2016-11-20.  The PCAP file contains SYN and retransmission packets.  
Figure 20 displays the PCAP file analyzed with Wireshark. 
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Figure 20. 2016-11-20.pcap file analysis. 
 
Shown above in Figure 20, the sample PCAP file for 2016-11-20, analyzed in 
Wireshark, shows SYN packets and retransmission packets.  A total of 93463 packets are 
captured in this PCAP file.  There are 61,343 SYN packets.  Wireshark has identified 32029 
retransmission packets.   The IP source varies in the network packets.  The IP destination of 
the packets vary; 130.152.184.2 is shown as the destination but other packets in the PCAP file 
contain different IP addresses.  Only the TCP protocol is captured.  The length of the packets 
is either 60 or 66.  The info column shows either telnet port 23 or 2323 is utilized for the SYN 
or retransmission packets.  This information provided supports the code review performed by 
this study for packet size and telnet ports.  The code review identifies the (a) SYN packets 
being sent from the Bot to the potential new Bot Victim; (b) the Bot may receive a packet 
with the TCP header restart flag set which would cause a retransmission packet; (c) telnet 
ports 23 and 2323 are used when the Bot attempts to establish the TCP handshake with the 
potential new Bot Victim.  The next sub-section analyzes the SYN packet.  
SYN packet.  The SYN packet initiates the TCP handshake for network connections 
(Arlitt & Williamson, 2005).  The code review showed that the Bot scanner creates a socket 
that connects to a potential new Bot Victim.  The socket connection initiates a SYN packet 
sent from the Bot to the potential new Bot Victim.  Figure 21 shows the details of the SYN 
packet.    
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Figure 21. SYN packet. 
 
Shown above in Figure 21, the details of the (a) Internet Protocol Version 4 and (b) 
Transmission Control Protocol are presented for the SYN packet.  The IP packet header 
contains the Source [89.212.62.62] and Destination [130.152.184.2] IP addresses.  The Bot IP 
is the Source IP and the potential new Bot Victim is the Destination IP.  The IP header 
protocol is TCP.  The TCP header contains the Source Port [58920], the telnet Destination 
Port [23], and the SYN Flag [0x002].  The Source Port on the Bot is available for the Bot to 
use for initiating the SYN packet.  The Bot is trying to connect to the telnet Destination Port 
to determine if the potential new Bot Victim has that telnet port open.  The values of the 
variable and flags of the IP header and TCP header support the analysis performed by the 
code review.  The next sub-section analyzes the retransmission packet.   
Retransmission packet.  When a Bot is attempting to establish a connection to a 
potential new Bot Victim with the TCP handshake, the potential new Bot Victim may not 
respond to the SYN with an ACK packet or may send back a restart flag in the TCP header 
(Arlitt & Williamson, 2005).  If the Bot does not receive an ACK back from the potential new 
Bot Victim or the potential new Bot Victim sends back the TCP header restart flag, the Bot 
sends another SYN packet.  Figure 22 shows the details of the retransmitted SYN packet. 
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Figure 22. TCP retransmission packet. 
 
Shown above in Figure 22, the TCP header details are presented for a retransmission 
packet.  The Source Port, Destination Port, Sequence Number, and Flags are the same as the 
original SYN packet.  Wireshark suspects this packet as a retransmission since the 
Retransmission Time-Out (RTO) for this segment was approximately 68 seconds.  The 
retransmission packet indicates a potential new Bot Victim not responding to the Bot request 
for establishing a TCP handshake.  The next sub-section provides a summary for the sample 
packet analysis. 
Bot scanning network packet analysis summary.  The PCAP file analyzed for this 
section is for the Bot scanning traffic recorded on 2016-11-20.  The PCAP file contains SYN 
and retransmission packets.  A total of 93463 packets are captured in this PCAP file.  There 
are 61,343 SYN packets and 32029 retransmission packets.  The IP source varies.  The IP 
destination of the packets vary.  Only the TCP protocol is captured.  Either telnet port 23 or 
2323 is utilized for the SYN or retransmission packets.  The IP packet header contains the 
Source and Destination IP addresses.  The Bot IP is the Source IP and the potential new Bot 
Victim is the Destination IP.  The TCP header contains the Source Port, the telnet Destination 
Port, and the SYN Flag.  The Source Port on the Bot is available for the Bot to use for 
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initiating the SYN packet.  The Bot is trying to connect to the telnet Destination Port to 
determine if the potential new Bot Victim has that telnet port open.  If the Bot does not 
receive an ACK back from the potential new Bot Victim or the potential new Bot Victim 
sends back the TCP header restart flag, the Bot retransmits the SYN packet in an attempt to 
establish the TCP handshake.  The Source Port, Destination Port, Sequence Number, and 
Flags for the TCP header in the retransmission packet are the same as the original SYN 
packet.  The values of the variables and flags of the IP header and TCP header support the 
analysis performed by the code review.  The next sub-section presents a code review of the 
Mira Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.              
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype Code Review 
The previous section analyzed a sample PCAP file from the Bot scanning traffic 
recorded on 2016-11-20.  The PCAP file contains SYN and retransmission packets.  A total of 
93463 packets are captured in this PCAP file consisting of 61,343 SYN packets and 32029 
retransmission packets.  The SYN packet represents a Bot attempting to establish a 
connection to the potential new Bot Victim with a TCP handshake over a telnet port.  As a 
reaction to the potential new Bot Victim not responding back with an ACK packet, the 
retransmission packet signifies a Bot re-attempting a connection to the potential new Bot 
Victim by sending another SYN packet.  With the Bot scanning dataset consisting of daily 
PCAP files gathered starting on June 6, 2016 and ending March 31, 2017, this study presents 
the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype for experimentation with the Bot scanner dataset 
consisting of TCP SYN and retransmission packets. 
    This section presents the code review for the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype.  The summation and assessment component Python artifacts will be reviewed.  The 
summation process is responsible for tabulating the Bot scanning mechanism for each PCAP 
file of the Bot scanning dataset.  The assessment component provides reports and graphs that 
allow for the monitoring of the Bot scanning mechanism over time.  The summation and 
assessment component interfaces with the persistent database.  The summation process stores 
the tabulated results within the database.  The assessment process retrieves the records from 
the database to build the reports and line graphs.  This section provides (a) a code review for 
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the summation; (b) a code review for the assessment; (c) a summary of the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype.  This next section presents the code review for the summation process.  
Summation.  The Bot scanning dataset consists of 304 daily PCAP files gathered 
starting on June 6, 2016 and ending March 31, 2017.  Each PCAP file contains only Bot 
scanning data consisting of TCP SYNs and TCP retransmission packets sent on telnet ports 23 
and 2323.  (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-
scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  The summation component a Python script that analyzes 
and tabulates each PCAP (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  The Python script, BotScanner.py, contains 
the functions necessary to summate the Bot scanning mechanism contained in each PCAP file 
of the Bot scanning dataset.  Each PCAP file is read and are tabulated and saved in a 
MongoDB database.  The BotScanner.py function analyze_pcap_file reads a PCAP file and 
saves the summation into the MongoDB database.  Figure 23 shows the functionality of 
analyze_pcap_file for reading the PCAP file and gathering all the source and destination IP 
addresses. 
 
 
Figure 23. Gathering the packet source and destination IPs. 
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Shown above in Figure 23, the function analyze_pcap_file function reads the PCAP 
file and stores the source and destination IP in a list.  Also, the destination subnet is stored in a 
list.  At line 110, the Scapy rdpcap routine is called to read the PCAP file (Montante, 2018).  
At line 113, a for-loop is initiated to read each packet [each_packet in packets].  At line 116, 
total_packets is incremented as a counter for calculating the total number of packets in the 
PCAP file.  Line 119 adds the source IP to the source IP list [ip_src_list].  At line 120, the 
destination is added to the destination IP list [ip_dst_list].  Lines 123 to 130 represent the 
functionality for putting the destination subnet into the subnet list [subnet_list].  The source 
and destination IP address of the network packet represents the identification of  a Bot 
scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  Once all the packets have been read the for-loop 
ends.  All the source and destination IP addresses have been discovered as well as the 
destination subnets.  With the source and destination IP addresses discovered, the number of 
Bots and potential new Bot Victims can be calculated along with the number TCP SYN and 
retransmission packets.  Shown below, Figure 24 contains the logic for determining the 
number of Bots, potential new Bot Victims, SYN packets, and retransmission packets. 
 
 
Figure 24. Determining the Bots and potential new Bot Victims. 
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 Shown above in Figure 24, the source and destination lists are analyzed to determine 
the Bots, potential new Bot Victims, SYN packets, and retransmission packets.  At line 137, a 
dictionary [packets_dict] is constructed containing the source and destination for each packet.  
On line 140, a Pandas DataFrame [packets_df] is created from the dictionary of source and 
destination IP addresses.  The DataFrame provides methods for adding data, deleting data, 
indexing data, and querying data ("Pandas: powerful Python data analysis toolkit," 2018).  
Line 143 calculates the total number of bots [total_bots] from the unique source IPs contained 
in the DataFrame.  On line 146, the frequency for the source and destination IP is calculated 
[packets_df1].   Line 149 gathers all the source and destination IP combos that only occur 
once [Freq == 1].  Lines 151 to 155 determine the number of SYN packets 
[total_syn_packets] based upon the number of packets with a source and destination IP with a 
frequency of one .  Line 158 and 159 calculate the number of potential new Bot Victims based 
upon the number of unique destination IP from the SYN packets 
[total_potential_new_bot_victims].  At line 162, the total number of retransmission packets is 
calculated by subtracting the total SYN packets from the total packets contained in the PCAP 
file [total_retransmission_packets].  The total number of packets will be comprised of SYN 
packets and retransmission packets.  At line 165, the packet date [packet_date] is determined 
by calling the function pcap_file_date with the pcap_file parameter.  The number of Bots, 
potential new Bot Victims, SYN packets, and retransmission packets along with the packet 
date have been determined for the PCAP file.  The totals for the PCAP file are stored in a 
MongoDB database.  Figure 25 contains shows the PCAP file totals being inserted into the 
MongoDB database. 
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Figure 25. Totals inserted into MongoDB. 
      
Shown above in Figure 25, the totals are inserted into the Daily_PCAP table.  The 
Daily_PCAP table will contain the totals for all the Bot Scanning PCAP files.  Once the 
PCAP totals have been inserted into the Daily_PCAP table, run-time processing information 
is inserted into another table.  Figure 26 shows the run-time information inserted into the 
MongoDB table. 
 
Figure 26.  PCAP processing time. 
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Shown above in Figure 26, the starting and ending date for processing the PCAP will 
be inserted into the Daily_PCAP_Runtime table.  The starting and ending date will contain the 
date along with the hour, minutes, and second.  The information in the Daily_PCAP_Runtime 
table is used to analyze the processing time of the packets for the PCAP file.  To process all 
the PCAP files, the utility Analyze_PCAP_Files.py is included (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  Shown 
in Figure 27, the analyze_pcaps function enumerates the PCAP files provides each PCAP file 
on as a parameter to the summation function bs.analyze_pcap_file.   
 
 
Figure 27. Process PCAP files. 
 
Shown above in Figure 27, starting at line 79 the directories containing the 2016 and 
2017 PCAPS are supplied as parameters to analyze_pcaps.  The analyze_pcaps function 
determines the PCAP filenames in the directory and then calls bs.analyze_pcap_file to 
summate each PCAP within the directory.  Executing Analyze_Pcap_Files.py will 
sequentially analyze the PCAP files from the Bot scanning dataset.  Once all the PCAP files 
have been analyzed with the summation being stored in the Daily_PCAP table, then the 
assessment module can assess the summation by interfacing with the Daily_PCAP table.  The 
following sub-section presents the code review for the assessment process.  
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Assessment.  The previous sub-section presented the summation process.  This sub-
section provides a code review for the assessment component.  The BotScannerResults.py 
Python program contains the reporting and graphical functions for assessing the summation 
contained within the MongoDB database (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  The details and summaries 
are provided for the PCAP files in formatted text.  Shown below, Table 7 provides a listing of 
the functions providing the details and summaries. 
 
Table 7 
Detail and Summary Functions 
Function Description 
pcapruntime_details This function prints out the details for the PCAP runtime 
  pcapruntime_summary This function summarizes the PCAP runtime 
  dataset_details This function prints out the details for the dataset 
  dataset_summary This function summarizes the dataset 
 
  
 Shown above in Table 7, there are four functions which provide formatted text output.  
Pcapruntime_details provides the details for the PCAP runtime.  Pcapruntime_summary 
summarizes the PCAP runtime.  Dataset_details provides the details for the PCAP files 
contained in the Bot scanning dataset.  Dataset_summary summarizes the PCAP files.  Each 
function contains two parameters, start_date and end_date.  The start_date and end_date 
parameters allow for the flexibility to include a range of PCAP files for assessment.  Figure 
28 presents the dataset_details function. 
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Figure 28. Dataset details. 
 
Shown above in Figure 28, the details are provided for the PCAP file.  At line 312, the 
Daily_PCAP table is searched for finding all records between the start date and end date.  All 
PCAP files between the start and end date will be selected.  At line 324, for each PCAP file, 
the totals will be displayed on the screen [for p_file in all_pfiles].  Each field from the 
Daily_PCAP table is presented.  The code for the remaining functions mentioned in Table 1. 
Detail and summary functions will not be reviewed.  The code for the detail and summary 
Python functions are similar in functionality (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  Besides providing detail 
and summary reporting functions, three graphical functions are provided. The Bokeh library is 
utilized for providing the graphing capabilities for the solution  ("Welcome to Bokeh," 2015).  
Table 8 provides a listing of the functions providing graphical analysis. 
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Table 8 
Graphical Functions 
Function Description 
bot_totals_graph This function produces two line graphs 
Graph 1: Number of Bots 
Graph 2: Number of potential new Bot Victims 
bot_average_graph This function produces two line graphs 
Graph 1: Average Number of Bots  
Graph 2: Average Number of potential new Bot Victims 
packet_total_graph This function produces a three-line graph 
Line 1: Total Packets  
Line 2: Total Syn Packets 
Line 3: Total Retransmission Packets 
 
 Shown above in Table 8, there are three functions which provide graphical analysis.  
Bot_totals_graph provides two line graphs.  The first line graph contains the Bot totals.  The 
second graph contains the potential new Bot Victim totals.  Bot_average_graph provides two 
line graphs.  The first graph provides the average number of Bots scanning per second.  The 
second graph provides the average number of potential new Bot Victims per minute.  The 
packet_total_graph function provides a three-line graph for total packets, total SYN packets, 
and total retransmission packets.  Each function contains two parameters, start_date and 
end_date.  The start_date and end_date allow for the flexibility to include a range of PCAP 
files.  Figure 29 presents the bot_totals_graph function. 
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Figure 29. Bot totals graph function. 
 
Shown above in Figure 29, the bot_totals_graph function computes PCAP totals from 
a starting date and ending date.  At line 361, the daily PCAP information is found for PCAPS 
in the search range of the starting date and end date [all_pfiles].  Starting at line 367, for each 
PCAP file included in the search (a) the packet date is appended to the pcaps list [pcaps]; (b) 
the total number of bots is appended to the bots list [bots]; (c) the total number of potential 
new bot victims are appended to the potential new bot victims list 
[potential_new_bot_victims].  When all the PCAP information is gathered and the lists are 
built, then the graphs are created.  Figure 30 presents the code for creating the line graph for 
the Bot Totals. 
 
 
Figure 30. Creating the line graph for the number of Bots. 
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 Shown above in Figure 30 is the code that produces a line graph for the Bot Totals for 
the date range from the start_date and end_date parameters.  Line 379 defines the Hyper Text 
Markup Language (HTML) file that will open in a web-browser [output_file].  At line 382. 
The title and x-axis type are set for the graph [p1].  At line 385, the Bokeh line function is 
called providing the pcaps as the x-axis values and the bots as the y-axis values.  A legend is 
provided as well as the line width of five and the line color as red.  At Line 388, the show 
function displays the graph in the browser containing the red Bots line over the time period 
provided in the pcaps list.  Once the Bots line graph has been shown, then the potential new 
Bot Victims line graph is produced.  Figure 31 presents the code for producing the potential 
new Bot Victim line graph. 
 
 
Figure 31. Creating the line graph for number of potential new Bot Victims. 
 
 Shown above in Figure 31, the code for creating the line graph for the number of 
potential Bot Victims is similar to the code for creating the line graph for the number of Bots.  
At line 392, the HTML output file is defined [output_file].  At line 392, the title and x-axis 
type are defined for the graph [p2].  On line 398, pcaps list is provided for the x-axis and the 
pot_new_bot_victims list is provided for the y-axis.  Line 401 shows the potential Bot Victims 
line graph in a different browser session than the Bots line graph.  The bot_totals_graph 
function provides a graphical representation for Bots and potential new Bot Victims over a 
time-period.  The code for the remaining functions mentioned in Table 2. Graphical functions 
will not be reviewed.  The code for all the graphical functions is similar to the code for 
bot_totals_graph (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  The next sub-section provides a summary. 
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Prototype code review summary.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
includes the following Python programs (a) BotScanner.py; (b) Analyze_PCAP_Files.py; (c) 
BotScannerResults.py.  The BotScanner.py program contains the functions for summation of a 
PCAP file from the Bot scanning dataset (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  The summation process is 
able to analyze each network packet of the Bot scanner dataset to identify a Bot scanning for a 
potential new Bot Victim.  The summation for each PCAP file includes the totals for: Bots, 
potential new Bot Victims, unique SYN packets, and retransmission packets.  The summation 
totals are stored in a MongoDB database.  Analyze_pcap_files.py contains the function for 
listing all the PCAP files of the Bot scanning dataset (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  Each PCAP file 
is supplied as a parameter to the PCAP summation function analyze_pcap_file of 
BotScanner.py.  BotScannerResults.py provides the assessment functions for reporting along 
with corresponding line graphs (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  The next section focuses on single 
case experimentation performed with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.         
Single Case Experimentation 
The previous section presented a code review for the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype.  This section performs experimentation with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype for answering the research questions.  This section presents (a) a discussion of the 
persistent database; (b) a discussion of assessment automation; (c) a discussion concerning 
reporting assessment; (d) a discussion concerning line graphing assessment; (e) a summary 
for the single-case experiment.  The next sub-section discusses the persistent database. 
Persistent database.  The summation process tabulates the Bot scanning mechanism 
for each PCAP file.  The summation results are stored in the MongoDB database.  The 
assessment process searches the MongoDB to produce reports and line graphs.  Performing 
the experimentation with the summation process to summate all of the PCAP files of the Bot 
scanner dataset, Figure 32 presents the contents of the MongoDB database.  
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Figure 32. Persistent database contents. 
    
Shown above in Figure 32, the MongoDB Daily_PCAP contains 304 records.  Each 
record corresponds to a summated PCAP file of the Bot scanner dataset.  Each record contains 
the packet_date, total_potential_new_bot_victims, total_retransmission_packets, 
total_packets, total_syn_packets, dest_subnet, and total_bots.  The Daily_PCAP_Runtime 
table contains the start and ending time for the summation of each PCAP file.  The summation 
was successful storing the summated Bot scanning mechanism in the persistent MongoDB 
database.  The next sub-section discusses assessment automation.   
Assessment automation.  The Python program Answer_Reserach_Questions.py 
defines two functions for answering the research questions (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  In the 
main portion of the Answer_Reserach_Questions.py program, the two functions are called for 
automating the assessment.   Figure 33 presents the two functions for answering the research 
questions.  
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Figure 33. Functions for answering the research questions. 
 
 Shown above in Figure 33, two functions answer the research questions.  Starting at 
line 35, the function can_the_bots_and_potential_new_bot_victims_be_identified is defined.  
The function can_the_bots_and_potential_new_bot_victims_be_identified answers the first 
two research questions for identifying and summating Bots as well as potential new Bot 
Victims.  Two BotScanner.py functions are called.  Both functions include the starting and 
ending date of the Bot scanning dataset as parameters.  At line 38, the bsr.dataset_details 
function provides the details from the Daily_PCAP table.  At line 41, the 
bsr.dataset_summary function provides the summary of the records from the Daily_PCAP 
table.   
 Starting at line 48, the is_it_possible_to_monitor_bot_scanning_over_time function is 
defined.  The is_it_possible_to_monitor_bot_scanning_over_time function performs 
assessment to answers the third research question concerning monitoring the Bot scanning 
mechanism over time.  Three BotScannerResults.py functions are called.  The starting date, 
2016-12-20, and the ending date, 2016-21-24, is supplied as parameters.  The Bot scanning 
assessment is performed starting on 2016-12-20 and ending on 2016-12-24.  At line 51, the 
function bsr.dataset_summary provides the summary from the date range.  At line 54, the 
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bsr,packet_total_graph function is called to graph the packet totals.  At line 58. the 
bsr.bot_total_graph function is called to graph the Bot and potential new Bot Victims.   
The main part of the Python program Answer_Reserach_Questions.py calls the 
functions for answering the research questions.  Figure 34 presents the main driver for calling 
the two functions for answering the research questions.   
 
 
Figure 34. Main driver for answering the research questions. 
 
 Shown above in Figure 34, the main portion of Answer_Reserach_Questions.py calls 
the two functions for answering the research questions.  At line 68, the 
can_the_bots_and_potential_new_bot_victims_be_identified function is called to answer the 
first two research questions concerning identifying and summating Bots and potential new 
Bot Victims.  At line 71, the is_it_possible_to_monitor_bot_scanning_over_time function is 
called to answer the third research question for monitoring the Bot scanning mechanism over 
time (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  The next sub-section discusses Bot assessment. 
Reporting assessment.  The previous sub-section presented a code review for the 
Answer_Research_Questions.py Python program for automating assessment.  This sub-
section will evaluate the can_the_bots_and_potential_new_bot_victims_be_identified 
function for reporting assessment.  The function calls the BostScannerResults.py functions for 
dataset details and summary.  Figure 35 shows an example of the details for a PCAP file. 
 
Packet Date:  2016-11-20 
Destination Subnets:  [u'130.152.184.0/24', u'192.228.79.0/24'] 
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Number of Packets:  93463 
Number of SYN Packets:  54302 
Number of Retransmission Packets:  39161 
Number of Bots:  40540 
Number of Potential New Bot Victims:  257 
Figure 35. Dataset details example. 
 
 Shown above in Figure 35, the dataset details are provided for the PCAP file on 2016-
11-20.  ANSWER_RESEARCH_QUESTIONS.PY FORMATTED TEXT OUTPUT contains 
the details for each PCAP file of the Bot scanning dataset from the MongoDB database 
(Infosecchazzy, 2019).  In the example above, two destination subnets were identified 
[130.152.184.0/24, 192.228.79.0/24].  The following was calculated for the packets (a) 93,463 
network packets; (b) 54,302 SYN packets; (c) 39,161 retransmission packets.  The PCAP file 
consists of 40,540 Bots and 573 potential new Bot Victims.  Shown below, Figure 36 presents 
the summated PCAP record in the MongoDB.  
 
 
Figure 36. Dataset verification from MongoDB Daily_PCAP table. 
 
Shown above for Figure 36, the Daily_PCAP table contains an entry for the PCAP file 
on 2016-11-20.  The summation totals in the Daily_PCAP table match the totals from the 
dataset details report.  The report presented accurate totals from the MongoDB database.  
Evaluating and verifying the assessment from the details report has provided some interesting 
insight into the Bot scanning mechanism over time.   
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 From 2016-06-01 to 2016-07-31 there is no Bot scanning activity.  The PCAP files 
during this time period are empty.   
 From 2016-08-01 to 2016-11-19 only one Subnet [130.152.184.0/24] is scanned 
by Bots.  Multiple Bots are attempting to connect to only one potential new Bot 
Victim.  There are no retransmission packets.  This data seems to indicate targeted 
scanning.  The original Mirai scanner randomly generates IP addresses.  Future 
research could include further analysis of these packets. 
 From 2016-11-20 to 2016-11-28 two subnets are scanned [130.152.184.0/24, 
192.228.79.0/24].  The details during this time period contains varying Bot 
scanning summation totals as well as retransmission packets.  
 From 2016-11-29 to 2017-03-08 three subnets are scanned [192.228.79.0/24, 
130.152.184.0/24, 199.9.14.0/24].  The description for the dataset does not include 
the 199.9.14.0/24 subnet (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-
LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  The description of the 
dataset only included the subnets [130.152.184.0/24, 192.228.79.0/24].  Future 
research is needed for clarifying the subnets contained in the dataset.  During this 
time period, summation fields contain fluctuating values.  
 From 2017-03-09 to 2017-03-20 514 potential new Bot Victims are recorded while 
the other summation fields contain fluctuating values. 
 From 2017-03-21 to 2017-03-31 four subnets were scanned [192.228.79.0/24, 
199.9.14.0/24, 130.152.184.0/24, 190.103.186.0/24].  During this time period, 
each PCAP contained 515 potential new Bot Victims.  The other summation 
details contain fluctuating values. 
    
The detail report provided insight for monitoring the Bot scanning mechanism.  From 
2016-06-01 to 2016-07-31 there is no Bot scanning activity.  2016-08-01 to 2016-11-19 
recorded targeted scanning one Subnet [130.152.184.0/24].   From 2016-11-20 to 2016-11-28 
scanning increased to two subnets [130.152.184.0/24, 192.228.79.0/24].  The time period 
from 2016-11-29 to 2017-03-08 recorded three subnets being scanned [192.228.79.0/24, 
130.152.184.0/24, 199.9.14.0/24].  From 2017-03-09 to 2017-03-20 514 potential new Bot 
Victims were reported.  From 2017-03-21 to 2017-03-31 the scanning increased to four 
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subnets [192.228.79.0/24, 199.9.14.0/24, 130.152.184.0/24, 190.103.186.0/24] and 515 
potential new Bot Victims were reported.  Over time, the recorded Bot scanning dataset 
shows a slight increase in the subnets being scanned, from one to four.  From 2017-03-09 to    
2017-03-31 there is a slight increase in potential new Bot Victims from 514 to 515.  Future 
research could include additional statistical analysis of the dataset details.              
The summary report provides dataset totals and averages.  Figure 37 contains the 
summary for the Bot scanner dataset. 
 
 
Summary for Bot Scanning Dataset 
Start Date:  2016-06-01 
End Date:  2017-03-31 
Destination Subnets:  ['130.152.184.0/24', '192.228.79.0/24', '199.9.14.0/24', 
'190.103.186.0/24'] 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total number of packets: 45422522 
Total number of successful SYN packets: 24946360 
Total number of re-transmission packets: 20476162 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Average number of Bots scanning (per PCAP): 41325.53 
Average number of potential new Bot Victims (per PCAP): 215.74 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Average Number of Packets (per minute): 103.76 
Average Number of Bots Scanning (per minute):  28.70 
Average Potential New Bot Victims (per minute):   0.15 
Average Potential New Bot Victims (per hour):   8.99 
 
Figure 37. Dataset summary for all PCAP files. 
 
  Shown above in figure 37, the Bot scanner dataset is summarized spanning all the 
PCAP files of the dataset.  The dataset contained four different destination subnets 
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[130.152.184.0/24, 192.228.79.0/24, 199.9.14.0/24, 190.103.186.0/24].  Totals calculated for 
the packets included: 45,422,522 network packets, 24,946,360 SYN packets, and 20,476,162 
retransmission packets.  The dataset contains a total of 12,562,962 unique instances of Bots 
scanning and 65,584 instances of potential new Bot Victims. Averages per PCAP include: 
41,325.53 Bots and 215.74 potential new Bot Victims.  Average per minute include: 103.76 
packets, 28.70 Bots, and 0.15 potential new Bot Victims.  Results indicate 8.99 potential new 
Bot Victims per hour.  
 The summary report provides the Bot and potential new Bot Victim totals along with 
packet totals.  Also, averages per PCAP are calculated.  The dataset summary provides 
averages for Bots, potential new Bot Victims, and packets.  The detail report provides the 
contents of each summated PCAP file from the MongoDB database.  Both reports, detail and 
summary, were generated in real time with no noticeable delay.  Assessment with the detail 
report allows monitoring of the Bot scanning mechanism over time.  The next sub-section 
discusses graphical assessment.   
Graphical Assessment.  This sub-section performs graphical assessment of the Bot 
scanner dataset.  This sub-section will detail the experimentation with the 
is_it_possible_to_monitor_bot_scanning_over_time function.  This function calls the 
BotScannerResults.py dataset_summary function in the date range from 2016-12-20 to 2016-
12-24.  Figure 38 presents the dataset summary. 
 
 
Summary for Bot Scanning Dataset 
Start Date:  2016-12-20 
End Date:  2016-12-24 
Destination Subnets:  ['199.9.14.0/24', '192.228.79.0/24', '130.152.184.0/24'] 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total number of packets: 2702090 
Total number of successful SYN packets: 1242849 
Total number of re-transmission packets: 1459241 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Average number of Bots scanning (per PCAP): 118556.40 
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Average number of potential new Bot Victims (per PCAP): 513.60 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Average Number of Packets (per minute): 375.29 
Average Number of Bots Scanning (per minute):  82.33 
Average Potential New Bot Victims (per minute):   0.36 
Average Potential New Bot Victims (per hour):  21.40 
 
Figure 38. Dataset summary for a certain date range. 
   
Shown above in Figure 38, the dataset summary spans the PCAP dates starting 2016-
12-20 and ending on 2016-12-24.  Three destination subnets are determined [199.9.14.0/24, 
192.228.79.0/24, 130.152.184.0/24].  The packet totals include: 2,702,090 network packets, 
1,242,849 SYN packets, and 1,459,241 retransmission packets.  Averages for the PCAP 
include: 118556.40 Bots and 513.60 potential new Bot Victims.  Average per minute include: 
375.29 packets, 82.33 Bots, and 0.36 potential new Bot Victims.  Results indicate 21.40 
potential new Bot Victims per hour.   
 The packet_total_graph function provides a line graph for the packet totals from the 
dataset summary.  Figure 39 shows the line graph containing the various packet totals. 
 
Figure 39. Packet totals line graph. 
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Shown above in Figure 39, the packet totals are represented in a line graph containing 
three lines.  Starting on 12/20 and ending on 12/24, an individual line is graphed for the 
following totals: total packets, SYN packets, and retransmission packets.  This graph monitors 
the packet totals over a time period starting on 12/20 and ending on 12/24.  This time period 
shows a decline in total packets.  There is a decline in SYN packets while retransmission 
packets seem consistent.  After 12/21, retransmission packets outgain SYN packets.  The Bots 
and potential new Bots Victims are graphed by calling the bot_totals_graph function.  Figure 
40 presents the line graph for the Bots.  
 
 
Figure 40. Bots line graph. 
 
Shown above in Figure 40, the total number of Bots per day is represented by a line 
graph.  This graph monitors the Bot totals over a time period starting on 12/20 and ending on 
12/24.  Between 12/20 and 12/22 there is a steady decline for Bot totals.  Start on 12/23, the 
Bot totals rise.  Then on 12/24 the Bot totals decline.  Figure 41 presents the potential new 
Bot victims.  
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Figure 41. Potential new Bot Victims line graph. 
 
Shown above in Figure 41, the total number of potential new Bot Victims per day is 
represented by a line graph.  This graph monitors the potential new Bot Victim totals over a 
time period starting on 12/20 and ending on 12/24.  Between 12/20 and 12/22 total number of 
potential new Bot Victims remains constant at 514.  Starting on 12/23, the number of potential 
new Bot Victims drops by one to 513.   
The line graphs were produced in real time with no delay.  The BotScannerResults.py 
line graph functions, for packet totals and the Bot totals, provide a visual representation of the 
Bot scanning mechanism.  Experimentation with line graphing provided the assessment to 
monitor the Bot scanning mechanism over time.  The next sub-section provides a summary.   
Single case experimentation summary.  This section presented validation of the 
MongoDB database for summation and assessment.  A Python program, 
Answer_Reserach_Questions.py, was evaluated for assessment automation.  Reporting 
assessment was evaluated for dataset details and dataset summary.  Line graphing was 
assessed for Bot, potential new Bot Victim, and network packet totals.  The report for the 
dataset details provided the PCAP summation totals, from the MongoDB database, that 
allowed for monitoring of the Bot scanning mechanism.  Also, the line graphs were able to 
monitor the Bot scanning mechanism with visual representation.  The prototype assessment 
component  provided investigation of the Bot scanning dataset for identifying a Bot scanning 
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for a potential new Bot Victim.  Experimentation with the prototype demonstrated it	is	
possible	to	develop	a	solution	that	can	analyze	network	traffic	to	identify	a	Bot	scanning	for	a	
potential	new	Bot	Victim.  The next section provides a discussion of a solution comparison 
between the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype and NIDS.  
Prototype Solution Comparison 
The previous section discussed a single case experiment with the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype.  This section compares a NIDS solution to the prototype.  This section 
presents (a) a discussion of the method for the NIDS evaluation; (b) a discussion of the 
experimentation performed with the NIDS solution for generating reports and graphs; (c) a 
discussion for a comparison between the NIDS and the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype; (d) a summary for the prototype solution comparison.  The next sub-section 
discusses the NIDS evaluation. 
NIDS evaluation.  A signature-based NIDS solution produces an alert log from 
signatures applied to a captured PCAP file for identifying malicious network activity.  
Typically, the NIDS alert log is forwarded to a SIEM system for further analysis and 
reporting (Nagaraja & Kumar, 2018).  Recent research has focused on the Suricata NIDS for 
applying signatures to PCAP files to alert on malicious network traffic (Day & Burns, 2011).  
Splunk is a popular SIEM for assessing NIDS alert logs (Shah, 2015).  This study performs 
NIDS experimentation on the same PC as in the single case experiment with the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype.  The PC requirements are identical for the NIDS and 
prototype experimentation.  The PC is a Dell computer running the Windows 10 OS with 12 
GB of memory, 500GB hard drive, and an Intel Core i5 2.20 GHz processor.   Suricata v4.0 
and Splunk v7.2 reside on the same PC as the dataset.  The Bot scanning dataset is alerted on 
by Suricata.  Once every PCAP file of the dataset has been alerted on by Suricata, Splunk will 
index the alert log.  Indexing the alert log allows Splunk to search thru the indexed alert log to 
produce reports and charts of summated Bot scanning activity.  Similar to the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype, Splunk performs the assessment for monitoring the Bot 
scanning mechanism over time.  Shown below, Table 9 contains the method for the NIDS 
evaluation.         
         
110 
Table 9 
Method for NIDS Evaluation 
Step Solution Description 
1. Python script Convert PCAP Next Generation (PCAPNG) files of Bot scanner 
dataset to PCAP format. 
 
2. Suricata Develop signature for alerting on all packets of the dataset. 
 
3. Suricata Configure Suricata alert log. 
 
4. Suricata Generate alerts for all of the PCAP files of the dataset. 
 
5. Splunk Index alert log with Splunk. 
 
6. Splunk Produce reports and charts to assess Bot scanner dataset. 
 
 
Shown above in Table 9, the NIDS evaluation method requires six major steps.  The 
Step, Solution, and Description is provided in Table 9.  Step 1 requires a Python script for 
converting the PCAPNG files of the dataset to PCAP files.  Step 2 describes a signature 
created in Suricata for detecting the SYN packets of the dataset.  Step 3 represents the 
configuration of the Suricata alert log.  For Step 4, Suricata generates alerts for all of the 
converted PCAP files of the dataset.  In Step 5, Splunk indexes the alert log.  For Step 6, 
Splunk searches the indexed alert log to produce reports and charts to assess the Bot scanner 
dataset.  The next sub-section discusses the PCAP conversion. 
PCAP conversion.  The dataset consists of PCAPNG files.   PCAPNG is a format for 
storing network traffic (Velea, Ciobanu, Gurzau, & Patriciu, 2017).  Suricata is unable to read 
the format of PCAPNG files.  Suricata can process PCAP files.  A Python utility was written 
to convert the Bot scanning dataset PCAPNG files to PCAP files (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  
Shown below, Figure 42 presents the convert_pcaps function for converting a PCAPNG file 
to PCAP. 
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Figure 42. PCAP conversion function. 
 
Shown above in Figure 42, the convert_pcaps function is called to convert all of the 
PCAPNG files of the dataset to PCAP format.  At line 119, tiger_shark is assigned the 
Tshark, the Wireshark Command Line Interface (CLI), command with the -F option for pcap 
format, -r for reading the pcapng_file, and -w for writing to the pcap_file.  The next sub-
section discusses the Bot scanning signature.   
Bot scanning signature.  Suricata is a signature-based NIDS.  A signature is needed to 
detect the Bot scanning packets from the dataset.  A signature file was created for the Bot 
scanning (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  The signature is shown below: 
 
alert tcp any -> any $MIRAI_SCANNING_PORTS (flags: S; msg: "MIRAI";) 
Figure 43. Bot scanning signature. 
 
Shown above in Figure 43, based upon the Bot scanner code review performed in this 
study, the Bot scanning signature alerts on TCP packets from any source IP or port.  The 
destination can be any IP.  $MIRAI_SCANNING_PORTS is configured to contain telnet ports 
23 and 2323.  $MIRAI_SCANNING_PORTS is defined in the suricata.yaml configuration file 
(Infosecchazzy, 2019).  Flags: S specifies alerting only on SYN packets.  The Bot scanner 
dataset only contains SYN network packets.  Msg: "MIRAI" represents a message to include 
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with each alert generated from the signature.  The signature will alert on all of the network 
packets contained in the Bot scanner dataset.  The signature analyzes the Bot scanner network 
packets to alert on a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  The next sub-section 
discusses the configuration of the Suricata alert log.  
Alert log configuration.  For this evaluation, the Suricata alert log is configured for 
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format.  The Splunk SIEM can parse JSON formatted 
alert logs for assessment and charting (Shah, 2015).  Shown below, Figure 44 shows the 
configuration for the Suricata alert log.   
 
# Extensible Event Format (nicknamed EVE) event log in JSON format 
  - eve-log: 
      enabled: yes 
      filetype: regular #regular|syslog|unix_dgram|unix_stream|redis 
      filename: eve.json 
Figure 44. Suricata alert log configuration. 
 
Shown above in Figure 44, the Suricata alert log is configured for JSON format in the 
suricata.yaml configuration file (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  The alert log is enabled, the filetype is 
set to regular, and the alert filename is eve.json.  The next sub-section discusses generating 
alerts from the dataset.  
Generating alerts from dataset.  For generating alerts from the dataset, a batch script 
was written that calls Suricata to alert on each PCAP file of the dataset (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  
Shown below in Figure 45 is an example a line in the batch script. 
 
suricata -c suricata.yaml -s mirai-bot-scanning.rules  -r C:/MiraiCONVPCAPS/2016-08-
03.pcap  
Figure 45. Suricata command line options. 
 
Shown above in Figure 45, Suricata is alerting on a PCAP file  The -c option specifies 
the suricata.yaml configuration file, -s specifies the mirai-bot-scanning.rules signature file, 
and the -r option specifies reading the C:/MiraiCONVPCAPS/2016-08-03.pcap file.  Once the 
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batch script has completed, the mirai-bot-scanning.rules signature has been applied to all of 
the PCAP files of the dataset.  A 32.6 GB eve JSON formatted log file was created.  The next 
section presents indexing the alert log.    
Indexing alert log.  The Suricata eve alert log is indexed with Splunk.  The index 
allows Splunk to search the alert log.  Figure 46 displays information from the indexed alert 
log.  
 
 Name           Actions        Type    App         Current Size    Max Size   Event Count  Earliest Event  Latest Event  Home Path    
 
Figure 46. Splunk alert log index. 
 
Shown above in Figure 46, the alert log bot_scanning index is 30.59 GB.  The index is 
contained in $SPLUNK_DB\bot_scanning\db.  Splunk references the bot_scanning index to 
perform searches for generating reports and charts.  The next sub-section discusses generating 
Splunk reports and charts.    
NIDS reports and charts.  For monitoring the Bot scanning mechanism, Splunk 
performs searches, utilizing the bot_scanning index, to produce reports and charts.  This sub-
section presents (a) a search for Bot totals from the alert log; (b) a search for network packet 
totals from the alert log; (c) a search for potential new Bot Victim subnets from the alert log.  
The next sub-section discusses the search for Bot totals. 
Searching for bot totals.  Splunk provides a web interface for searching indexed data.  
Figure 47 presents the Splunk search statement for summating Bots and potential new Bot 
Victims per PCAP file of the dataset.   
 
source="C:\\aaaeve\\eve.json" host="DESKTOP-D52LDB1" index="bot_scanning"  | eval 
packet_month=case(date_month=="january","01", date_month=="february","02", 
date_month=="march","03", date_month=="april","04", date_month=="may","05", 
date_month=="june","06", date_month=="july","07", date_month=="august","08", 
date_month=="september","09", date_month=="october","10", 
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date_month=="november","11", date_month=="december","12") | eval 
packet_day=printf("%02d",date_mday) | eval Pcap_Date = (date_year + "-" + packet_month + 
"-" + packet_day) | where date_year in (2016, 2017) AND event_type == "alert" | chart 
distinct_count(src_ip) AS Bots, distinct_count(dest_ip) AS Pot_Bot_Victims by Pcap_Date 
Figure 47. Splunk Bot totals search. 
 
Shown above in Figure 47, the Splunk search statement specifies the alert log source 
as source="C:\\aaaeve\\eve.json".  The index is specified as index="bot_scanning".  A chart 
is produced for Bots and potential new Bot Victims grouped by the PCAP date [chart 
distinct_count(src_ip) AS Bots, distinct_count(dest_ip) AS Pot_Bot_Victims by Pcap_Date].     
Upon search completion, a report and chart is available for assessment.  The report contains 
three columns representing the PCAP date, the number of Bots, and number of potential new 
Bot Victims (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  Table 10 contains a sample from the Splunk Bot totals 
report. 
   
Table 10 
Splunk Bot Total Report Sample 
Pcap_Date  Bots 
         
Pot_Bot_Victims 
8/1/16  108  1 
8/2/16  235  1 
8/3/16  332  1 
 
Shown above in Table 10, is a sampling from the Bot totals report.  The Bot totals 
report contains a row for each PCAP of the dataset that contained network traffic.  The first 
row is for the PCAP recorded on 8/1/16 and the last row of the contains the PCAP date of 
3/31/17.  For each row, Pcap_Date represents the PCAP date, Bots represents the summation 
of Bots on the Pcap_date, and Pot_Bot_Victims represents the summated potential new Bot 
Victims.  Based upon the search results, Splunk creates a chart.  Shown below in Figure 48, 
the Splunk Bot totals line graph is presented. 
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Figure 48. Splunk Bot totals line graph. 
 
Shown above in Figure 48, Splunk produces a line graph for the summated Bots and 
potential new Bot Victims spanning the entire dataset of PCAP files.  The line graph shows the 
fluctuation of Bots per PCAP while the potential new Bot Victims summation remains 
constant.  Splunk provides the functionality for zooming in on a part of the line graph.  Figure 
48 displays a column chart zoomed in from the line chart. 
 
Figure 49. Splunk Bot totals column chart. 
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Shown above in Figure 49, a column chart is presented starting on 2016-12-09 to 
2016-12-18.  On 2016-12-14, 218,803 Bots were summated.  The potential new Bot Victims 
column, Pot_Bot_Victims, does not appear in the chart since the value [513] is much lower 
than the Bots total.  Splunk provides the searching capabilities as well as the reporting and 
charting functionality to monitor the Bots and potential new Bot Victims over time.  The next 
sub-section discusses searching for network packet totals.         
Searching for network packet totals.  To determine the network packet totals, a 
Splunk search is executed for summating the packet total, the unique SYN packets, and the 
retransmission packets.  Figure 50 presents the search command for summating the network 
packets. 
 
source="C:\\aaaeve\\eve.json" host="DESKTOP-D52LDB1" index="bot_scanning"  | eval 
S_Packets=src_ip + dest_ip | eval packet_month=case(date_month=="january","01", 
date_month=="february","02", date_month=="march","03", date_month=="april","04", 
date_month=="may","05", date_month=="june","06", date_month=="july","07", 
date_month=="august","08", date_month=="september","09", date_month=="october","10", 
date_month=="november","11", date_month=="december","12") | eval 
packet_day=printf("%02d",date_mday) | eval Pcap_Date = (date_year + "-" + packet_month + 
"-" + packet_day) |  where date_year in (2016, 2017) AND event_type == "alert" | chart 
sum(linecount) AS Total_Packets, distinct_count(S_Packets) AS SYN_Packets by Pcap_Date | 
eval Retran_Packets = Total_Packets - SYN_Packets 
Figure 50. Splunk search for packet totals. 
 
Shown above in Figure 50, the packet totals search statement specifies the alert log as 
source="C:\\aaaeve\\eve.json".  The bot_scanning index is specified.  A chart is produced for 
Total Packets, SYN Packets, and Retransmission Packets grouped by the PCAP date [chart 
sum(linecount) AS Total_Packets, distinct_count(S_Packets) AS SYN_Packets by Pcap_Date | 
eval Retran_Packets = Total_Packets - SYN_Packets].  Upon search completion, a report and 
chart is available for assessment.  The report contains four columns representing the PCAP 
date, total number of network packets, the amount of unique SYN packets, and the number of 
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retransmission packets (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  Table 11 contains a sample from the Splunk 
network packet totals report. 
 
Table 11 
Splunk Network Packet Totals Report Sample 
Pcap_Date     Total_Packets       SYN_Packets Retran_Packets 
8/1/16 109 108 1 
8/2/16 235 235 0 
8/3/16 332 332 0 
 
Shown above in Table 11, is a sampling from the network packet totals report.  The 
report contains a row for each PCAP of the dataset that contained network traffic.  The first 
row is for the PCAP recorded on 8/1/16 and the last row of the report contains the PCAP date 
of 3/31/17.  For each row, Pcap_Date represents the PCAP date, Total_packets represents the 
summation of network packets on the Pcap_date, SYN_Packets represents the summated 
unique SYN packets, and Retran_Packets represents the summated retransmission packets.  
Based upon the search results, Splunk creates a chart.  Shown below in Figure 51, the Splunk 
network packet totals line graph is presented. 
 
 
Figure 51. Splunk packet totals line graph. 
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Shown above in Figure 51, Splunk produces a line graph for the summated 
Total_Packets, SYN_Packets, and Retran_Packets spanning the entire dataset of PCAP files.  
The line graph shows the fluctuation of the summated packets per PCAP.  Splunk provides 
the functionality for zooming in on a part of the line graph.  Figure 52 displays a column chart 
zoomed in from the line chart. 
 
 
Figure 52. Splunk packet totals column chart. 
 
Shown above in Figure 52, a column chart is presented starting on 2016-02-04 to 
2016-2-23.  On 2016-12-14, 1,289,585 network packets were summated.  The column chart 
provides the Total_Packets, SYN_Packets, and Retrans_Packets totals per PCAP file.  
Experimentation has shown that Splunk is able to monitor the dataset network packet totals 
over time.  The next sub-section discusses searching for potential new Bot Victim subnets.         
Searching for potential new Bot Victim subnets.  To determine the potential new Bot 
Victim subnets, a Splunk search is executed for determining the subnets based upon the PCAP 
date.  Figure 53 presents the search command for identifying the victim subnets. 
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source="C:\\aaaeve\\eve.json" host="DESKTOP-D52LDB1" index="bot_scanning"  | eval 
temp=split(dest_ip,".") | eval Sub0 = mvindex(temp,0) | eval Sub1 = mvindex(temp,1) | eval 
Sub2 = mvindex(temp,2)  | eval packet_month=case(date_month=="january","01", 
date_month=="february","02", date_month=="march","03", date_month=="april","04", 
date_month=="may","05", date_month=="june","06", date_month=="july","07", 
date_month=="august","08", date_month=="september","09", date_month=="october","10", 
date_month=="november","11", date_month=="december","12") | eval 
packet_day=printf("%02d",date_mday) | eval Pcap_Date = (date_year + "-" + packet_month + 
"-" + packet_day) | where date_year in (2016, 2017) AND event_type == "alert" | dedup Sub0, 
Sub1, Sub2, Pcap_Date | eval D_Subnet = printf("%d.%d.%d.0/24",Sub0, Sub1, Sub2) | table 
botscanning_subnets Pcap_Date D_Subnet | sort by Pcap_Date 
Figure 53. Splunk search from victim subnets. 
 
Shown above in Figure 53, the subnet search statement specifies the alert log as 
source="C:\\aaaeve\\eve.json".  The "bot_scanning" index is specified.  A table 
[botscanning_subnets] is created containing the PCAP Date [Pcap_Date] and the potential 
new Bot Victim subnet [D_Subnet] sorted by the PCAP date [table botscanning_subnets 
Pcap_Date D_Subnet | sort by Pcap_Date].  Upon search completion, a table and report is 
available for assessment.  The table and report contains two columns.  One column represents 
the PCAP date and the other column represents the subnet (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  Table 12 
contains a sample from the Splunk subnet report. 
 
Table 12 
Splunk Subnet Report Sample 
PCAP DATE  SUBNET 
11/24/16  192.228.79.0/24 
11/24/16  130.152.184.0/24 
 
Shown above in Table 12, is a sampling from the subnet report.  The report contains a 
row for each new potential Bot Victim subnet.  In the sample above, the PCAP file dated 
11/24/16 contained two new potential Bot Victim subnets [192.228.79.0/24, 
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130.152.184.0/24].  The report contains a row for each potential new Bot Victim subnet 
identified in the PCAP file.  The next sub-section provides the prototype comparison with the 
NIDS solution        
Prototype comparison with NIDS solution.  This sub-section compares the 
evaluation of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype with the NIDS solution consisting 
of Suricata integrated with Splunk.  This section presents (a) a comparison of the methods; (b) 
a comparison of performance; (c) a comparison of Bot scanning assessment results.  The next 
sub-section discusses the method comparison between the prototype and NIDS solution. 
Methods comparison.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype contains a 
component for summating the dataset and a component that provides for assessment 
consisting of reports and line-graphs.  The NIDS solution consists of the Suricata NIDS for 
producing an alert log and the Snort SIEM for assessing the alert log with reports and charts.  
Shown below in Table 12 is the methods a Bot researcher follows for the prototype and NIDS 
solution.     
 
Table 13 
Methods Comparison 
Step Prototype 
Component 
Description NIDS 
Component 
Description 
1. Summation 
Component 
The PCAP files are 
summated into a 
MongoDB database via 
Python functions. 
Python  
script 
Convert PCAP Next 
Generation (PCAPNG) files 
of Bot scanner dataset to 
PCAP format. 
 
2. Assessment 
Component 
Real-time reports and 
line-graphs produced 
from Python functions 
searching the 
MongoDB database. 
Suricata Generate alerts, with the Bot 
scanning signature, for all of 
the PCAP files of the dataset. 
 
3. -  Splunk Index alert log with Splunk. 
 
4. -  Splunk Search indexed alert log to 
produce reports and charts to 
assess Bot scanner dataset. 
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Shown above in Table 13, the Mirai Bot Scanner Prototype contains two methods, or 
steps, for evaluating the dataset.  The Bot researcher summates the packets contained in the 
PCAP files of the dataset.  Then, the Bot researcher performs assessment thru Python 
functions.  Concerning the NIDS solution, four steps are required.  In the first step, the PCAP 
files must be converted from PCAPNG format to PCAP format.  Suricata is unable to read 
PCAPNG files.  The second step requires Suricata to generate the alert log.  The alert log is 
produced by reading the PCAP converted files of the dataset and applying the Bot scanning 
signature.  In the third step, the alert log is indexed by Splunk.  Indexing allows Splunk to 
perform searches of the alert log.  In the final step, the Bot researcher executes searches for 
assessment of the alerted Bot scanning.  The NIDS solution requires two more steps than the 
prototype.  The prototype is able to read the PCAP files while a conversion of the PCAP files 
is necessary for Suricata.  Evaluation showed that assessment with Splunk required complex 
searches whereas the prototype requires a Python function call with two parameters for 
specifying a date range.  The next sub-section provides a performance comparison.   
Performance comparison.  This section provides a performance comparison.  The 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype and the NIDS solution was evaluated on the same 
PC.  The performance comparison will consist of comparing the run-time for the summation 
and assessment process of each solution.  
 
Table 14 
Performance Comparison  
Step Prototype 
Component 
Description Run 
Time 
(Hr.) 
NIDS 
Componen
t 
Description Run Time 
(Hr.) 
1. Summation 
Component 
The PCAP 
files are 
summated 
into a 
database. 
               
19 
Python 
script 
Convert 
PCAPNG files 
of Bot scanner 
dataset to PCAP 
format. 
 
                 
1 
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Table 14 (continued) 
Performance Comparison 
      
Step Prototype 
Component 
Description Run 
Time 
(Hr.) 
NIDS 
Componen
t 
Description Run Time 
(Hr.) 
2. Assessment 
Component 
Real-time 
Reports and 
line-graphs 
produced 
from Python 
functions. 
                 
0 
Suricata Generate alerts, 
with the Bot 
scanning 
signature, for all 
of the PCAP 
files of the 
dataset. 
 
              
19 
3. -   Splunk Index alert log 
with Splunk. 
 
                 
4 
4. -   Splunk Produce reports 
and charts to 
assess Bot 
scanner dataset. 
 
                 
1 
  
TOTALS 
                
19 
                 
25 
  
Shown above in Table 14, the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype required 19 
hours for summation.  Assessment was performed real time.  Concerning the NIDS solution, a 
total of 25 hours was required for the evaluation.  For the first step of the NIDS solution, one 
hour was needed to perform the PCAP conversion.  For the second step, Suricata required 19 
hours to produce the alert log.  Concerning the third step, Splunk required four hours for 
indexing the alert log.  For step four, Splunk required one hour to search the index for 
assessment that produced reports and charts.  The prototype required seven less hours, or 24% 
less time, to summate and assess the Bot scanning dataset.  The next sub-section presents a 
comparison for the Bot scanning results.  
Bot scanning results comparison.  During experimentation, the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype summated the Bot scanning mechanism per PCAP file (Infosecchazzy, 
2019).  The Bots, potential new Bot Victims, and network packets were summated.  For the 
NIDS solution, a Splunk report was generated for Bot totals per PCAP file.  Another report 
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summated the packet totals.  The prototype and Splunk summation totals are compared to 
determine the accuracy of the assessment of the dataset (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  Table 15 
presents a solution totals comparison.  
 
Table 15 
Solution Totals Comparison 
Assessment Category Prototype Splunk Splunk  
Percentage Difference 
Bots 12562962  12505157 
 
‐0.46% 
 
Potential New Bot 
Victims 
65584 
 
65587 
 
0.00% 
 
Network Packets 45422522 
 
45288087 
 
‐0.30% 
 
SYN Packets 24946360 
 
27229399 
 
8.38% 
 
Retransmission Packets 20476162 
 
18058688 
 
‐13.39% 
 
    
Shown above for Table 15, the total amount of Bots, Potential New Bot Victims, 
Network Packets, SYN Packets, and Retransmission Packets is compared between the 
Prototype and Splunk assessment.  The Splunk percentage difference is provided.  There is an 
insignificant percentage difference for Bots, Potential New Bot Victims, and Network Packets.  
There is an 8.38% difference for SYN Packets.  Also, there is a 13.39% difference for 
Retransmission Packets.  The difference between the prototype and Splunk totals is expected 
since the prototype summation algorithm classifies Bots, potential new Bot Victims, and 
network packets differently than the Splunk searches performed for summation.  Concerning 
the SYN summation, the prototype includes packets with only one instance.  The originating 
SYN packet that initiated the retransmission packets is included with the retransmission 
summation.  The Splunk search does not include the originating SYN packet in the 
summation for retransmission packets.  Compared to the Splunk totals, it is anticipated that 
the prototype will have less SYN packet totals and more retransmission packet totals.      
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The Tshark CLI for Wireshark can be executed to summate the SYN and 
retransmission packets per PCAP file.  Figure presents summating the PCAP SYN packets 
with Tshark. 
C:\"Program Files"\Wireshark\Tshark -r <filename> -T fields -e ip.src -e ip.dst | sort |  uniq | 
wc -l 
Figure 54. Tshark SYN packet summation. 
   
Shown above in Figure 54, Tshark reads a PCAP file [-r <filename>] and the ip,src 
and ip.dst fields are chosen [-T fields -e ip.src -e ip.dst].  The list is sorted, then uniq rows 
determined, and finally a count of the rows is taken [wc -l].  The count of the rows determines 
the amount of unique SYN packets.  Also, Tshark can summate the number of retransmission 
packets per PCAP file.  Figure 55 presents the Tshark command for retransmission packet 
summation. 
 
C:\"Program Files"\Wireshark\tshark -r <filename>  -Y "tcp.analysis.retransmission" | wc -l 
Figure 55. Tshark retransmission packet summation. 
 
Shown above in Figure 55, Tshark reads a PCAP file [-r <filename>] and applies the 
read filter for retransmission packets [-Y "tcp.analysis.retransmission"].  The count of the 
rows [wc -l] determines the amount retransmission packets.  Table 16 provides a sampling of 
the dataset for comparing the Tshark SYN and retransmission packet totals to the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype and Splunk.   
 
Table 16 
Tshark Packet Comparison 
PCAP Date 
Packet 
Type  Tshark  Prototype 
Prototype 
% Diff. 
with 
Tshark  Splunk 
Splunk  
% Diff.  
with  
Tshark 
8/11/16  SYN  272  271  0.37% 261  4.04% 
8/11/16  Retran.  0  2  0.00% 1  0.00% 
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Table 16 (continued) 
Tshark Packet Comparison 
PCAP Date 
Packet 
Type  Tshark  Prototype 
Prototype 
% Diff. 
with 
Tshark  Splunk 
Splunk  
% Diff.  
with  
Tshark 
9/22/16  SYN  909  869  4.40% 979  ‐7.70% 
9/22/16  Retran.  217  321  -47.93% 244  ‐12.44% 
10/27/16  SYN  1009  842  16.55% 1017  ‐0.79% 
10/27/16  Retran.  1477  1810  -22.55% 1585  ‐7.31% 
11/5/16  SYN  1817  1633  10.13% 1867  ‐2.75% 
11/5/16  Retran.  1147  1453  -26.68% 1233  ‐7.50% 
12/22/16  SYN  158289  129480  18.20% 148421  6.23% 
12/22/16  Retran.  205066  250349  -22.08% 187291  8.67% 
1/11/17  SYN  159842  136810  14.41% 159977  ‐0.08% 
1/11/17  Retran.  206785  244711  -18.34% 200833  2.88% 
2/15/17  SYN  121382  109332  9.93% 123882  ‐2.06% 
2/15/17  Retran.  102083  123049  -20.54% 111247  ‐8.98% 
3/19/17  SYN  194794  186687  4.16% 193105  0.87% 
3/19/17  Retran.  34694  46673  -34.53% 37688  ‐8.63% 
        
 Totals  1189783  1234292  ‐3.74%  1169631  1.69%  
 Shown above in Table 16, the prototype and Splunk SYN and retransmission counts 
are compared with Tshark.  There is a 3.74% total difference for SYN and retransmission 
packet totals between the prototype and Tshark.  A total difference of 1.69% is calculated for 
the difference between Tshark and Splunk.  Splunk percentage differences for SYN and 
retransmission packets do not contain as wide a range as compared to the prototype.  
Concerning Splunk, the largest difference was on 9/22/16 with a 12.44% difference for 
retransmission packets.  On 12/12/16, Splunk experienced its highest difference for SYN 
packets, 6.23%.   On 9/22/16, concerning the prototype, there is a 47.93% difference in 
retransmission packets.  On 12/22/16, there is a 18.20% difference in SYN packets for the 
prototype.  The prototype experienced a wide range of difference ranging from -47.93% for 
retransmission packet totals on 9/22/16 to 18.22% for SYN packet totals on 10/22/16.  The 
differences between Tshark are expected.   
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 Tshark calculates retransmission packets based upon old sequence numbers and 
retransmission timeout (RTO) (Asrodia & Patel, 2012).   The Prototype and Splunk classify 
SYN and retransmission packets differently.  The Splunk and Tshark searches classify unique 
IP addresses for SYN packet totals.  The Splunk retransmission packet total calculation is 
performed by subtracting the SYN total from the network packet total.  The Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype algorithm classifies SYN and retransmission packets 
differently.  Concerning the SYN summation, the prototype includes packets with only one 
instance.  The originating SYN packet that initiated the retransmission packets is included 
with the retransmission summation.  Tshark and Splunk do not include the originating SYN 
packet in their summation for retransmission packets.  Therefore, it is expected that the 
prototype will have less SYN packet totals and more retransmission packet totals per PCAP.   
The next sub-section provides a summary.      
Prototype solution comparison summary.  The Suricata solution was evaluated for 
creating an alert log from the dataset.  Required by Suricata for reading PCAP files, the 
dataset PCAP files were converted from PCAPNG format to PCAP format.  Suricata read 
each converted PCAP file of the dataset to apply a Mirai Bot scanning signature to alert on all 
of the Bot scanning network packets.  Since Suricata does not contain any functionality for 
assessing the alert log, the Splunk SIEM indexed the alert log.  Once the alert log was 
indexed, Splunk searched the indexed alert log for assessing Bot totals and network packet 
totals.  Splunk produced reports as well as various charts for assessment.  Evaluation of the 
NIDS solution, Suricata and Splunk, was compared with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
prototype.  The prototype required 50% less steps for summating and assessing the dataset.  
Analysis of the run-time steps indicates that the prototype is 24% faster for summation and 
assessment.  Lastly, a comparison of summation results with the Tshark packet analyzer 
shows a difference in SYN and retransmission packets for the prototype as well as Splunk.  
The difference with Splunk is unexpected since Splunk summates the SYN packets similar to 
Tshark.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype algorithm classifies SYN and 
retransmission packets differently than Tshark.  The prototype classifies unique SYN packets 
and includes the originating SYN packet with retransmission totals.  The difference in 
classification is expected to cause a difference for the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
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Prototype summation of SYN and retransmission packets.  The next section provides a 
chapter summary.       
Chapter Summary 
Chapter 4 presents (a) a code review of the Bot scanner; (b) network packet analysis 
from a sample PCAP file of the Bot scanning dataset; (c) Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype code review; (d) single case experimentation performed with the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype; (e) a comparison of the prototype to a NIDS solution.  The Bot scanner 
code review identified the Bot scanning mechanism of attempting to establish a connection to 
a potential new Bot Victim with a TCP handshake over the telnet port 23 or 2323.  The packet 
analysis of the Bot scanning dataset identified the SYN and retransmission packets.  The 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype code review presented the Python programs for the 
summation and assessment components.  Experimentation with the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype assessed the reporting and graphing capabilities for monitoring the Bot 
scanning mechanism over time.  Comparison with the Suricata NIDS and Splunk SIEM for 
the dataset assessment indicates the efficiency and effectiveness of the prototype for 
summating and assessing the Bot scanning dataset.  Both, the prototype and the NIDS 
solution, were able to assess the Bot scanning dataset to identify Bots, potential new Bot 
Victims, and Bot scanning network packets.  Both solutions monitored the Bot scanning 
mechanism over time.  Experimentation performed with the prototype and NIDS 
demonstrated it	is	possible	to	develop	a	solution	that	can	analyze	network	traffic	to	identify	a	
Bot	scanning	for	a	potential	new	Bot	Victim.    The next chapter provides the conclusion of this 
study.     
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The focus of this study is performing single case experimentation with the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype for summating a Bot scanning dataset and assessing the Bot 
scanning mechanism over time.  Chapter 4 performed experimentation to answer the research 
questions presented for this dissertation.  The experimentation comprised of a code review of 
the Bot scanner, network packet analysis from a sample PCAP file of the Bot scanning 
dataset, a Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype code review, and research questions 
answered from experimentation performed with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype.  
A comparison to a NIDS solution indicated the usefulness of the prototype for assessing the 
Bot scanning dataset.    
Chapter 5 contains the following sections (a) an overview of this study; (b) 
contributions from the completed research; (c) findings of the research conducted; (d) 
limitations of the study; (e) recommendations for future research.  The next section provides 
an overview of this study. 
Overview 
This research performed experimentation with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype to summate and assess a Bot scanning dataset (Internet Addresses Census dataset, 
IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  The Bot scanning 
dataset contains PCAP files starting on June 1, 2016 and ending on March 31, 2017.  It 
includes Bot TCP SYNs sent to ports 23 and 2323.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype assesses the Bot scanning dataset to answer the research questions of this 
dissertation.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype (a) summates Bots; (b) summates 
potential new Bot Victims; (c) summates packet totals; (d) assesses or monitors the Bot 
scanner mechanism over time.   
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The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype consists of a summation and assessment 
component.  The summation and assessment components interface with a persistent database.  
The assessment component contains the functionality for summation of each PCAP file of the 
Bot scanner dataset.  The assessment component provides reports and line graphs.  The 
summation component stores the tabulated Bot scanning totals, per PCAP file, in the 
persistent database.  The assessment component searches the database for the records needed 
for reporting and graphing.  The experimentation performed with the Mirai Bot Scanner 
Summation Prototype is automated.  Reporting and line-graphing assessment was able to 
monitor the Bot scanning mechanism over time.  Compared to a NIDS solution, the prototype 
has been shown to be advantageous for summating and assessing the Bot scanning dataset.  
The next sub-section provides the major findings. 
Contributions 
The previous sub-section provided an overview of the Bot scanning dataset and the 
Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype for summating and assessing the dataset.  This sub-
section presents the contributions of this study.  According to Mirai botnet researchers (Kolias 
et al., 2017) , “Surprisingly, IoT botnets have received only sporadic attention from 
researchers” (p. 81).  Current research has performed dynamic analysis of Mirai network 
traffic, but not concentrated on the Bot scanner (Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 
2017).  Considering that Mirai is receiving only sporadic attention, the major contribution of 
this study is in performing experimentation with an actual Bot scanning dataset.   
This study follows the DSR research methodology.  The main DSR requirements are 
rigor and relevance (Offermann et al., 2009).  This study performs rigorous experimentation 
with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype for summating and assessing the recorded 
Bot scanning dataset.  The Bot scanner code review reveals the Bot functionality for A Bot 
connecting to a potential new Bot Victim.  Sporadic code reviews have been performed for 
the Bot scanner (Conley, 2017; Kolias et al., 2017; Sinanović & Mrdovic, 2017).  This study 
presents a comprehensive code review for a Bot trying to make a connection to a potential 
new Bot Victim.  Analysis of a sample PCAP file from the Bot scanning dataset confirms the 
Bot scanner functionality discovered from the code review.  This study presents the rigor and 
relevance necessary for experimentation with the Bot scanning dataset. 
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The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype summates each PCAP file of the Bot 
scanning dataset.  Each PCAP is analyzed and the results are stored in a MongoDB table.  
Therefore, each PCAP file needs to be analyzed once to determine the number of Bots, 
potential new Bot Victims, and packet totals.  The Bot scanning results functions, which 
include (a) dataset details; (b) dataset summary; (c) packet totals line graphs; (d) bot totals 
line graphs, which provide formatted text and graphical line charts.  These functions require 
the start date and end date as parameters.  The results of any valid date range of the Bot 
scanning dataset can be assessed.  The prototype for this study provides the ease and 
flexibility to assess the dataset for the desired date range, which provides for rigor and 
relevance.  The next sub-section presents the findings from the experimentation performed for 
this study.  
Findings  
The previous sub-section presented the contributions of this study.  Considering that 
Mirai botnet research is sporadic, a major contribution of this study is performing 
experimentation with a Bot scanner dataset.  A comprehensive code review for a Bot trying to 
make a connection to a potential new Bot Victim is performed.  Analysis of a sample PCAP is 
reinforced with the Bot scanning functionality discovery from the code review.  The Mirai 
Bot Scanner Prototype provides the components to summate and assess the dataset.  This sub-
section presents the findings from the (a) code review; (b) sample PCAP analysis; (c) 
experimentation performed with the prototype; (d) comparison of the prototype with NIDS; 
(e) discussion of the research questions.    
The Bot scanner code review revealed that the Bot randomly generates an IP address. 
Corporate subnets are black-listed, such as General Electric and Hewlett-Packard, as well as 
US government subnets, such as the US Postal Service and the Department of Defense.  The 
Bot attempts to establish a TCP connection, thru a network socket, with the randomly 
generated IP address via a TCP handshake over telnet ports 23 and 2323.  The Bot will 
progress to brute-forcing when an ACK packet is received from the potential new Bot victim.  
The code review provided the necessary background for analyzing the Bot scanner network 
traffic captured in a PCAP file. 
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Analysis with the Wireshark packet analysis tool shows that the sample PCAP file 
contains TCP SYN packets and retransmission packets.  The SYN packet depicts a Bot 
attempting to connect to a potential new Bot Victim over telnet ports.  The retransmission 
packet represents a potential new Bot Victim not responding to the SYN packet with an ACK 
packet.  The retransmission packet indicates a failure of the Bot connecting to a potential new 
Bot Victim.  The Bots are contained in the source field of the network packets.  The potential 
new Bot Victims are contained in the destination field of the SYN packets.  Analysis of the 
PCAP file provided necessary knowledge for the solution. 
The prototype summates each PCAP file.  Based upon the SYN packets contained in 
the PCAP file, the number of Bots and potential new Bot Victims are calculated and stored in 
a database table.  The summation process of the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
required approximately 19 hours and 15 minutes on a PC to summate all the PCAP files and 
store the tabulated results for each individual PCAP file in a table (Infosecchazzy, 2019).  The 
solution was able to dynamically provide reports and line graphs for assessment, based upon a 
date range.  Based upon the date range, the PCAP details database table is queried to gather 
the total number of Bots, total number of potential new Bot Victims, total number of SYN 
packets, and total number of retransmission packets.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation 
Prototype provides real time response for reports and line graphs. 
Comparison with a NIDS solution, Suricata NIDS and Splunk SIEM, highlights the 
advantages of the prototype.  Suricata produces an alert log from applying a Bot scanning 
signature to all of the PCAP files.  Snort indexes the alert log to enable searches that produce 
reports and charts of the Bot scanning mechanism over time.  The NIDS solution requires two 
solutions interfacing with each other while the prototype is self-contained and does not 
interface with other solutions.  The NIDS solution requires more steps for assessing the 
dataset and these steps require 24% more time to complete.  Comparing the assessment 
results, the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype summation algorithm classifies SYN and 
retransmission network packets differently than Splunk, therefore a comparison of the 
summation results expected differences in summation totals. 
Experimentation demonstrated with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype and 
NIDS solution verified it is possible to develop a solution that can analyze network traffic to 
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identify a Bot scanning for a potential new Bot Victim.  These solutions were able to answer 
the three research questions presented in this study: 
1. Can the Bots be identified for summation? 
2. Can the potential new Bot Victims be identified for summation? 
3. Is it possible to monitor the Bot scanning mechanism over time? 
Bots identified.  Concerning the first research question, the prototype is able to read 
the source IP address for each network packet of the Bot scanning dataset.  The source IP 
represents the Bot.  The prototype summation component is able to tabulate the Bot totals.  
The assessment component is able to evaluate Bot totals.  With the Suricata NIDS solution, a 
Bot scanning signature alerts on each network packet of the dataset.  The alert log is indexed 
by the Splunk SIEM to allow for a query to summate and assess the Bots based upon the 
source IP in the alert log.  Experimentation with the prototype and NIDS has shown that the 
Bots can be identified for summation.  
Potential new Bot Victims identified.  Similar to the process for answering the first 
research question, the prototype is able to read the destination IP address for each network 
packet of the Bot scanning dataset.  The destination IP represents the potential new Bot 
Victim.  The prototype summation component is able to tabulate the potential new Bot Victim 
totals.  The assessment component is able to evaluate the Bot Victim totals.  With the Suricata 
NIDS solution, a Bot scanning signature alerts on each network packet of the dataset.  The 
alert log is indexed by the Splunk SIEM to allow for a query to summate and assess the 
potential new Bot Victims based upon the destination IP in the alert log.  Experimentation 
with the prototype and NIDS has shown that the potential new Bot Victims be identified for 
summation. 
Bot scanning mechanism monitored.  For the third research question, the Mirai Bot 
Scanner Summation Prototype and Splunk assess Bot totals and potential new Bot Victims 
totals over time.  The prototype provides Python functions for assessment.  The assessment is 
performed based upon the starting and ending date supplied by the botnet researcher.  A 
Splunk query, constructed by the researcher, assesses the Bot scanning.  The prototype and 
the NIDS solution, consisting of Suricata and Splunk, assess Bots, potential new Bot Victims, 
and network packet totals over time.  Experimentation performed with the prototype and 
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NIDS solution has demonstrated it is possible to monitor the Bot scanning mechanism over 
time.  The next sub-section presents the limitations of this study. 
Limitations 
The previous sub-section discussed the findings of the study.  Considering that Mirai 
botnet research is sporadic, a major contribution of this study is performing experimentation 
with a Bot scanner dataset.  A comprehensive code review reveals the functionality of a Bot 
connecting to a potential new Bot Victim.  Analysis of a sample PCAP discloses the network 
packet types, SYN packets and retransmission packets, sent from the Bot to the potential new 
Bot Victim.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype provides the components to 
summate and assess the dataset.  This sub-section presents the limitations of the study. 
The Bot scanner dataset contains only Bot scanning packets (Internet Addresses 
Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  
The prototype components contain functionality specific to the Bot scanning dataset 
containing only SYN packets and retransmission packets.  The dataset does not contain non-
Bot scanning packets and thus the porotype does not summate or assess for network packets 
besides TCP SYN and retransmission packets.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
is a specific solution for only summating and accessing Bot scanning TCP SYN packets 
which are contained in the dataset. 
The prototype contains specific functionality for summation and assessment.  If 
additional functionality is need, then the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype needs to be 
modified.  Each individual PCAP file is summated for the number of Bots, potential new Bot 
Victims, SYN packets, and retransmission packets.  If summation requires tabulating different 
fields for the SYN packet, the summation component will need to be modified.  The 
assessment component is specific to the tabulated information stored in the database from the 
summation component or process.  If the summation is modified to include additional fields 
from the SYN packet, assessment component will need to be modified to include the 
additional fields for reporting and graphing.  The next sub-section presents future research for 
summating and assessing Bot scanning mechanism.       
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Future Research 
The previous sub-section discussed limitations for this study.  The Bot scanner dataset 
contains Bot scanning TCP SYN packets only.  The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype 
is specific to the Bot scanner dataset.  Additional functional requirements will cause 
modification of the summation and assessment components.  This sub-section presents future 
Bot scanning research. 
 This research filled a void regarding the Mirai botnet.  Experimentation is performed 
with the Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype to summate and assess a recorded Bot 
scanner dataset.  The prototype summates the dataset to tabulate the number of Bots and 
potential new Bot Victims.  Additional summation could be performed to determine the non-
vulnerable IoT devices.  The Bot scanner dataset contains retransmission packets.  A 
retransmission packet represents a destination IP address that has not responded to the SYN 
packet sent by the Bot.  To determine the non-vulnerable IoT devices, the retransmission 
packets could be analyzed to summate the unique destination IP addresses within the 
retransmission packets. 
The Mirai Bot Scanner Summation Prototype components contain functionality that is 
specific to the Bot scanner dataset (Internet Addresses Census dataset, IMPACT ID: USC-
LANDER/Mirai-B-scanning-20160601/rev5870, 2016).  Considering that assessment searches 
for summated records in the database, additional Bot researcher functionality could provide 
added insight into the Bot scanner dataset.  Future research could include the use of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) techniques, within the prototype components, for learning from the Bot 
scanner dataset.  Future research could include experimentation with the prototype that 
includes a different Bot scanning dataset.  The dataset could include Bot scanning and non-
Bot scanning network packets.  The prototype could be modified to account for the different 
network packets captured in a dataset.   
Researchers (Kolias et al., 2017) describe the operation and communication steps of 
Mirai.  The Bot brute-forcing is described as the Bot connecting to a potential new Bot Victim 
and then the Bot attempting to log into the potential new Bot Victim with a factory default 
user-id and password.  Currently the solution is focused on analyzing the network traffic of a 
Bot connecting to a potential new Bot Victim.  Future research could include identifying a 
Bot attempting to remotely log into a potential new Bot Victim.  Once a Bot brute-forces the 
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potential new Bot Victim, the logon information of the potential new Bot Victim is sent from 
the Bot to the report server (Kolias et al., 2017).  The prototype could be extended to identify 
a Bot communicating back to the C&C report server.  The other function of the Bot is to 
respond to C&C for executing DOS attacks (Kolias et al., 2017).  The solution could include 
identifying a Bot via C&C.  The solution could be modified to include additional network 
packet analysis for identifying a Bot based upon command and operational functionality.  The 
command and operational functionality including: A Bot remotely accessing a potential new 
Bot Victim with a factory default user-id and password, a Bot sending the logon information 
of the potential new Bot Victim back to the report server, and a Bot responding to a C&C 
request to execute a DOS attack.       
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